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University of Pittsburgh, 2015
The first chapter experimentally examine repeated partnerships with imperfect moni-
toring, where participants can unilaterally sever partnerships at any time. The experiment
examines effects from changes in the value of an outside-the-partnership option. We find
four main results where partners have access to the same outside option: i) the presence of
a dissolution option increases cooperation; ii) the use of dissolution is dictated by individual
rationality; iii) where dissolution is used as a punishment, subjects increases lenience, but
are still forgiving; iv) overall efficiency is non-monotone in the outside option. An exten-
sion examines asymmetric outside options finding: advantages to terminating first-movers
creates highly inefficient outcomes; a last-mover advantage is less inefficient but reduces
forgiveness; while an arbitrator-mechanism assigning higher payoffs to “more-deserving”
parties increases efficiency.
The second chapter experimentally investigates the effects from adding a simple and
intuitive stage before the start of a repeated partnership, where agents communicate about
strategies they intend to play. Varying the bindingness of the message sent in the preplay
communication, I examine the efficiency gain of adding these two communication institu-
tions and behavior of senders and receivers in each of them. I find that adding both forms
iv
of preplay communication increases cooperation and efficiency in the ensuing repeated
partnership. In particular, when the communication is binding, i.e. senders formulate
specify strategies as contracts, the efficiency of the repeated partnership is highest. More-
over, I find that more cooperative and lenient strategies are sent and receivers are more
cooperative in partnerships governed by contracts.
The third chapter analyzes the sales method for a sample of 575 M&A deals announced
between 1998 and 2012 and find that targets use auctions to increase the probability of
finding bidders that can relax their financial constraints rather than to create operational
synergies. Auctions, compared to negotiated deals, are associated with significantly higher
target announcement returns, especially for relatively small targets. Bidder returns are
positively related to auctions for bidders acquiring relatively small targets, not for the full
sample. Taking into account size differences, we find that auctions, decrease target gains
and increase bidder gains expressed in dollars.
v
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1.0 DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIPS IN INFINITELY REPEATED
GAMES
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Dissolving a relationship is a familiar, easy-to-understand dynamic response, and can
be readily incorporated as a future punishment threat to support cooperation today. It is
clearly a force in many repeated scenarios of interest to economists: Workers quit firms that
treat them badly, and are fired by firms that find them unproductive. Couples petition for
divorce if their marriages become unhappy. Consumers stop patronizing businesses where
they have had bad experiences, while firms refuse to deal with problem customer (schools
expelling students, insurers denying renewals). But in these examples participants also
have access to, and make use of, in-relationship punishments: Workers strike and conduct
slow-downs, firms demote workers, cut back hours, or withhold bonuses. Couples argue,
and atone for things they did not do. Businesses win back customers with steep discounts
after bad service, while consumers can retain access to firms by paying more (a donation
to the alumni fund, paying higher premiums). In environments where mistakes or bad
outcomes are inevitable, despite the best efforts of all parties, in-relationship punishments
allow for the possibility of forgiveness, and a return to cooperation, where leaving the
relationship does not.
Whether or not dissolution is preferable to in-relationship punishment for the individ-
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ual depends on several factors: What is the in-relationship punishment’s expected value,
can it recoordinate on an efficient outcome? How severe are the dissolution frictions (legal
costs, losses on the sale of illiquid jointly held asset, reputation shocks, etc.)? What is the
expected value from starting afresh in a new relationship (given equilibrium selection, and
accounting for the population available to rematch)? Are outside options fixed, and com-
monly available, or do they depend on the way the relationship ends? Such environments
have many moving parts, and the values to both remaining in the relationship and dissolv-
ing it are endogenous, leading to many possible equilibrium outcomes. To get a handle on
such a complex problem, our paper uses a laboratory study to examine selected outcomes
as we exogenously vary the outside-option value with exogenous, stationary rematching.
Using a fixed in-relationship stage game—a prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game with imperfect
public monitoring—our experimental treatments alter the possibility of/payoffs attained
by walking away.
In the static PD game, and in finitely repeated play, we have an inefficient equilibrium
outcome: both players defect, and the outcome is Pareto dominated by joint cooperation.
However, where interactions are repeated indefinitely, more-efficient equilibria become pos-
sible. Folk theorems tell us that with patient enough participants, all individually rational
payoffs can be supported in equilibrium Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)—each individual
can condition their future behavior, and so any deviations from the intended path today
will be punished tomorrow. The ensuing multiplicity in prediction has been addressed by
a recent and growing body of experimental work analyzing equilibrium selection, finding
strong support for conditional cooperation when players are patient enough. Moreover,
in experimental implementations with imperfect monitoring—where actions in the stage
game are unobserved, with outcomes providing an imperfect signal—results indicate sub-
jects have an affinity for lenient and forgiving strategies Fudenberg et al. (2010). Subjects
require multiple bad outcomes to enter a punishment phase (so they are lenient), while
punishment durations are short followed by a return to cooperation (so they are forgiving).
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Because signals are imperfect, entering a punishment phase eventually is unavoidable, even
with both parties cooperating. The selection of forgiving punishments therefore serves to
increase efficiency, as the relationship will not become mired in an inefficient punishment.
To these games, our paper adds an intuitive, empirically relevant punishment device, ending
the relationship, where terminating a relationship precludes forgiveness.
Whether or not dissolution is preferable to in-relationship punishment depends on sev-
eral factors: What is the in-relationship punishment’s value (and can it recoordinate on
efficient outcomes)? How severe are any dissolution frictions (legal costs, losses from illiq-
uid markets for jointly held assets, reputation shocks, etc.)? What is the expected value
from starting afresh in a new relationship (given the selected strategies, accounting for the
population available to rematch)? Such environments have many moving parts, and the
values to both remaining in the relationship and dissolving it are endogenous, leading to
many possible outcomes. To get a handle on such a complex problem, our paper uses a
laboratory study to examine selected outcomes as we exogenously vary the value of termi-
nating with exogenous, stationary rematching. Using a fixed in-relationship stage game—a
PD with imperfect public monitoring—our experimental treatments alter the possibility
of/payoffs attained by walking away.
The paper addresses two main questions: i) How does the presence of an option to walk
away affect efficiency, and how does it change as we alter the outside option’s value? ii)
What types of punishment are used to support cooperation at each outside-option value;
what triggers their use, and how does the presence of dissolution crowd-out the selection
of potentially more-forgiving in-relationship punishments?
A first set of experiments examines dissolution with symmetric payoffs to the partic-
ipants, where each has access to the same in-relationship actions/payoffs and the same
fixed outside option. Here the fundamental tension is the interplay between incentive
compatibility and efficiency of inside and outside the relationship punishments. A slight
strengthening of the folk theorem (weakly undominated, individually rational payoffs) im-
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plies termination should never be used when its value is lower than the expected value of
the in-relationship minmax (in our game, joint defection). Though its presence might alter
equilibrium selection, we should not see relationship dissolve along the path. In contrast,
once the dissolution payoff exceeds the expected in-relationship minmax, the effect is to
alter the individually rational point. Dissolved relationship are now expected to be ob-
served along the path. Our experimental results are mostly in line with this hypothesis.
When outside options are far below the in-relationship minmax (in which region, we can
think of termination as a form of costly punishment) we see very low rates of dissolution.
When very high, we see much more substantial rates of dissolution. However, in contrast
to the prediction, we observe large increases in termination use once outside options ex-
ceed the minimum realization attainable from the in-relationship minmax, rather than its
expectation.
In terms of the types of strategy used we find two main results: First, the presence of
termination increases the selection of initially cooperative strategies, even where termina-
tion is weakly dominated and is an unused action by most subjects. Second, as mentioned
above, once the outside option exceeds the minmax realization, strategies using termina-
tion become the focal form of punishments. Subjects utilizing termination punishments
are more lenient in entering punishment phase, but just as forgiving as those subjects
in treatments without termination or with much-lower outside options. This somewhat
counter-intuitive result is explained by the frequent selection of a compound-punishment
device we refer to as “probation” strategies. Here, the first part of the punishment is the
probation period, an in-relationship punishment (defection in the PD). Successful outcomes
in probation lead back to cooperation, so the punishment is potentially forgiving. On the
other hand, continued bad outcomes in the probation phase lead to the second part of
the punishment: dissolution. However, despite selecting forgiving strategies, the rate at
which intially cooperative strategies are used is mostly unchanged from other treatments.
Though observed cooperation rates in ongoing relationships do increase slightly with higher
4
outside options, this is an effect of attrition, as relationships with uncooperative players
are dissolved more frequently.
In terms of overall efficiency, our experimental results point to a non-monotonicity over
the outside-option value. Through an increased selection of cooperative strategies, the
presence of termination with a low payoff provides an initial boost to efficiency. From
the lowest outside option levels, efficiency increases with the outside option, until the
dissolution payoffs exceeds the minimal payoff from the in-relationship minmax. Ending a
relationship becomes a more plausible threat as the value increases, but its actually use is
infrequent. However, increasing the outside option beyond this point leads to much higher
rates of termination. Because using dissolution is fairly inefficient ex post, and we do
not observe increased cooperation, this leads to a large welfare drops. Increasing outside
options still further increase welfare again. The selection of cooperative strategies and the
usage of dissolution remain flat, while the ex post inefficiency on termination decreases
proportionally.
The symmetric outside-option treatments addressed the size of the pie on dissolution,
and provide a window into the effect of ex post frictions on ex ante outcomes in rela-
tionships. Our second set of treatments examines effects from changes to the relative
distribution on dissolution. Here we are motivated by relational contracts specifying how
assets/costs are divided when relationships are dissolved. Examples range from prenup-
tial agreements in marriages to LLP’s incorporation documents, consumer mortgages and
residential leases to joint-venture by firms; severance payments for fired workers and non-
compete clauses for ship-jumping employees. In these examples, contracting parties retain
rights to unilaterally void the contract, subject to the early termination costs/benefits
specified. Our second treatment set examines three plausible asymmetric divisions on
dissolution: i) an environment where the party terminating receives the larger amount; ii)
an environment where the party who is being terminated gets the larger amount; and iii)
an environment where an independent arbitrator/judge diagnoses “blame” for the partner-
5
ship’s dissolution, assigning the larger amount to the more-cooperative party.
Our findings in these asymmetric environments are stark. Rewarding the party ending
the relationship leads to a strong selection of termination from round one, despite expected
outside options being Pareto dominated by the in-relationship minmax. Relationships with
this type of division rarely seem to get off square one in our experiments. In contrast, in
what seems to be a more common arrangement in leases and labor contracts, an asym-
metric division rewarding the party being terminated substantially reduces termination
rates, though we do find reduced cooperation and fewer subjects using forgiving strate-
gies relative to comparable symmetric-payoff treatments. Finally, our simulated-arbitrator
treatment produces very high cooperation rates, leading to the most-efficient outcomes
across the studied environments. Subjects select lenient strategies, with high initial coop-
eration rates (where punishments exhibit similar forgiveness levels to other treatments).
Because subjects are highly cooperative, and lenient towards bad outcomes, the selected
strategies lead to lower dissolution rates than the symmetric treatments where terminating
strategies are selected. Despite dissolution payoffs with ex post inefficiency comparable to
our worst symmetric treatment, the asymmetric assignment produces the right marriage
between plausibility of the punishment’s use by cooperators, and the punishment power to
discourage deviations.
Below we briefly discuss the connection between our paper and the current literature.
Section 2 describes our experimental design and explores some of the theoretical predictions
in each of our seven treatments. Section 3 reports the results from the experiments, while
Section 4 discusses the results and concludes.
1.1.1 Literature
The folk theorem for repeated games with discounting is articulated in Fudenberg
and Maskin (1986), and shows that any feasible, individually rational payoff can be sus-
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tained in equilibrium when players are sufficiently patient.1 The theorem is construc-
tive and shows that cooperation can be supported by punishing deviations by minimizing
the maximum amount deviators can obtain, over a number of punishment round. Re-
peated games with imperfect public monitoring were initially studied with respect to cartel
behavior in dynamic Cournot-type competition. Firms receive imperfect signals of the
other cartel members’ quantity decisions from the market via prices (Porter, 1983), citep-
green1984noncooperative, but monopoly quantities can be implicitly supported by the car-
tel with high prices with market flooding punishments (Cournot quantity choices) whenever
the price gets too low. Further theory for imperfect monitoring is developed in Abreu et
al. (1986, 1990), where the authors demonstrate the simple structures that can support
optimal cooperation.
The closest theory paper to our environment is Radner et al. (1986), who study part-
nerships game with imperfect monitoring and positive discount rates.2 Their finding is
that the supergame equilibria are bounded away from full efficiency, uniformly over the
discount. Fudenberg et al. (1994) subsequently extends the folk theorems to infinitely
repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, articulating a condition (pairwise iden-
tification) on the monitoring technology for the folk theorem.3 The partnership game in
Radner et al. (1986), and our own stage game, fails this condition, and so points on the
feasible-payoff frontier are not attainable, even for δ → 1.
Given the endogenous endpoints (choosing to end the relationship) in our experiments,
our environment is more technically a dynamic or stochastic game Dutta (1995). That
is, we require an additional state variable that determines the particular stage game (here
whether or not a player has terminated before the current period), and this state variable
1For earlier work see references within Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), in particular Friedman (1971).
2In this version of the partnership game, monitoring is two-sided imperfect. In contrast, in the principal-
agent game in Radner (1985), imperfect monitoring is one-sided. See also Cole and Kocherlakota (2005)
for characterization of symmetric public-perfect equilibria attainable with finite memory strategies.
3Essentially the condition requires that players’ deviations can be statistically distinguished, so that
punishment can be optimally used.
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is endogenous, determined by players’ actions. In many dynamic games the focus is on
Markov perfect equilibrium Maskin and Tirole (2001), an equilibrium refinement where
strategies are conditioned only on the state variable. Given the simple binary nature of the
state variable in our experiments, and the complete lack of agency in one state (inactive
partnerships), our focus will instead be on a larger set of equilibria for our game, public-
perfect equilibria (cf. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)).
Theoretical models for dividing surplus on termination have focused on ex post division
of the partnership’s assets Cramton et al. (1987); Preston McAfee (1992).4 Comino et al.
(2010) posit that firms might strategically leave out explicit termination clauses to ensure
costly litigation on early termination, which is related to findings with low termination
values.5
Early experiments on infinitely repeated games showed that cooperation is greater when
it can be supported in equilibrium, but that subjects fail to make the most of the opportu-
nity to cooperate (see Roth and Murnighan (1978); Murnighan and Roth (1983); Palfrey
and Rosenthal (1994)). More recent experiments (Dal Bo´ (2005); Aoyagi and Fre´chette
(2009); Duffy and Ochs (2009)) have provided more positive results on subject’s ability to
support cooperation in infinitely repeated games. The theory on infinitely repeated games
listed above does not generically provide sharp predictions—the folk theorems predict no
specific payoffs within the individually rational set, without further refinement (for exam-
ple, symmetry and efficiency). Recent experimental evidence has made a contribution to
these equilibrium-selection questions. Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette (2011) study the evolution of
cooperation in infinitely repeated PD games, but they introduce a methodology for esti-
mating the strategies used. They find that in treatments where cooperation cannot be
supported in equilibrium, the level of cooperative strategies decreases with experience and
eventually converges to a fairly low level. When cooperation can be supported in equi-
4For an experimental examination of ex post dissolution see Brooks et al. (2010).
5See also Li and Wolfstetter (2010).
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librium, subjects fail to cooperate as much as they can, with Tit-for-Tat-like strategies
becoming more prevalent at higher discount rates, where the gains from cooperation are
highest.
Experiments have also studied noise/imperfect public monitoring in repeated games.
Fudenberg et al. (2010) study repeated PD games with noise (implemented as a proba-
bility that a selected cooperate choice is implemented by the computer as defect, and vice
versa) and find that successful strategies are “lenient” in not retaliating after a single de-
viation, and that many use “forgiving” strategies in order to return to cooperation after a
punishment phase. In a different setting, Aoyagi and Fre´chette (2009) examine imperfect
public monitoring by experimentally varying the quality of the public signal. Their main
finding is a rise in cooperation levels with increased signal quality. Embrey et al. (2011)
examine an environment with the most similar signal structure to our own paper, where
their experiments manipulate the game through the addition/subtraction of a third inter-
mediate action between the standard cooperate and defect, and the relative temptations.
Their paper’s aim is to examine the empirical validity of alternative equilibrium concepts
(in particular renegotiation proofness). Though they do not find much support for the
renegotiation predictions, they do find that it helps predict the selection of more-forgiving
strategies.
Experiments have also introduced punishments into the repeated PD game. Dreber et
al. (2008) study the option for temporary and costly punishment, where they find that the
existence of a punishment option substantially increases cooperation but not the average
payoff of the group. In our treatments with symmetric but low outside options, termination
is similar to costly punishment, though termination commits to an irreversible path and
cannot be used to realign non-cooperative agents. However, for higher outside options,
termination takes on a different role and adds equilibrium-selection questions.
Perhaps closest in motivation to our paper is Rand et al. (2011). They study coop-
eration in a structured network, where they examine the effects on the ability to change
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partners. Their paper examines termination and re-partnering as a punishment/selection
device, but where the value of terminating is endogenously determined. They find that
when subjects update their network connections frequently, cooperation is maintained at
a much higher level through endogenous selection. Our own paper seeks to map out the
effects of exogenous changes to the outside-option/punishment on cooperation, where we
do not allow new links to form.
Another related experimental paper is Hyndman and Honhon (2014), where they ex-
amines preferences for flexibility over termination options (though here in a coordination
game). They find that subjects show a slight preference for flexibility in ending the rela-
tionship. However, subjects over-use the termination option, with too much sensitivity to
short-term noisy outcomes. Our own paper indicates much more forgiveness, with subjects
more willing to delay termination after a bad outcome.
1.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS
1.2.1 Repeated Partnership Game
Our experimental game has two players engaged in a repeated joint-production task
with imperfect public monitoring, similar to that in Radner et al. (1986). In every round
t of their interaction, each partner i simultaneously chooses a private action ati ∈ {C,D}.
Given the resulting action profile at = (at1, a
t
2), a public signal Y
t ∈ {Success,Failure}
is realized and observed by both players, alongside their round payoff ri(a
t
i, Y
t). The
probability of a Success signal each round is a function of the selected actions, and the
expected round payoff to partner i given the action profile (a1, a2) is
ui(a1, a2) = Pr {S |(a1, a2)} · ri(ai, S) + (1− Pr {S |(a1, a2)}) · ri(ai, F ).
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The partnership continues indefinitely under an exponential discount rate δ, so that the
discounted-average expected payoff for the partnership is
Wi
({
at1, a
t
2
}∞
t=1
)
= (1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1ui(at1, a
t
2). (1.1)
Table 2.1 indicates the payoff realizations ri(ai, Y ) and the conditional success rates
Pr {S |a} chosen for our experiment, where the resulting expected payoffs make clear that
the stage-game is a PD in expectation.6 The game can be thought of as two partners
making choices over their individual effort levels into a jointly held venture (with C being
high effort). The two partners equally split a $5 firm revenue on a success and $2 revenue
on a failure. If either chooses to put in high effort they individually incur an additional $1
cost. Higher efforts increases the likelihood of a successful outcome: if both players expend
effort there is a 98 percent chance the outcome is success; if both players put in low effort
the probability of success is just 10 percent; if one exerts high effort and the other free
rides the success probability is 50 percent.
Our main experimental treatments modify the repeated game above by adding a third
action to the game, which allows either partner to unilaterally dissolve the partnership. If
either party chooses this third action, T (ermination), no further action choices are made
by either partner in subsequent rounds,and both parties receive a fixed payoff. Our exper-
iments will focus on two types of termination: i) symmetric termination payoffs to each
partner (piT , piT ); and ii) asymmetric payoffs on termination (pi, pi), with the assignment of
the the higher payment (pi > pi) dictated by players’ actions.
6The game is therefore a prisoner’s dilemma where outcomes are simple lotteries. Under constant relative
risk-aversion there are no risk parameters that would reverse the PD ordering on the stage-game payoffs.
Under constant absolute risk aversion, the risk aversion coefficient would need to be between 1.5 and 2.4
(for payoffs in cents) to induce a different ordinal game; consistent preferences at this level would require
experimental subjects to take 50¢for sure over an even gamble between zero and a million dollars.
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Table 1.1: Stage-game payoffs
Payoff, ri(ai, y) Pr {Success |(ai, aj)} Expectation, ui(ai, aj)
y: aj : aj :
Success Failure C D C D
ai:
C 150 0 0.98 0.5 147 75
D 250 100 0.5 0.1 175 115
1.2.2 Experimental Specifics
In Appendix B.1 we include more detailed instructions and screenshots of the interface
used, but we here summarize the experimental design choices. The design is between
subject: students are recruited for general economic experiments, and placed in sessions
with exogenous and fixed assignment of treatment, the particular payoff on termination.
Subjects participate in sessions of 12–16 subjects, at the start of which they are provided
with instructions (a representative example of which is included in Appendix B.1) which
were read aloud.
As asking subjects to provide infinite choice sequences is infeasible, the experiment mir-
rors an infinitely-repeated game with exponential payoff discounting through an exogenous,
stochastically determined end point. That is instead of scaling down the payoffs receive
the next period and onward by a factor δ = 45 , we scale down the probability of obtaining
any additional amount in the next and subsequent rounds, and retain the same stakes.
After every round of the game where the partnership is still accumulating payment, there
is a 15 probability that payment for the supergame will end, and
4
5 that it continues. The
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agents expected discounted-average payoff from the supergame is given by (1.1), as the
probability of getting to round t ∈ {1, 2, . . .} is given by δt−1. Subjects are paid the sum
of their realized round payoffs ri(a
t
i, Y
t) or (after a dissolution) their round termination
payoffs piT , up to point where the partnership payment exogenously stops.
This method for implementing repeated games (exogenous stochastic termination) with
no fixed horizon goes back to Roth and Murnighan (1978) and has been used extensively
in experimental studies of dynamic behavior. One drawback to using a stochastic endpoint
is that observed relationships can be very short, where such short interactions offer limited
power to assess the strategies being used. To increase the length of the observed partner-
ships in the experiment, we use a block design Fre´chette and Yuksel (2013). Subjects are
only informed on when/whether the partnership payment has ended after every block of
five rounds. That is, at the end of every round the computer rolls a 100-sided die, common
to all subjects in a session. The first round where the die-roll exceeds 80 is the last round
for which we pay subjects. However subjects only observe the outcomes from these rolls
after rounds 5, 10, 15, etc.. If all five rolls are less than or equal to 80 the game continues
to another block of five rounds, otherwise the partnership ends and payment is made on
all rounds up to the first die-roll over 80.
We will refer to each experimental supergame, a repeated partnership with another fixed
individual, as a “cycle.” At the end of each cycle, subjects are randomly and anonymously
rematched, and they begin a new cycle. Sessions continue for at least an hour (excluding
the time taken to read instructions). The first cycle to end after an hour is the end of
the session. Two cycles are randomly chosen for payment. By design, each cycle in the
experiment has the same duration for all participants, whether the partnership is dissolved
or not. Subjects cannot influence their time in the laboratory, nor can they increase
their payoffs by playing more cycles. However, one potential concern we had was that
subjects might not use the termination option as they have no actions to take if they
do. To mitigate this, our experimental design has each subject participating in two cycles
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concurrently (this method is also used in Hauk and Nagel (2001)).7 To facilitate these two
concurrent partnership, the matching protocol in each cycle randomly and anonymously
forms subjects into a circle. The subjects’ two cycle partners are the session participants
clockwise and counterclockwise from their position in the randomly formed circle. In
this way, we minimize the ability a subject has to affect their clockwise partner through
actions they take with their counterclockwise partner. In addition, all elements of the
design are held constant across treatments except the treatment variable, the availability
of termination, and its payoff when chosen.
1.2.3 Termination Institutions
Theoretically, endogenous dissolution introduces a state variable into the partnership,
that can be either Active or Inactive, where the transitions between states are determined
by participants’ choices. Our experimental game is therefore a stochastic game with im-
perfect information. However, because the Inactive state is absorbing (once a partner
terminates the game never returns to the Active state) and degenerate (no players have
any available choices over their actions here) this particular stochastic game is fairly simple.
We will focus on examining choices in the Active state, and we will use standard infinitely
repeated game concepts for our analysis.8
1.2.3.1 Symmetric Termination Payoffs Our first set of treatments consider an in-
stitution where the two partners receive the same payoff piT if the partnership is dissolved.
Interpretations for this are a partnership with assets having a net value of 2 · piT on dis-
7Referred to as Partnership Red and Partnership Blue within the experiment, both partnerships are
affected by session-wide realizations for the exogenous end of payment. However, the probability of Success
and Failure in each partnership depends only on the partnership-specific actions chosen, and are independent
of all other outcomes in the experiment.
8N.B. The only pure-strategy Markov perfect equilibria for this dynamic game involves always defecting
or always terminating, depending on the termination payoff piT .
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solution, where the partners equally split the proceeds, or that each partner anonymously
re-enters some stationary matching market for new partnerships with an expected outcome
net rematching costs of piT . The effects from the addition of the termination option to the
partnership game is to change the sets of feasible and individually rational (IR) payoffs.
Generically, the feasible payoffs are the convex hull of the expected stage-game outcomes
in the Active state and the termination payoff vector (piT , piT ).
In terms of individual rationality, the addition of termination complicates things. Be-
cause termination can be unilaterally imposed there are weak Nash equilibria of the game
where both parties terminate in round one, regardless of the value piT .
9 Because of this, our
focus here will be on a refinement: individually rational outcomes of the game attainable
in weakly undominated strategies.
Given the weakly undominated restriction we will examine two cases: when piT <
ui(D,D) and piT ≥ ui(D,D), where the extra-relationship payoff is below and above the
in-relationship minmax. In the first case, any strategy involving termination is weakly
dominated by the same strategy with D-forever after replacing any termination action. In
the second case, because termination can be unilaterally imposed any discounted-average
payoff less than piT is not individually rational. So, weakly undominated individual ratio-
nality yields the following testable hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. When piT < ui(D,D), termination is not used and the expected discounted-
average payoff vector satisfies (W1,W2) ≥ (u1(D,D), u2(D,D))
Hypothesis 2. When piT ≥ ui(D,D), the expected discounted-average payoff vector satis-
fies (W1,W2) ≥ (piT , piT )
Hypothesis 1 is slightly more amenable to experimental tests than Hypothesis 2, as it
precludes termination as an observed action choice, whereas the defect action can still be
chosen along the path when piT ≥ ui(D,D) (but only in transition to playing C again,
or where the other player uses termination). Hypothesis 2 does have a complementary
9Note, this does require a fixed division of the termination payoff. If, for example, the person who
initiates dissolution gets a lower value pi, the (T, T ) equilibrium will not hold.
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prescription, that both players cannot play Always Defect after any history.10
uiHD,DL uiHD,CLuiHC,CL
uiHD,DL
uiHD,CL
uiHC,CL
Figure 1.1: Feasible, Weakly-Undominated–Individually-Rational and Equilibrium payoffs-
No Termination
10N.B. For all values of piT > u1(D,D) the asymmetric strategy pairing (Always Terminate, Always
Defect) constitutes a weakly undominated equilibrium outcome.
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pT uiHD,DL uiHD,CLuiHC,CL
pT
uiHD,DL
uiHD,CL
uiHC,CL
Figure 1.2: Feasible, Weakly-Undominated–Individually-Rational and Equilibrium payoffs-
Termination lower than joint defection
pTuiHD,DL uiHD,CLuiHC,CL
pT
uiHD,DL
uiHD,CL
uiHC,CL
Figure 1.3: Feasible, Weakly-Undominated–Individually-Rational and Equilibrium payoffs-
Termination higher than joint defection
These two hypothesis are illustrated graphically in Figure 1.1, Figure 1.2 and Figure
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1.3. In each figure the lighter gray polygon represents the set of feasible discounted-
average expected payoffs, while the darker-gray region is the set of weakly undominated,
individually rational expected payoffs. The first figure (1.1) illustrates the partnership
game without a termination option, figure ( 1.2) the game with a termination payoff of
piT < ui(D,D) (in particular piT = $0.75), while figure ( 1.3) illustrates the case where
piT > ui(D,D) (in particular piT = $1.25). In addition to the IR payoffs, Figure 1.1-Figure
1.3 also indicates the expected payoffs possible from all symmetric equilibria using 3-state
machines (with further details provided in section 1.2.4 below).
Given that the expected discounted-average payoff from joint defection is $1.15 in our
stage game, our main symmetric treatments focus on termination values of piT = $0.75 and
piT = $1.25, which we label as S-75 and S-125 respectively, where we run three independent
experimental sessions for each. To contrast the behavior when termination is available we
also conduct three sessions where the termination action is not available (a treatment we
will refer to as No T ). In addition, to understand substitution between termination and de-
fection as a punishment we run one session each for piT ∈ {$0.85, $0.95, $1.05, $1.15, $1.35} ,
(with the treatment labels S-100 · pi). In Section 1.2.4 we specify further restrictions over
strategies, however, we first introduce our asymmetric treatments.
1.2.3.2 Asymmetric Termination Payoffs Our second set of treatments examine
the same repeated partnership game with a dissolution option, however the two partners
here receive different payoffs on termination. One partner receives a high payoff amount
pi, while the other gets the low payoff, pi .Which partner gets which payoff is decided by
the actions preceding termination. All of our treatments with ties on the assignment-rule
break them with a fair coin, so the expected payoff on a tie is pˆi = 12pi+
1
2pi for both players.
In general, the asymmetric division could depend on the entire available history{
at1, a
t
2, y
t
}T
t=1
up to the point of termination. There is subsequently a huge constellation
of asymmetric division rules. Our focus will be on the three rules and parametrizations,
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which to our minds, are both strategically interesting and policy relevant:11
Asymmetric First: this treatment assigns a higher payoff to the party ending the
relationship, and the lower payment to the party being terminated, where we label this
treatment A-First. The treatment is motivated by partnerships where parties that exit first
are best prepared, or where last-movers are left stuck with large debts/costs. There are
recent examples of law and accountancy firms, incorporated as partnerships, which upon
hitting hard times saw large-scale partner defections to rival firms (one would assume
bringing with them many of their previous firms’ clients).12 The treatment mirrors this
tension, a strong belief that the other will leave the partnership makes leaving yourself a
best response.
Unlike the symmetric cases, joint-termination cannot be removed by appealing to weak
dominance for any pi > pi. Each partner strictly prefers to end the relationship if they
believe the other is going to too. In particular, we will examine the case where the
discounted-average value of joint termination, pˆi = 12pi +
1
2pi, is lower than $1.15. The
treatment therefore alters the weakly undominated individually rational point to (pˆi, pˆi), an
equilibrium outcome that is Pareto-dominated by the in-relationship minmax.
The addition of this inefficient equilibrium might not matter if subjects are able to
coordinate on different equilibrium strategies. However, asymmetric division with a first-
mover advantage has another negative effect compared with comparable partnership games
with symmetric outside options. Per the above, the set of weakly undominated IR payoffs in
the symmetric game is {Feasible}∩{(u′, u′′) |u′, u′′ ≥ max (pˆi, ui(D,D))}. However, because
of the asymmetric division and absorbing nature of dissolution, any feasible payoff outside
11An interesting institution which we have not pursued is asymmetric fixed division, where player one
gets pi with certainty on dissolution. Theoretically, this is not too different from the symmetric division
discussion above, but can allow for ‘abusive’ equilibria where player one uses the threat of termination to
produce asymmetric outcomes such as (D,C).
12For instances: Arthur Andersen LLP, saw huge partner defections after the Enron accounting scandal
broke; Howrey LLP, a global law firm dissolved itself in 2011, but witnessed extensive partner defections to
competing firms before this point.
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of {(pˆi, pˆi), (pi, pi), (pi, pi, )} involves some positive probability of both players not terminating.
As such, any expected payoffs to the player in (pˆi, pi) cannot be enforced, as terminating
in the first round would produce a strictly better outcome. Where pi > ui(D,D), the
asymmetric division has the effect of removing any equilibria which rely on punishment
phases with continuations in (ui (D,D) , pi), any pure-strategy equilibria of the game using
termination must do so jointly.
Given the above, our parametrization for this treatment chooses dissolution payoffs of
pi = $1.25 and pi = $0.75. Joint-termination in round one is Pareto dominated by Always
Defect, but pi > ui(D,D), so the high termination payoff creates a meaningful restriction
on the equilibrium set as Always Defect cannot be an equilibrium punishment. However,
the chosen parametrization does allow for equilibria with initial cooperation supported by
joint-termination on failure.
Hypothesis 3. In the A-First treatment the discounted-average payoff vector either sat-
isfies (W1,W2) > (pi, pi) or involves joint termination in round 1 and (W1,W2) = (pˆi, pˆi).
Asymmetric Last: Our second asymmetric treatment A-Last is the mirror of A-
First, assigning the higher payoff to the party who has been terminated, and the lower
payoff to the partner choosing to terminate. Individual rationality is now dictated by the
point max {pi,min {pi, ui(D,D)}}. Each player can guarantee themselves the higher of: i)
the lower termination payoff pi if they choose to end the game themselves, or ii) if they
switch to defect forever, the other partner can force them to take the minimum of the
joint-defection payoff or the high termination value pi.
This treatment is designed to mirror contract clauses that specify the party initiating
early termination incur additional costs. Many employment contracts allow for severance
payments (“golden parachutes” for executives) if the firm voids the relationship. If the
contract is voided by the employee this severance payment is not made (in the other
direction, employees who walk away might have to adhere to non-compete agreements,
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reducing their outside options). This might induce employees in faltering relationships to
seek termination by the other party, rather than quitting themselves.13
Unlike the A-First treatment, A-Last does not have joint-defection as an equilibrium
outcome, as each partner does strictly better by defecting if they believe the other will
terminate. Cooperation cannot be supported by joint termination, and so equilibrium pun-
ishments must use some defection by at least one player. When pi < Ui(D,D), the weakly
undominated IR set is identical to the symmetric termination games with piT < Ui(D,D) .
In order to focus on the tension between ending the relationship oneself vs having the other
player terminate, our treatments use the parametrization pi = $1.25 and pi = $1.35. Given
this, unilaterally dissolving the partnership is better than joint-defection forever, but each
partner strictly prefers that the other party is the one terminating. Individual rationality
is therefore defined by the low-termination payoff of $1.25, where the weakly undominated
IR set is the same as the S-125 treatment. However, the equilibrium sets do differ, which
we discuss in more detail below.
Hypothesis 4. In the A-Last treatment the discounted-average payoff vector satisfies
(W1,W2) ≥ (pi, pi)
Asymmetric-Judge: Our final asymmetric treatment is motivated by arbitration-
hearings after a relationship ends. A judge/arbitrator (through some perfect, possibly
costly, forensic process) obtains access to the complete history
{
ak1, a
k
2, y
k
}t
k=1
, not just the
public history. She assigns the higher dissolution payoff to the party that cooperated most.
That is, once one player chooses termination in round t, the judge examines the action
sequence
{
ak1, a
k
2
}t
k=1
, and assigns the higher termination payoff to player i and the lower
payoff to player j if
t∑
k=1
(
1
{
aki = C
}
− 1
{
akj = C
})
> 0.
13An alternative non-equilibrium interpretation is that the party firing/quitting/jilting the other does
so publicly. This public signal could plausibly affect their ability to recruit new partners/gain subsequent
employment when rematching, so forcing the other party to leave is preferable.
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We will call this our A-Judge treatment, and it is intended to mirror an institution where a
third party chooses a division of assets, taking into account the partners’ behavior. Exam-
ples of this institution are: divorce settlements, where judges might take into account the
behavior of each party when dividing assets and custody of children, and labor arbitration
hearings, where firms and workers abide by the third-party’s decision.
The institution has the intuitive effect of increasing the outside option for cooperating
players, and decreasing it for deviators. Termination punishments therefore make devia-
tions more costly, while entering the punishment is more palatable to cooperators. However,
in-relationship punishment becomes less useful, as resorting to it can be detrimental, as
those being punished can cooperate, and then and seek arbitration.
Technically, this treatment induces a somewhat complex stochastic game, with an im-
perfectly observed, endogenous state, the cooperation-difference ωt =
∑t−1
k=1 1
{
ak1 = C
}−
1
{
ak2 = C
}
. Each agent observes their private history {aki , Y k}t−1k=1, from which they up-
date their beliefs about ωt, which influences their expected payoff from taking the action
ati = T . For a patient enough player, individual rationality can be shown to be arbitrarily
close to pi.14 However, it is beyond the scope of the present work to examine the game for
arbitrary δ. Our focus will be on the strategies human subjects use in this environment,
and whether they can be rationalized. We think this environment is well motivated both
by observed institutions, and through the highly cooperative play we will document within
it. However, as we mention below, none the simple set of strategies we will examine (nor
non-trivial extensions) are equilibria of the A-Judge game.
Hypothesis 5. In the A-Judge treatment the discounted-average payoff vector satisfies
(W1,W2) ≥ (pi, pi).15
14Each player can specify a strategy that cooperates initially. After every period it calculates the proba-
bility of the observed sequence of outcomes under the null that the other play is cooperating. The strategy
terminates if the probability of the observed sequence drops below some pre-specified confidence level α?.
So long as α? is small enough and δ large enough, ex ante this strategy guarantees an amount close to pi,
regardless of the other player’s choices.
15N.B. We present here the hypothesis for δ → 1. When δ = 4
5
the individual rational payoff is
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1.2.4 Equilibrium Strategies
D
All
Figure 1.4: Simple three-state machines with Termination-Always Defect
C D
Failure
Success All
Figure 1.5: Simple three-state machines with Termination-Grim Trigger
C D
Success
Failure
Success Failure
Figure 1.6: Simple three-state machines with Termination-Mono
T
All
Figure 1.7: Simple three-state machines with Termination-Always Terminate
strictly lower, between [101.7,115.0]. Given arbitrary strategies σi and σj for the two players, and ex-
pected discounted-average payoff of Wˆi(σi, σj). The two bounds on minσi maxσi Wˆ (σi, σj) come from:
101.7 = minσj Wi(σˆi, σj) for the player strategy σˆi which plays two periods of initial cooperation then
terminates after the first failure; and 115.0 = maxσi Wi(σi, σˆj) for the strategy σˆj of Always Defect.
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Failure
All
Success
Figure 1.8: Simple three-state machines with Termination-1 Strike
C D
T
Success
Failure
All
Success
Failure
Figure 1.9: Simple three-state machines with Termination-Probation
The above outlines fairly broad hypotheses using just weak dominance and individual
rationality to produce lower-bound predictions on the payoffs possible in any equilibrium
of the game, for arbitrary δ. We now look more constructively for simple equilibria of these
games under δ = 45 . Our focus will be on the following restricted, but cognitively simple
set of equilibria: weakly undominated, symmetric, stationary, public-perfect equilibria
(wSSPPE), which can be represented as finite machines. That is, we will look for strategies
of the game that depend only on the public signal in the last round Y t−1 and a finite number
of internal states. The machine’s chosen action at each point in time is dictated by its
internal state, and the transition between these states depends only on public signal (S or
F ) and the internal state last round. For simplicity, we here examine only those machines
with three internal states C, D and T , where the three states are connected to the actions
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cooperate, defect, and terminate, respectively. By discussing only the strategies that fall
into this small category we hope to illustrate the broad effects on the types of equilibria
possible from changes to the outside option. In our data analysis, we will consider a larger
constellation of machines, and asymmetric pairings between them.
Because termination is an absorbing state by construction, the set of 3-state machines
in our setting has 81 distinct entries.16
In terms of theoretical prediction, from those 81 possible machines, just three form
wSSPPEs when the symmetric outside option piT is less than $1.15 (or when dissolution
is not present). These three machines are depicted in the Figure 1.4- Figure 1.6, and
correspond to the strategies (1.4) Always Defect, (1.5) the Grim Trigger, and (1.6) the
Mono(tone) strategy, where we have highlighted the most-efficient starting state in gray.17
When the value of termination is strictly greater than $1.15 the set of equilibria changes,
Always Defect is now replaced by the strategy (1.7) Always Terminate as an equilibrium,
while the Grim Trigger is replaced by its termination complement (1.8), which we will refer
to as 1-strike. However, the forgiving Mono machine remains a symmetric equilibrium so
long as the value of termination is not too much greater than $1.15. As the termination
value increases past $1.24, Mono stops being an equilibrium—the continuation value in
the D state falls below the dissolution option piT , so the punishment is no longer sub-game
perfect. As the value of termination increases further still (beyond $1.31) the 1-strike
strategy drops from the equilibrium set too, as defecting in the C state becomes profitable
as the dissolution punishment lacks power.18,19
16The C and D states each have two edges, with three possible destinations, so there are 34 = 81 possible
machines, where the machines can start in any state
17If we look at the set of all two-state machines without termination (allowing for asymmetric matchings
between different machines) there are four equilibria (unique up to state relabelings): symmetric Always
Defect, symmetric Mono starting in either the Cooperate or Defect state, and symmetric Grim Trigger.
18Moreover, once the value of termination crosses $1.32, the only perfect equilibrium of any form for
δ = 4
5
is Always Terminate.
19In addition to the existence of differing equilibria, when termination increases in value past $1.15, the
comparable risk-dominance orderings of the equilibria change. Introduced in Blonski and Spagnolo (2004)
and applied by Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette (2011), risk dominance has been a useful measure to predict subjects’
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Other than Mono, of the 81 machines we consider there are no other forgiving wSSPPEs
for any termination value piT—strategies capable of returning to cooperation after entering
a punishment phase.20 The only forgiving machine with incentive-compatible cooperation
using both dissolution and the D action in the punishment path is the Probation strategy
illustrated in Figure 1.9.21 However, despite the punishment supporting cooperation, the
strategy is not a wSSPPE as the punishment phase is not incentive compatible. Best-
responding agents will deviate to play C (or T if piT is large enough) where the strategy
specifies the D action. This is because of a much higher probability of returning to the
high-payoff cooperation state if they deviate to C (a 50 percent chance) as opposed to
D (a 10 percent chance). Other simple forgiving strategies such as Win-stay-lose-shift
(WSLS) and the unconditional one-round-punishment (T11) lack incentive compatibility
for cooperation, as continuation values in the in-relationship punishment are too high.22
The asymmetric-division treatments have similarly stark predictions. For A-First just
two of the three-state machines are wSSPPE: Always Terminate and 1-Strike. In the
A-Last treatment, none of these 81 machines are symmetric equilibria, though asymmet-
ric combinations such as Always Defect/Always Terminate and Grim/1-Strike are w(no
S)SPPEs. Finally, in the A-Judge treatment, none of the 81 machines, nor any asymmet-
ric pairing are PPEs of the game. The A-Judge game requires much more sophisticated
asymmetric strategies to form an equilibrium outcome (in particular mixed strategies with
response in perfect monitoring environments. Among the three equilibrium strategies for piT < $1.15 (Grim,
Mono and Always Defect), we find that Always Defect risk dominates Grim, which in turn risk dominates
Mono. Where piT ≥ $1.15, Mono and 1-strike both risk dominate Always Terminate, which dominates
Always Defect.
20No “lenient” strategies are possible without allowing for additional states that play the C action.
21A variant of the Probation strategy which exchanges the Success and Failure arrows in the D-state is
also not an equilibrium, though here because cooperation is not incentive compatible when the termination
value is weakly greater than $1.15, and for lower values the termination action is weakly dominated.
22There are many asymmetric equilibria when pi = $1.15, involving combinations of Defection and Ter-
mination. Once the termination value increases to $1.25 all conditionally cooperative asymmetric equilibria
combining the 81 machines involve at least one player using a variant of 1-strike. For example, one player
use the Suspicious 1-strike that starts at Defect, moves to Terminate on a failure, and to the standard 1-
Strike Cooperation state on a success; and the other player can use Suspicious-Grim (replace the T action
in Suspicious 1-strike with Always D).
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a corresponding belief update rule over the game state ωt).
1.3 RESULTS
We have conducted 20 sessions at the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory.
A total of 291 subjects, recruited from the University of Pittsburgh general subject pool
participated in the experiment. For each session we recruited 18 subjects and ran with
at most 16 from those attending the session, with an average of 14.6 subjects per session.
Subjects earnings ranged from a minimum of $5 to a maximum of $77.75, where this
includes a $5 guaranteed show-up payment. Table 2.2 summarizes the experiments carried
out and subject numbers per session.
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Table 1.2: Experiment Summary
Treatment Sessions Subjects Cycles Cycle Length Activity Active Choice Freq.
Avg. Max (t ≥ 2) C T |not C
S-75 3 14,16,13 21,23,24 4.3 21 0.936 0.580 0.018
S-85 1 16 12 7.8 17 0.940 0.494 0.014
S-95 1 16 24 4.6 17 0.867 0.739 0.066
S-105 1 16 23 4.4 9 0.699 0.583 0.115
S-115 1 16 18 2.4 6 0.778 0.537 0.098
S-125 3 12,16,14 18,20,17 5.1 20 0.624 0.607 0.143
S-135 1 16 21 5.0 21 0.572 0.536 0.129
No T 3 14,15,14 17,23,23 4.3 21 1.000 0.409 0.000
A-First 2 16,11 19,16 4.5 25 0.096 0.415 0.811
A-Last 2 14,15 24,20 6.0 13 0.775 0.519 0.072
A-Judge 2 11,16 13,20 5.7 25 0.790 0.834 0.142
Note: Number of cycles are given for each session, cycle lengths are in terms of payment rounds, observed
rounds are nearest multiple of five above the final payment round.
1.3.1 Choices and Efficiency
We first examine aggregate choice behavior through some simple sample-averages, to
illustrate broad patterns in the data. To start we look at the choice proportions within
each treatment, aggregating over sessions, subjects, cycles and rounds. We then exam-
ine the within-session evolution of behavior, analyzing subject behavior as subjects gain
28
experience with the environment. Next, we illustrate the patterns for within-cycle dynam-
ics, comparing the cooperation and relationship activity in the first and fifth rounds of
each cycle. Finally, we illustrate how these choices affect final outcomes, examining payoff
efficiency across treatments, and comparing this to the hypotheses produced from weak
dominance and individual rationality.
1.3.1.1 Aggregate Choices and Relationship Activity The last three columns in
Table 2.2 summarize sample averages for a nested series of binary outcomes. The Activity
column summarizes the fraction of rounds t ≥ 2 where the state is Active, where neither
player has yet dissolved the partnership (all rounds are active by design in round 1).
Where the state is Inactive, subjects had no choices to make, so the next two columns
present choices conditional on the round being active. The penultimate column presents
the cooperation rate in active partnerships. Finally, conditioning on both the round being
active and that the subject chose not to cooperate, the last column illustrates the fraction of
non-cooperative choices that terminate the relationship, with the residual being defections.
Aggregating all the symmetric treatments with the termination option available, sub-
jects choose to cooperate 59 percent of the time, where the sample probability of coop-
erating varies mostly between 50 and 60 percent (the single S-95 session is an outlier at
74 percent). Using session-level averages for Active Cooperation, we fail to reject equiv-
alence using Mann-Whitney tests across the symmetric treatments.23,24 Rather than raw
cooperation rates, the main change across the symmetric treatments is over which non-
cooperative action is selected. This is seen in the table through an increased termination
rate as pi heads past $1.00 (and a matching reduction in activity). In treatments with
23All remaining tests in this section are one-sided Mann-Whitney tests using session averages against the
small-sample U -distribution. We use this fairly conservative test to illustrate patterns, though for some
comparisons the test is underpowered and cannot reject at the 10 percent level (any 3 session vs 2 session
test), and so we will there examine tests against sessions from contiguous S-X treatments.
24For instance, we fail to reject a null of equivalence between S-75 and S-125 (three session observations
for each), while there is no significant relationship between treatments with outside options lower than $1.15
and treatments with values equal or greater than or equal to $1.15 (six and five sessions, respectively).
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piT > $1.00 subjects who have chosen not to cooperate end the relationship 10–15 percent
of the time. In comparison, for dissolution payoffs between $0.75 and $0.95, the uncooper-
ative subjects end the relationship between one and seven percent of the time. Examining
session-level averages, all three S-75 treatments have lower termination rates (and higher
activity rates) than the three S-125 treatments, so we can reject equivalence at the five
percent level (p = 0.050).
However, a part of Hypothesis 1 (produced through risk-neutrality, weak dominance and
individual rationality) proscribes termination as an observed action whenever piT < $1.15.
Because this is a boundary prediction, the quantitatively small termination rates in S-75
and S-85 might be attributable to choice errors. However, given the size of the errors in
S-75–85, the observed termination behavior in the S-95 and S-105 sessions are statistically
larger (p = 0.066). With enough risk-aversion, one could rationalize observed termination
in S-105, however, for S-95 the termination payoff is lower than the minimal realization
from choosing D, a payoff of $1.00, so the Termination action is stochastically dominated
by defecting forever.
In contrast to the S-X treatments, in No T, where termination is not an available
action, the cooperation rate is significantly lower at 40 percent. We can reject equivalence
in cooperation between No T and the symmetric-termination treatments S-75 –135 (p =
0.011).25 Given the absence of a termination option in No T, all non-cooperative actions
are necessarily defections, so there are no useful comparisons beyond cooperation.
The last three rows in Table 2.2 present the same data for the asymmetric treatments.
In the A-First treatment the most obvious difference to the symmetric treatments is the
very low activity rate (and correspondingly high use of termination). Indeed, the two
25Cooperation rates are also significantly lower in the No-T treatment compared to the symmetric treat-
ment blocks where the weakly undominated IR hypotheses differ, S-75–105 and S-115–135 (p = 0.048
and p = 0.018, respectively). However, the test fails to reject when comparing the three sessions of No-T
against the three sessions of S-75 (p = 0.200), as the minimally cooperative session from S-75 is smaller
than the maximally cooperative session from No-T.
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A-First sessions–where the partner who terminates gets a constant $1.25 round payment
to their partner’s $0.75—have the two lowest activity rates across the 20 experimental
sessions. The observed activity rates drops below ten percent. Testing equivalence for
termination/activity against any four other sessions (for instance, S-125 –135 ), we reject
in favor of greater termination and inactivity in A-First (p = 0.066). Though the overall
cooperation rate in the Active state does not seem very low, at just over 40 percent, this
figure oversamples pairs of cooperators who manage to get to an active round 2, where the
vast majority enter Inactivity in round two onward. The raw termination rate in the very
first round of each cycle is approximately 70 percent here. Given the round-one termination
rate and independent matching, this explains the approximately 90 percent inactivity rate
in rounds two and beyond, as 1− (1− 0.7)2 ≈ 0.9.
In contrast, for A-Last, where those terminating receive the smaller payoff of $1.25,
compared to their partner’s $1.35, the observed activity rates are much higher. In fact
both sessions have a higher activity rates than any session from S-125–135.26 The small
asymmetry in termination payoffs leads to relationships with longer durations. However,
the institution does not have increased cooperation. In fact the average active cooperation
rate is lower than both S-125 and S-135 (though not significantly so).
Finally, the last row in Table 2.2 provides data for the A-Judge treatment. Here we find
the highest cooperation rates across all of our sessions. where 83 percent of the time the
chosen action in an active partnerships is to cooperate (underpowered with p = 0.101 for
tests against the S-75 /S-125 /No-T in isolation, but p = 0.018 against the nine session from
the three treatments pooled together). Activity rates also indicate more-active partnerships
(p = 0.066) than the symmetric treatments with high termination values S-125–135, and
lower rates (again, p=0.066 ) than the low-termination-value treatments S-75—95.
Result Summary 1. Results at the aggregate level indicate:
26Termination rates are statistically lower (higher activity) when compared to the four pooled sessions
of S-125–135.
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 As symmetric termination rates increase there is no significant effect on cooperation,
but activity (termination) rates decrease (increase) with the outside option piT .
 The presence of dissolution increases cooperation.
 Asymmetric treatments that reward players ending the relationship produce very high
termination rates, while those that reward the player being jilted lead to low termination
rates.
 The asymmetric division that favors the more cooperative player leads to very high
cooperation rates and relatively low inactivity.
1.3.1.2 Session Dynamics We here summarize the dynamics within sessions, provid-
ing more detail in Appendix B.0.1 for interested readers.
Result Summary 2. Across sessions the data indicates:
 Reduced cooperation in No T relative to the symmetric termination treatments emerges
quickly.
 Cooperation rates fall across all treatments’ sessions except A-Judge, which exhibits
increased cooperation.
 The direction of the trend in termination use depends on the outside option piT . When
above (below) the lower-bound realization for joint defection ($1), the termination rate
increases (decreases) across the session.
 Subjects converge quickly within the session toward dissolution in round one of the
A-First cycles.
1.3.1.3 Cycle Dynamics Figure 1.10 illustrates the general patterns in response across
cycles, comparing behavior in round one (the gray markers) and round five (white mark-
ers) within each cycle. The gray triangles indicate the average cooperation rate in round
one (active in all cycles), while gray circles illustrate the termination rate in round one
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Figure 1.10: Actions and Activity across Cycles
(with the residual being defection choices). This behavior in round one of the cycle can be
contrasted with the white shapes, indicating inactivity (white diamonds) and the active co-
operation rate (white squares) by the cycle’s fifth round. In addition, a table in Appendix
B.0.2 provides greater detail on across-cycle response by providing the five-most-popular
sequences of action-outcome pairs across cycles.
For S-75–95 we observe reduced active cooperation across the cycle, but the vast ma-
jority of cycles are still Active in round five. In contrast, for S-105–135 the pattern is
reversed: the active cooperation rate increases across the cycle, but 40–50 percent of the
cycles Inactive by this point.27 In comparison to the symmetric termination treatments,
the No T treatment starts out with lower cooperation, and the drop-off in cooperation
27The active cooperation rate within-cycle differences are significantly smaller (p = 0.016) when compar-
ing S-75–95 to S-105–135, however, the relationship is not significant when comparing just S-75 and S-125
(p = 0.200).
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across the cycle is comparable to that in S-75 –95.
For our asymmetric treatments, the clearest effect is the very high termination rate
in the first round of A-First cycles (70.1 percent), and low initial cooperation rate (24.3
percent). Matching this we find very high inactivity by the fifth round (94.6 percent),
though for those partnerships which do survive to the fifth round, the cooperation rate
is fairly substantial (84.0 percent cooperation for the 50 partnerships still active in round
five). Second, within A-Last, despite observing similar initial cooperation rates to the
comparable symmetric treatments (S-125–135), we observe the opposite within-cycle re-
sponse: many more cycles are still Active in round 5, and the active cooperation rate drops
across the cycle. Finally, the A-Judge treatment has very high cooperation rates in active
relationships, with little drop-off across the cycle. However, compared to the symmetric
treatments where termination is frequently used (S-105 –135 ), the A-Judge treatment has
a substantially lower fraction of Inactive cycles by round five.
Result Summary 3. Within cycle we find:
 Decreasing active cooperation rates for treatments where termination is not used ( S-
75–95, No-T).
 Where termination is used ( S-105–135), active cooperation increase across the cycle,
though this is potentially driven by selection, as uncooperatinve relationships become
inactive.
 In asymmetric treatments, A-Judge sustains high cooperation across the cycle, while A-
Last is the only treatment with substantial termination use where the active cooperation
rate falls across the cycle.
1.3.1.4 Payoff Efficiency We now examine payoff efficiency and the hypotheses from
individual rationality and weak dominance detailed in section 1.2.4. Our efficiency mea-
sure will be the sample discounted-average payoff for cycles in the experimental treatment,
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relative to the discounted-average payoff from the in-relationship minmax ($1.15). This is
then normalized by the difference in discounted-average payoffs between mutual coopera-
tion and mutual defection ($1.47 − $1.15 = $0.32). The payoff efficiency for a particular
subject-cycle is therefore
Υ
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Taking sample averages for Υ across all subject-cycles we illustrate the payoff efficiency
by treatment in Figure 1.11. For each treatment, the figure indicates the discounted payoff
efficiency across all cycles as the larger gray diamond, where the error bars indicate a 95-
percent confidence region for this mean. In addition to the overall discounted average, we
illustrate the average payoff efficiency for round one on its own, and rounds five onward as
white circles and triangles. Payoff components from Hypotheses 1–5 (alongside an upper-
bound from the best wSSPPE efficiency attainable, per section 1.2.4) are illustrated as the
shaded region. Examining the lower and upper bounds on efficiency, all of our treatments
except S-135 fall within the identified region (for the discounted-average, as well as in
rounds one and rounds four onward). With the exception of S-135, we therefore fail to
reject any of the IR hypotheses.28
28Given δ = 4
5
, the unique equilibrium payoff in S-135 (all equilibria involve at least one player terminating
in the first round) coincides with the IR payoff, producing a payoff efficiency of 62.5 percent. The sample-
average efficiency in the S-135 session is significantly lower at 56.5 percent, where a bootstrap indicates
values greater than the IR prediction with probability 0.043. However, examining the discounted-average
payoff from rounds five onward, the average efficiency in S-135 is 60.8 percent, with a 0.362 probability
the mean is larger that 62.5 percent. Rounds two–four drive the lower average, and the discounted-average
efficiency across these three rounds is 44.8 percent, reflecting a high degree of (C,D) and (D,D) choices
(expected efficiencies of 31.3 percent and 0 percent, respectively).
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Figure 1.11: Payoff Efficiency by treatment
Note: Shaded areas represent lower-bound from individual rationality hypotheses (achievable with Always
Defect or Always Terminate in majority of treatments), and upper bound from best symmetric pure-
strategy memory 1 wSSPPE. For A-Judge, the indicated region represents a lower bound on the IR level at
δ = 4
5
, upper bound indicated at full efficiency. Error bars indicate 95 percent confidence region for mean
payoff-efficiency calculated with a bootstrap of size 5,000.
For the symmetric termination treatments, five out of seven generate significantly higher
efficiency than No-T : S-75 —95, S-125 and S-135 when we examine averages over all
subject-cycles.29 The pattern in the figure indicates increasing efficiency as the outside
option increases from 75 to 95, stemming from increased cooperation. However, a sharp
drop in efficiency occurs at S-105, as subjects begin to use the (here highly inefficient)
termination action more frequently. From here efficiency increases with the termination
value, where this is driven by increasing payoffs from termination, rather than increased
cooperation rates (seen by greater slope of the shaded region lower bound).
For the asymmetric treatments, the lower-bound efficiency in A-First is negative, as
29However, there is substantial variation at both the session and subject-levels.
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symmetric Always Defect Pareto dominates symmetric Always Terminate. Moreover, as
we have detailed, termination from the very first round is both an equilibrium outcome and
the modal experimental response. As such this treatment generates the worst outcomes
among all our treatments. The A-Last treatment performs similarly in efficiency terms
to the comparable symmetric treatments (S-125 and S-135 ). However, where most other
treatments start out with higher efficiency and decrease consistently over the cycle, the
A-Last treatment initially falls, then begins to increases again once the partnership is
old enough. Finally, A-Judge generates the highest efficiency among all our treatments,
however it also generates the highest drop-off in efficiency across the cycle.
Result Summary 4. In terms of efficiency we find:
 Across all treatments except S-135 we fail to reject our weakly undominated, individually
rational hypotheses.
 In total efficiency terms, the best treatment is A-Judge and the worst is A-First.
 Efficiency is not monotone in the outside option, where a middle region where termi-
nation is frequently used (but highly inefficient) reduces welfare.
 The majority of the symmetric treatments ( S-75–95 and S-125-135) are more efficient
than No T.
 Efficiency falls as the cycle progresses in almost all treatments.
1.3.2 Strategy Estimation
This section investigates the strategies adopted by subjects within each treatment.
We use the methods detailed in Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette (2007), referred to as the Strategy
Frequency Estimation Method (SFEM, also used in Fudenberg et al. (2010); Embrey et al.
(2011)).30 To use the SFEM method we specify a set of 38 strategies, motivated both
30In addition to this, Appendix B.0.2 provides a comparable reduced-form analysis of the data, looking
at the one-period conditional response. This appendix effectively estimates an aggregate level memory-one
public strategy (with probabilistic transitions).
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by theory and the previous experimental literature. Given the strategy-set restriction, and
an econometric error term (an independent probability of mistakes when implementing a
strategy), we estimate the proportions of play for each strategy with a maximum likelihood
approach, using data from the last six cycles in each experimental session. Appendix A
outlines the method in more detail and reports full estimation results over the 38 strategies.
We focus here on providing the broad families of strategy used, and the modal strategy
selections.
Table 1.3 reports the proportion of estimated strategies that exhibit: i) initially co-
operative behavior; ii) the possibility for ongoing cooperation; iii) lenience in response
to failure; iv) forgiving punishment phases; and v) punishment phases with termination
components.31 In addition to these broad groupings, the table also indicates the three
most-popular strategies in each treatment, and their estimated incidence.
31Possibility of cooperation is defined by there existing a future-round m and a sequence of public out-
comes such that the strategy cooperates in all rounds n > m. A lenient strategy is any machine with
a cooperative state that points to another cooperation state in both outcomes. A forgiving strategy is a
machine with a defect-state which can transit back to a cooperation state. A terminating strategy is any
machine which enters the Inactive state with positive probability.
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Table 1.3: Strategy Classifications (Last six cycles)
No T S-75 S-125 A-First A-Last A-Judge
Initial C 52.5% 64.8% 59.8% 7.2% 54.8% 96.3%
Ongoing C 58.4% 64.9% 55.2% 0.0% 51.0% 88.9%
Lenient 10.4% 29.2% 40.9% 0.0% 24.0% 69.5%
Forgiving 27.0% 15.9% 33.7% 0.0% 10.5% 34.0%
(+ All-C) (32.6%) (33.7%) (33.7%) (0.0%) (24.1%) (61.9%)
Terminating 0.0% 7.2% 53.9% 92.8% 11.5% 28.6%
Popular All-D (34%) All-D (31%) All-D (19%) All-T (93%) All-D (36%) All-C (28%)
Strategies Grim (26%) Grim (24%) Probation-21 (17%) CDCD (7%) Grim (25%) Mono-31 (25%)
Mono (7%) All-C (18%) 2-Strike (12%) – All-C (14%) 2-Strike (13%)
In No T, where termination is not an option, the most-common strategies are always
defect (All-D), the grim-trigger (Grim), and the monotone strategy (Mono). Just ten
percent of the selected strategies exhibit lenience (All-C and the Sum-2 strategy that co-
operates if more successes have been observed than failures), while 27 percent are forgiving
(primarily the Sum-2, Mono and WSLS strategies). However, just over half of the re-
sponses are initially cooperative, while 58.4 percent of the selected strategies are capable
of sustaining cooperation.
In comparison to No T, the S-75 treatment adds termination as an available action,
but theory indicates its use is weakly dominated. Here the SFEM estimates indicate just
7 percent of selected strategies use termination, where this figure is much higher than the
figures suggested by a reduced-form approach. The reason for the differing incidence is
that the terminating strategies indicated by SFEM are the conditionally cooperative 2-
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and 3-Strike responses. These lenient strategies require two or three failures to trigger
dissolution, and otherwise cooperate. As such, termination is used less frequently along
the path, despite a higher incidence of subjects selecting strategies with termination as a
punishment.
The S-75 treatment is more cooperative than No T (both initially, and in selecting
strategies capable of ongoing cooperation) and has greater lenience, and so is more likely
to remain at cooperation. The primary driver for this is a much larger proportion of
subjects assessed as using the most cooperative strategy from the 38 specified, the All-
C strategy. Always cooperate is selected at the expense of two forgiving strategies, the
suspicious variants of Mono and WSLS (termed S-Mono and S-WSLS in Appendix A
estimation tables) that start out in the defection state. Because All-C has no punishment
phase it is not classified as a forgiving strategy. Potentially, what has been classified here
as All-C, are in fact just very lenient, conditionally cooperative strategies. Because of
the excessive lenience, the particular paths of play may not identify the punishment, and
subsequently whether the punishment is forgiving or not. As such, below the Forgiving
row we also provide the fraction of forgiving strategies including All-C.
Increasing the outside option from $0.75 to $1.25 has the effect of substantially increas-
ing the selection of terminating strategies. Fifty-four percent of selected strategies use
termination along the path, where the most-common termination strategy is a Probation
variant. Labeled Probation-21, this initially cooperative strategy is lenient with an addi-
tional cooperation state after the first failure, and a round of defection after the second
failure, but terminating on the third failure. Success in any of the probation parts of the
punishment moves the state back into the first cooperation state. As such the strategy
is both cooperative, lenient, forgiving and terminating. The estimates reflect an approxi-
mately 21 percent incidence of the 1-, 2- or 3-strike strategies, where the most commonly
chosen of the three is the (lenient) 2-strike at 11.5 percent. Our estimates indicate that
S-125 is in fact more lenient and more forgiving (weakly if we include All-C as forgiv-
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ing) than either No T or S-75, where forgiveness is driven by the 17 percent selection of
Probation-21.
For the asymmetric treatments, the clearest selection is also obvious from the aggregate
levels, the heavy use of Always-T in the A-First sessions, with 93 percent of subjects
consistent with this strategy. In A-Judge, where active cooperation rates and efficiency
are highest, the threat of arbitration induces high frequency of selection for All-C (27.9
percent) and a very lenient and forgiving monotone-strategy variant (Mono-31 ), with three
cooperation states and a final defect state after four sequential failures. The vast majority
of selected strategies are initially cooperative, and 89 percent are capable of sustaining
cooperation given successes. Of the small minority that do play non-cooperative strategies,
the most common are the false cooperator (C-AllD) which cooperates in round one, and
then switches to always defect, the standard All-D, and the strategy which alternates
between C and D regardless of the public outcome (CDCD), with each strategy selected
at a three to four percent incidence. The majority of selected strategies are lenient and (if
including All-C ) forgiving.
Finally, examining A-Last, the small asymmetry in dissolution payoffs ($1.25 vs $1.35)
leads to a much smaller incidence of terminating strategy selection. With the exception
of A-First, the A-Last treatment has the lowest selection of cooperative strategies and
the least forgiving responses. Always defect is selected 36.0 percent of the time, with the
next most common strategy being the non-lenient, non-forgiving Grim. Comparing the
selected strategies to S-125, we see a drop from just over half of strategies selected using
termination to approximately one in ten. Of the terminating strategies that are selected,
the most common is to terminate in the very first round (All-T at 5.8 percent) followed
by the D-2-strike strategy at 3.4 percent (play D until two failures are observed, after
which terminate).32 Though the selected strategies are less likely to be terminating ones,
32A war-of-attrition style mixed-strategy wSSPPE exists for A-Last where each player defects with prob-
ability 0.758 and terminates with probability 0.242 with a discounted-average value of $1.262. Moreover, a
Grim-like cooperative wSSPPE exists where this mixed-strategy is used as the punishment path following
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the lack of lenience or forgiveness in the selections mean that dissolution is triggered more
often. To illustrate this, the table indicates close to two and half times the incidence of
terminating strategy selection for A-Judge over A-Last. But the inactivity rate for rounds
two and beyond in A-Last exceeds that of A-Judge.
1.4 CONCLUSION
We experimentally investigate a series of prisoners’ dilemma games with imperfect mon-
itoring. Introducing a termination option into the PD stage game that can unilaterally end
the relationship, our experiments manipulate the outside options available to the players.
Our first set of treatments examine the effect from varying the outside option symmet-
rically, where each partner receives the same payoff if the relationship dissolves. Here we
contrast the observed outcomes to an imperfect-monitoring environment without a disso-
lution option. Our findings suggest that the use of termination as a punishment is directly
related to the outside option’s value: if remaining in an uncooperative relationship stochas-
tically dominates walking away, subjects rarely end the relationship. However, the presence
of a dissolution option does increase both cooperation, and the lenience of the strategies
used. Without a termination option, the cooperative strategies selected are rarely lenient,
with punishment phases triggered by a single failure. In contrast, the selection of lenience
increases by a factor of three to four in our main symmetric treatments with a termination
option.
Moreover, we do not observe drops in the selection of forgiving strategies. Where
outside-options dominate the in-relationship punishment, we do see a majority of subjects
using terminating strategies. Despite the use of the intrinsically unforgiving termination
a failure.
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action, forgiveness does not decrease. The reason for this is a large proportion of sub-
jects combining both in-relationship and dissolutions punishments. The selected probation
strategies initially use in-relationship defections to punish, and in this phase are capable
of returning to cooperation. The second-stage of the punishment uses termination only
after continued bad outcomes. By using more sophisticated combinations of punishments,
subjects retain the ability to forgive and therefore return to the cooperative path.
Our results do differ slightly from hypotheses generated from weak dominance and
individual rationality. Ending a relationship is a weakly dominated action whenever the
outside-option value is lower in expectation than the in-relationship minmax. However, we
begin to observe termination use at significant frequencies below this level. Our results sug-
gest a substitution toward terminating strategies whenever outside options are not stochas-
tically dominated by staying within the relationship. Once the outside option exceeds the
lowest individually-rational realization (as opposed to its expectation), we see higher rates
of termination and relationship inactivity, increasing through sessions as subjects learn to
use termination more often. Below this level, we see much-reduced termination use and
inactivity, and this decreases over sessions. This leads to a non-monotonicity in observed
efficiencies with respect to outside options. As outside options increase, their plausibility
as punishments increases, which helps increase cooperation and therefore efficiency. How-
ever, because the termination rate increases so much at the minimal realization, we see
large welfare losses: subjects are using a very costly form of punishment. Further increases
to the outside option, decrease the costs of the termination punishment, and we again
see increasing welfare. The results suggest an optimal friction for the dissolution process
(incompleteness in contracts, costs in trials, etc.). These costs should be small enough to
make the punishment just plausible enough to be a threat, but large enough to make the
vast majority unwilling to use this option in all but the most extreme cases.
Our second set of treatments make payoffs on dissolution asymmetric, with one part-
ner getting a higher payoff depending on the choices made while the partnership was
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active. Three simple institutions are analyzed: the party that terminates gets a higher
payoff; the party being terminated gets a higher payoff; and, finally, the party that was
more cooperative in the partnership gets the higher payoff. The effect from changing the
asymmetric institutions are striking. Where first-movers have a payoff advantage, we see
almost all subjects move towards termination in the very first round. Partnerships are
very unlikely to get off the ground. The precise dissolution payoffs chosen actually result
in outcomes Pareto dominated by the in-relationship minmax (itself dominated by mutual
cooperation). In contrast, where the party being terminated receives a higher payoff, we
observe a large drop in the fraction of subjects using termination, relative to comparable
symmetric treatments. The quantitatively small asymmetry in dissolution payoffs leads to
lower initial cooperation rates, and selected strategies selected that are less forgiving and
lenient that those in the comparable symmetric treatments. Neither of these two asym-
metric treatments indicate an efficiency gain from contracts specifying unequal divisions
on dissolution.
However, our final asymmetric payoff treatment, A-Judge, is the most successful among
all of our treatments. Selected strategies are mostly cooperative, forgiving and lenient, re-
sulting in the high efficiency levels. This institution determines who receives the higher
and lower dissolution payoffs by determining who cooperated the most within the relation-
ship while it was active, and treatment mirrors an arbitrator or judge determining how
to distribute payoffs (through some moral remit to assign it to the more-deserving party).
In our experiments this judge player is automated and has access to a perfect forensic
process. Future research might examine the extent to which the highly efficient outcomes
we observe are retained when the arbitrator is a human subject without a set division rule
and/or with imperfect information on the two player’s actions. Such extensions will help
gauge the robustness of this result, and may help guide remits for arbitration. Further
to the discussion above, ex post inefficiencies can be useful to increase ex ante efficiency,
and our A-Judge treatment has an expected dissolution payoff across the partners equal
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to the lowest realization for the in-relationship minmax. This low efficiency ex post allows
for potentially very costly arbitration discovery hearings. Unlike the symmetric treatment
with a comparable average dissolution payoff (S-105, representing comparable dissolution
frictions), asymmetric division and assignment to the more-cooperative player combines a
highly plausible threat, with far-greater punishment effect on deviators. The effect is large
gains in cooperation rates, and reduced need to use the punishment. These gains are more
than enough to offset the large costs when dissolution does occur.
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2.0 COMMUNICATION IN INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Communication is a prevalent form of interaction before a relationship convenes. In
numerous scenarios of economic interest, agents communicate before they enter into a
relationship: companies talk to workers about how they plan to behave before employment
starts. Couples talk about life plans before marriage ensues. Partners discuss what each
of them would do before they start a company. In some of these examples, communication
is binding: companies sign contracts with workers on their promised behavior. Hence,
deviation from promised behavior is costly. In contrast, in other examples, communication
is non-binding: couples in general do not formulate contracts on their future behavior
but rather rely on verbal commitments. Here deviation does not entail any cost. In
these scenarios, the relationships are simple manifestations of the classical social dilemma,
where individuals are faced with tradeoffs between individual benefits and group welfare.
Communication, as a process of exchanging information and beliefs among individuals,
might enhance efficiency in these social dilemmas.
The economic value of communication in dynamic, ongoing relationships depends on
several factors. First of all, it depends on the binding power of the message. When the
message is not binding, i.e. the talk is cheap, it depends on whether it is in the sender’s
best interest to signal and actually execute the efficiency-enhancing plan of actions. If it
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is, the message is credible to the receiver. When the message is binding, i.e. the cost of
deviating is large enough, then it becomes a sequential decision problem where the sender
directly selects and executes plans of actions in her best interest after which receivers
best respond. In these two cases, the level of strategic uncertainty also varies. Cheap-
talk partially reduces strategic uncertainty-it hinges on the likelihood that the message
affects beliefs. On the other hand, fully-committed talk, i.e. a contract, removes all
the strategic uncertainty. Besides this important determinant, several other factors also
matter for the success of communication: attractiveness of the “secure” plan of action to
the “risky” one, fixed matching protocol and information feedback,etc.. To understand
how Cheap-talk and contracts create or destroy value, I conduct a laboratory study to
examine selected outcomes and mechanics of the communication in a repeated partnership.
A repeated partnership is abstracted with an infinitely repeated game with a fixed stage
game-a prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game with imperfect public monitoring. Moreover, I
exogenously vary the existence of communication institution and the binding power of the
message in presence of communication. When a communication institution exists, prior
to each repeated partnership, it transits information unilaterally: a specific plan of action
that the sender intends to carry out. A sender does not need to commit to the plan in a
Cheap-talk but has to be fully committed to the plan in contracts.
In the static and finitely repeated PD game, mutual defection is the equilibrium and
both players end up at this inefficient outcome. When repetitions are of indefinite horizon,
more equilibria with efficient outcomes emerge. The classic folk theorem states that as
long as agents are patient enough, all individually rational payoffs above mutual defection
can be supported as equilibria (Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)). The theory does not
provide further predictions as to the selection among these multiple equilibria, nor does it
say how certain behavior is supported. Recent experimental evidence has explored which
outcomes are selected, finding that agents fail to coordinate on the efficient outcome even
under stringent conditions (equilibrium action, risk dominance) in repeated interactions
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but efficient equilibria can be supported when agents are patient enough or the payoff from
cooperation is high enough. Moreover, in environments with imperfect monitoring, where
actions in each stage game are unobservable and outcomes provide an imperfect signal, the
previous literature (see Fudenberg et al. (2010)) finds that subjects tend to employ lenient
and forgiving strategies. Subjects require multiple bad outcomes to enter a punishment
phase, while punishment durations are short followed by a return to cooperation.
The above infinitely repeated games can be structured as symmetric coordination games
with Pareto-ranked equilibria, a variant of the classic stag-hunt game. The concept of
(pairwise) risk dominance by Harsanyi and Selten (1988) can be applied in the repeated
game context to rank strategies (see Dal Bo and Frechette (2014)): Strategy A dominates
Strategy B if A is a best response to the other play randomizing 50-50 between A and B. In a
simple infinitely repeated PD game, if we focus on all two-state machines, suppose we have
three equilibrium strategies: Always Defect (AD), Grim (G) and Tit-for-tat (TFT). Under
some payoff structures, we can have TFT Pareto dominates G, which dominates AD. On
the other hand, AD risk dominates G, which dominates TFT. Therefore the repeated game
is reduced to an one-shot coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. For this class
of games, an extensive experimental literature has explored the role of communication
in improving coordination (for reviews, see Camerer (2003) and Devetag and Ortmann
(2007)). In particular, games with tradeoffs between Pareto efficiency and payoff security
has been widely studied (Van Huyck et al. (1990); Cooper et al. (1990)). Among them,
Cooper et al. (1992a) find that without communication the risk-dominant equilibrium tend
to prevail. With Cheap-talk where players send a message about their desired actions, they
tend to coordinate on the Pareto-efficient equilibrium.
In the environment of this study, however, assessing the coordination value of costless
preplay communication raises a number of new questions. First of all, in the canonical stag-
hunt game, the efficient equilibrium becomes the focal point with communication because
it is a single action for the sender to choose and for the receiver to best respond with.
48
However in a repeated partnership, the efficient equilibrium comprises a strategy, i.e. a
series of actions. Behaviorally, it makes the efficient equilibrium less salient: it comprises
of actions as functions of a sequence of outcomes for senders to choose and for receivers
to best respond with. In this situation, subjects might tend to choose less efficient but
more salient strategies. Hence, whether preplay communication improves efficiency remains
to be examined. Second, a message here is a plan of action for the entire forthcoming
partnership. Therefore, as receivers go through the stage games, they learn the outcomes
as noisy signals of senders’ actual actions. Such informational feedback is partial and noisy,
as compared to the full information feedback in coordination games explored in previous
studies (e.g., Berninghaus and Ehrhart (2001); Brandts and Cooper (2006)), which was
found to be efficiency-enhancing in repeated coordination games. Whether or not such
noisy information feedback still improves efficiency remains an empirical question. Finally,
messages of strategies create another dimension of behavior as to the role of communication
in coordination: how the message of a plan of action affects the receiver’s beliefs as it is
verified repeatedly through the partnership. In summary, Cheap-talk does not change the
set of equilibria but is likely to improve the coordination and efficiency. The value creation
process, however, remains to be investigated. On the other hand, in the contract setting,
the efficiency effect is straightforward: it hinges on whether the sender’s best strategy is
socially optimal or not.
In summary, the study addresses two main questions: i) Does preplay communication
increases the cooperation and efficiency in a repeated partnership? ii) Which communica-
tion institution generates higher efficiency and how are more efficient outcomes reached?
Moreover, I pay attention to the information transmission in each institution: the set of
messages sent, senders’ deviations from the messages (in Cheap-talk) and receiver’s re-
sponses to the messages. The main result from the experiment confirms the conjectures:
both communication institutions increase cooperation and efficiency relative to the baseline
communication-free environment. Second, I find contracts generate higher in-relationship
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cooperation and efficiency than cheap-talk. Specifically, I find that actual cooperation of
senders and receivers after both cheap-talk and commitment are higher than in the baseline.
In cheap-talk, the actual cooperation from senders is lower than the implied cooperation
(from the message) but the deviation rate is only about 10%. In response, receivers are less
cooperative than senders by 10%. In contracts, senders’ cooperation is higher than those
in cheap-talk. Moreover, receivers are less cooperative than senders by only about 5%.
In terms of types of strategies selected, I separately analyze them in cheap talk and con-
tracts, for senders and receivers. For both institutions, senders send four main strategies
to receivers: AD (Always Defect), GRIM, T11 (One-period punishment) and AC (Al-
ways Cooperate). Among the strategies, AC is the most frequently sent message in both
treatments: it was sent 47.5% and 65.7% of the time in Cheap-talk and Contracts respec-
tively. Senders’ deviations from these strategies in Cheap-talk are about 5%. Receiver’s
responses against AC are different as well. In Cheap-talk, the most common responses are
AC (30.4%), AD (11.7%) and MONO21(13.9%) while those in contracts are AC (44.8%)
and MONO22 (26.4%). For other strategies sent, except for AD, receivers’ strategies are
more cooperative and lenient in both institutions.
The results from the experiment suggest some departures from the theory. In Cheap-
talk, receivers’ behavior seems to be sensitive to the messages sent, and so sending messages
conveying a dynamic response (one that will defect in some situations) can lead to the re-
ceivers focusing on the defection elements. On the other hand, sending the most cooperative
message AC helps receivers focus on coordinating on efficient outcomes. In Contract, where
receivers respond to a commitment, the AC contracts offered by senders can be thought of
through the lens of the trust game. By offering to always cooperate, they are exhibiting
a large degree of trust in the receiver in the hopes of getting the most efficient outcome.
Though receivers have the option to extract the maximum possible payoff, for the most
part they repay the trust shown in them through the offered AC contract by cooperating
themselves.
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Below I will first examine how my paper is connected to the current literature. Section
3 describes the game setup and explores some of the theoretical predictions. Section 4
presents the experimental design, followed by the report of results in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2.2 RELATED LITERATURE
2.2.1 Infinitely Repeated Games
The well-known folk theorem for repeated games (Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)) states
that any feasible and individually rational payoff can be sustained in equilibrium when
players are sufficiently patient. Repeated games with imperfect public monitoring are ini-
tially studied in dynamic Cournot competition settings, where firms see prices as imperfect
signals of cartel members’ joint quantity decisions, via (Porter (1983);Green and Porter
(1984)). They find that when monitoring is imperfect, players have to enter a punishment
phase of mutual defection to support any degree of cooperation, which is a stark difference
from games of perfect monitoring.
The environment in this paper is closest to Radner et al. (1986), which studies the
partnership game with two-sided imperfect monitoring and positive discount rates. The
finding is that the supergame equilibria are bounded away from full efficiency uniformly in
the discount rate. Fudenberg et al. (1994) subsequently extend the folk theorem to infinitely
repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. They state the pairwise identification
condition for the folk theorem, which requires that players’ deviations can be statistically
distinguished, so that punishment can be optimally used.
Early experiments on infinitely repeated games showed that cooperation is greater when
it can be supported in equilibrium, but that subjects fail to make the most of the oppor-
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tunity to cooperate (see Roth and Murnighan (1978);Murnighan and Roth (1983);Palfrey
and Rosenthal (1994)). More recent experiments (Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette (2011); Aoyagi and
Fre´chette (2009); Duffy and Ochs (2009)) have provided more positive results on subject’s
ability to support cooperation in infinitely repeated games. Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette (2011)
study the evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games and
find that when cooperation cannot be supported in equilibrium, the level of cooperative
strategies decreases with experience. When cooperation can be supported on equilibrium,
subjects fail to cooperate as much as they can, with Tit-for-Tat type strategies becoming
more prevalent at higher discount rates and when the gains from cooperation are highest.
Experiments have also studied noise/imperfect public monitoring in repeated games.
Fudenberg et al. (2010) study the repeated prisoner’s dilemma with noise (implemented
as a probability that a selection of cooperate is implemented by the computer as defect)
and find that successful strategies were ”lenient” in not retaliating after a single devia-
tion, and that many used “forgiving” strategies in order to return to cooperation after a
punishment phase. In a different setting, Aoyagi and Fre´chette (2009) find that a rise in
cooperation levels with increased quality of the public signal. Embrey et al. (2011) studies
the role of renegotiation concerns in supporting cooperative equilibria. They find that a
significant number of subjects reduce their level of cooperation in response to the addition
of renegotiation concerns. It should be noted that they add stage-game communication
into the experiment and find it to lead subjects to use more forgiving strategies to support
cooperation, even in cases when such strategies are not incentive compatible. WILSON
and WU (2014) investigates the effects from adding a termination action to a repeated
partnership. They find that indicates selecting between in-relationship punishments or
walking-away are dictated by individual rationality. Moreover, where dissolution is used
to punish bad outcomes, subjects commonly use a compound punishment, with a forgiving
probation phase before termination is used.
Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette (2013) implements a strategy choice method prior to each re-
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peated game to identify the set of strategies subjects employ. They ask subjects to design
strategies that will play in their place and find that the strategy elicitation has negligible
effects on behavior. They also find that the strategies elicited include some commonly
mentioned strategies, such as tit-for-tat and grim trigger. In my experiment, I use a
slightly more complex but general strategy elicitation method, which will be discussed in
the experimental design section.
2.2.2 Preplay Communication
This paper is also related to the literature on preplay communication (i.e. Cheap-talk)
1The theory of coordination via preplay communication starts from Farrell (1987, 1988) and
Rabin (1991). Their analysis pose two conjectures: that preplay communication will yield
and effective agreement to play an equilibrium in the underlying game; and that the agreed-
upon equilibrium will be Pareto-efficient within that game’s set of equilibria. Further
they show that rationalizable preplay communication need not assure equilibrium; and
that, although communication enhances coordination, even equilibrium with “abundant”
communication does not assure that the outcome will be Pareto-efficient. Farrell and Rabin
(1996)summarizes the theory on Cheap-talk and defines the types of messages existent in
preplay communication: self-commiting and self-signaling messages. A message is self-
commiting when it is optimal for the receiver to take the proposed action when the message
is believed. A message is self-signaling when it is optimal for the sender to take the proposed
action if the message is believed. They suggest that a self-commiting and self-signaling
message is highly credible and therefore can enhance coordination, but even unlimited
communication does not reliably lead to a Pareto-efficient outcome.
There is also a large experimental literature on preplay communication in coordina-
tion games. Two early studies suggest that coordination is a common phenomenon in the
1see Crawford (1998), Camerer (2003) and Devetag and Ortmann (2007) for related surveys
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laboratory, namely, Cooper et al. (1990, 1992b). Cooper et al. (1989) consider two-player
Battle of the Sexes with preplay cheap-talk. They find that coordination rates are much
higher with one-way communication than with two-way communication and also that the
sender in the one-way communication sends his favorite message, thereby inducing coor-
dination on his favorite outcome, with a very large frequency. Cooper et al. (1990) finds
that in games with conflict, one-way communication increases play of the Pareto-dominant
equilibrium relative to the no communication baseline; two-way communication does not
always decrease the frequency of coordination failures. In games with a less risky strat-
egy, two-way communication always leads to the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium, while
one-way communication does not. Some later studies 2 also find that costless preplay
communication is efficiency-enhancing.
2.3 PREPLAY COMMUNICATION IN THE PARTNERSHIP GAME
The experimental game is a simplified example of the partnership game from Radner
et al. (1986). Consider two individuals involved in a joint production task. In every period
each partner has two actions they can take relating to their effort level: High or Low. In
every period the partnership has two possible outcomes: S(uccess) or F(ailure). Partners
are imperfectly informed on the actions of each other with the public outcome signal
stochastically related to the individual partner’s choices. High effort is individually costly,
but increases the likelihood of the Success outcome. In contrast, Low effort is less costly,
but increases the likelihood of the Failure outcome. The parametrization implemented in
the experiment, captures the classic tensions between individual and social welfare: the
expectation of each action profile in our game produces a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. I will
2e.g. Cooper et al. (1992b); Van Huyck et al. (1992); Blume and Ortmann (2007); Duffy and Feltovich
(2002);Duffy and Feltovich (2006); Bangun et al. (2006))
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therefore label High effort as C (ooperate) and Low effort as D(efect) to align to standard
PD games.3
The stage game has each partner choosing an action ai ∈ {C,D}, which yields the joint
outcome/signal y ∈ {S, F}. In the experimental stage game the revenue from a success is
$6.00 while the revenue from failure is $1.00 (pi(S) = 600, pi(F ) = 100). Choosing high
effort costs the agent $0.95 for sure, while putting in low effort yields a certain gain of
$1.10 (so c(C) = 95 and c(D) = −110). The stage game payoff in cents are represented as
in Table 2.1 and are given simply as vi(y, ai) = pi(y)− c(ai).
Table 2.1: Stage-game payoffs
(a) Success outcome
2:
C D
1:
C (505, 505) (505, 710)
D (710, 505) (710, 710)
(b) Failure outcome
2:
C D
C (5, 5) (5, 210)
D (210, 5) (210, 210)
(c) Expected outcome
2:
C D
C (455, 455) (280, 485)
D (485, 280) (335, 335)
The random success/failure variable Y (a1, a2) depends on the actions of each of the
two player. In particular, given both players cooperating there is a 90 percent chance the
outcome is success. If both players defect the probability of success is just 25 percent.
Finally, if one player cooperates and the other defects the probability of success is 55
percent (Pr {Success |(C,C)} = 0.90,Pr {Success |(C,D)} = Pr {Success |(D,C)} = 0.55,
and Pr {Success |(D,D)} = 0.25). In the third panel I calculate the expected utility given
the action profile a = (a1, a2) as
ui(a1, a2) = Pr {Success |(a1, a2)} · vi(S, ai) + Pr {Failure |(a1, a2)} · vi(F, ai).
3In the experiment the two actions are given the labels A and B.
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Inspecting the third panel the game is clearly a prisoner’s dilemma in expectation,
however, the partners’ choices induces a lottery rather than a fixed payoff. If both partners
choose cooperate, they both receive the common lottery 90 percent on 505 and 10 percent
on 5. If one partner defects and the other cooperates there is a 55 percent chance of
the outcome 710 to the defector, 505 to the cooperator, and with 45 percent chance the
outcome 210 to the defector 5 to the cooperator. Finally, if both defect they get a 25
percent chance of both getting 710 and a 75 percent chance of both getting 210. Finally,
the discount rate in the partnership game is 80%.
Focusing on all up to two-state public strategies, the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE)
in the partnership game are AD, GRIM, WSLS and T11, the explanations of which are as
follows. The expected value of each strategy is in parenthesis.
 AD: Always Defect. (Value: $3.35)
 GRIM: Cooperate until a Failure and Defect forever afterwards. (Value: $4.21)
 WSLS (win-stay-lose-shift): Cooperate until a Failure and then switch to Defect; Defect
until a Failure and then switch to Cooperate. (Value: $4.44)
 T11(one-period punishment): Cooperate until a Failure and then switch to Defect; then
switch back to Cooperate regardless of the outcome. (Value: $4.46)
Denote the pairwise Pareto dominance relation as “p”, where X p Y means X Pareto
dominates Y, i.e., X is Pareto more efficient than Y. In this game, T11 p WSLS p
GRIM p AD. Similarly, denote the pairwise risk dominance relation as “r”, where
X r Y means X risk dominates Y. Therefore, for this game, I have AD p GRIM p
WSLS p T11.
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2.3.1 Partnership Game with Preplay Communication: A Two-stage game
Here I consider two simple communication institutions, namely Cheap-talk and Con-
tract, with one-way communcation from the sender to the receiver. The analysis above
suggests that the supergame can be viewed as a coordination game, with risk dominance
and Pareto dominance among the equilibria. Following Cooper et al. (1992b), the coordi-
nation game with one-way communication can be formalized as a two-stage game between
two players. Here in the first stage the sender communicates to the receiver by sending a
message comprising of a supergame strategy. In the second stage repeated game actions
are chosen. A message here is a supergame strategy that specifies the action to take in
every stage game by the sender. By restricting the attention on memory-1 machines, the
set of potential messages available to the sender constitutes 32 strategies.
In Cheap-talk, payoffs are independent of messages, even though messages may influ-
ence actual play by affecting the beliefs of receivers about senders. In Contract, messages
directly influence the payoffs: senders must commit to their messages and therefore their
expected payoffs are determined by these messages, as if the sender formulates a unilat-
eral “contract”; receivers freely choose actions in response to the contract specified by the
sender. After the pre-supergame communication, players simultaneously choose actions in
the second stage of the game.
I first analyze the set of equilibria in one-way cheap-talk. One equilibrium for the game
is for the sender to randomly send messages and for these messages to be ignored. The
equilibrium is called “babbling equilibrium” where messages are irrelevant and therefore
communication does not change the set of equilibria of the repeated game. For messages
to be relevant, it suffices to focus the subset of messages that transmit information of
the four memory-1 equilibrium strategies. Farrell and Rabin (1996) assumes that for a
message by the sender to be believed and honored, the message needs to be both self-
committing and self-signaling: it would be optimal for the sender to commit to the message
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if the receiver believes the sender would commit to it. If announcing T11 leads to the
play of T11, announcing and playing T11 is a dominant strategy for the sender. If this
equilibrium occurs, sending T11 and both players playing T11 avoid coordination failures.
Therefore, one equilibrium for the game with cheap-talk communication is the announcing
T11, followed by both players playing T11. This equilibrium, in the same spirit as in stag-
hunt type of games, demonstrates the value of preplay communication as a selection device
towards more efficient outcomes. Such value can be seen as a way to reduce the riskiness
of Pareto efficient equilibria, especially that of T11.
The plausibility of such efficient equilibrium as the experimental outcome is complicated
by several behavioral factors in our environment. First of all, the key to successful commu-
nication in the stag-hunt game is the salience of the efficient equilibrium. Behaviorally, in
our environment, multiplicity of dynamic equilibria and the noisy feedback channel make
the efficient equilibrium less salient. Second, communicating a supergame strategy essen-
tially specifies a function from outcomes to actions, which generates a series of actions
through the repeated game. Here the credibility of these promised actions are dynamically
related-the breakdown of credibility in previous actions might jeopardize that of later ones.
In Contract, the game simply reduces to a sequential decision problem, where in the
first stage the sender ex-ante chooses the strategy to implement and then the other in
the second stage best responds. The asymmetry here is that the sender commits to a ex-
ante optimal strategy while the receiver’s behavior still needs to satisfy the one-deviation
property to deliver a best response. For each of the 32 candidate memory-1 strategies for
the sender, a unique best response by the receiver can be identified. Conditional on the
best response from the receiver, the strategy that generates ex-ante highest value for the
sender constitute the unique equilibrium. Under my experimental parameters, DMONO-
AC4 is the unique equilibrium. In the equilibrium, the sender sends a message of DMONO
4DMONO: MONO that starts with Defect. MONO is the imperfect monitoring version of TFT: coop-
erate until a failure and defect; defect until a success and cooperate. AC: Always Cooperate. This strategy
pair works as follows.
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and commits to it throughout a supergame and the receiver best responds by playing AC.
This delivers an ex-ante value of $4.58 to the sender. Very close to the optimal DMONO
contract in the sender’s values, a sender’s contract of either MONO or AC5 has a value of
$4.55. In terms of efficiency, the expected efficiency of MONO/AC contract is $8.86 and
that of the DMONO contract is $9.25.
In summary, there are fundamental differences in the ways these two communication
institutions operate to coordinate agents’ behavior towards efficient outcomes. Cheap-talk
improves efficiency by affecting the beliefs of the receivers about senders and reducing the
riskiness of coordinating on efficient equilibria. It does not change the set of equilibria in
the game, each of which is symmetric. Senders’ contracts directly select the unique asym-
metric equilibrium, which, given sender’s individual rationality, induces higher efficiency
for both parties than that by a cheap-talk message. The important task of the following
laboratory experiment, is then to test the efficiency comparative statics and examine how
the mechanics of these two institutions work empirically.
2.4 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The experiment uses the partnership game as the baseline game throughout three treat-
ments, Baseline (no communication institution), Cheap-talk and Contract. In each treat-
ment, there are three parts: Phase 1, 2 and 3. I refer to a supergame as a cycle. In all
treatments, Phase 1 is the play of the normal partnership game for three cycles. Phase
2 is 20-minute play of the partnership game with incentivized strategy elicitation prior to
the start of each cycle. Phase 3 differs in three treatments but all lasts for 50 minutes. In
the Baseline, Phase 3 is the play of the normal partnership game again, just as in Phase
5A contract of MONO is: the sender commits to MONO and the receiver best responds by AC. A
contract of AC is: the sender commits to AC and the receiver best responds by playing the following
strategy: start with Defect and stay with Defect only with a Failure last round.
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1. Phase 3 of Cheap-talk and Contract implements preplay cheap-talk and contract re-
spectively. Each subject receives experimental payment from one randomly drawn cycle
among all cycles across three phases. In Phase 2, strategies are elicited for every cycle,
using the language that is later for communication in Phase 3. The structure of each treat-
ment intends to provide subjects with experience in the type of repeated interaction in this
study (Phase 1 and 2), and more importantly in the use of message language (Phase 2),
before subjects are engaged in the two communication institutions (Phase 3). One cycle,
randomly selected from completed cycles in all phases, is paid to each subject.
2.4.1 A cycle
The infinitely repeated game in the experiment is played in blocks of 5 rounds. In this
block design, whether or not the stage games in the block are counted towards payoffs
are determined by the continuation probability. Subjects are informed at the end of each
block whether or not the current supergame has ended. If the block has not ended, they
play another block of five rounds.The advantage of the block design is that it guarantees a
minimum number of rounds for observation without payoff discounting. The observation of
longer sequences of play is essential to getting good estimates of the strategies used by each
subject. This design is based on methodological research by Fre´chette and Yuksel (2013),
which compares lab mechanisms for infinitely repeated games and presents evidence in
favor of this block design. The block design has additional tradeoffs in the experimental
setup of this study. On one hand, to increase the statistical power of estimating strategies
subjects use, the block design is beneficial in ensuring longer sequences of observations in
expectation. On the other hand, to provide experience with the message language, it is
advantageous to have more cycles, while the block design potentially decreases it.
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2.4.2 Strategy Choice Method
To elicit strategies from subjects, the experiment implements a strategy choice method
prior to the start of every cycle, by modifying the method used by Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette
(2013). They use a strategy choice method featuring questions that elicit two-state strate-
gies and a menu of strategies including ready made popular strategies such as GRIM,
MONO, WSLS (win-stay-lose-shift), etc. For the initial set of sessions, they elicit strate-
gies prior to the start of a supergame by providing five questions. Subjects first answer
“In round 1 select {1, 2} and answer four questions covering all permutations of “After
round 1 if, I last selected [1, 2] and the other selected [1, 2], then select {1, 2}”. Later, to
examine whether these simple strategies are sufficient to explain subjects’ behavior, they
provide extra options with more complexed strategies: subjects can either “build” their
simpler plans by answering these questions or directly choose more complex strategies
from a menu. Moreover, for early sessions, they find that strategy elicitation has negligible
effects on behavior.
I modified their strategy choice method and adapted it to the environment of this
experiment in the following ways. First, since the public outcome is the only observable
signal in the partnership game, I changed each of the four questions (four actions to take
after round 1) to take the form of “After round 1 if, I last selected [A, B] and outcome in
the previous round was [A, B], then select {A, B}”. Second, after subjects answer the five
questions, a diagram organized a two-state machine, i.e. memory-1 strategy, that uniquely
corresponded to the strategy specified and was presented to the subjects. For Phase 2
through Phase 3, this diagram represents the elicited strategy from each subject and is also
used as the language of communication in Phase 3. Finally, the elicitation is incentivized
such that a subject receives 10 cents if the actual action she chooses corresponds to the
action her strategy suggests.
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2.4.3 Cheap-talk and Contract
The partnership game with communication is implemented in Phase 3 as a two-stage
game and has the following features. First, communication takes place first, followed
by the same partnership game in Phase 1 and 2. Second, communication is one-way.
Third, messages in communication use as language the diagram of two-state machines,
each uniquely representing a strategy. First of all, each of the two paired subjects specifies
the intended strategy she plans to send to her partner, by answering the five questions
as follows. After the strategies have been specified, one party is randomly selected as the
sender and the other is the receiver. Then the sender’s strategy is revealed to both parties
in every round of the cycle, as well as the action suggested by that strategy. Receiver’s
strategy is not revealed. In Cheap-talk, both parties can still freely choose actions in every
round of the cycle. In Contract, the sender’s strategy will play the partnership game for
the sender while the receiver can still freely choose actions.
2.5 RESULTS
Six sessions of the experiment were conducted, two for each treatment, at PEEL (Pitts-
burgh Experimental Economics Lab), recruiting University of Pittsburgh undergraduates
as participants. A trio of three sessions, each for a distinct treatment, shares a common
sequence of random numbers that determine the length of each cycle. Such implementation
renders the comparison of cooperation and efficiency across treatments free of any effects
coming from different lengths of cycles. On the other hand, this also guarantees that sub-
jects’ experience in the repeated game environment is comparable across all treatments. In
this section, the analysis of the main results is conducted in three parts: Summary Statis-
tics, Cooperation and Efficiency and Strategies. As a first step, I report a brief summary
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of the experiment in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Experiment Summary
Treatments Sessions Subjects
cycles
Avg. cycle Length Disc. Avg Payoff
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Total
Baseline 2 14,14 3 6, 5 18, 20 27, 28 4.9 $30.2
Cheap-talk 2 14,16 3 6, 5 16, 18 25, 27 4.3 $31.2
Contract 2 12,16 3 8, 7 16, 20 27, 30 4.5 $32.9
Note: Number of cycles are given for each session, the cycle lengths are in terms of payment rounds.
Disc. Avg Payoff is the discounted average cycle payoff.
2.5.1 Evolution of Cooperation
Next, I examine the evolution of cooperation for all treatments. For all treatments,
subjects are treated exactly the same in Phase 1 and 2. Therefore, the evolution of coop-
eration in these three parts are expected to be statistically similar with sufficient sessions
of data. Based on the similar cooperation profile through the end of Phase 2, I then only
need to compare differences in cooperation rates in Phase 3 across all treatments. However,
in practice, because I have limited sessions of data, possible differences of the evolution of
cooperation can arise across treatments. In such case, I employ a Difference-in-Difference
method to identify the effect of the treatment, i.e. communication institutions on the
cooperation rates.
Figure 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the evolution of cooperation in all three treatments. For
both first and all round cooperation, I observe that cooperation rates start at similar levels
in at the beginning of Phase 1 for all treatments. At the end of Phase 2, cooperation rates
are similar for Cheap-talk and Contract but are lower in Baseline. In Phase 3, cooperation
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rates in Contract are higher than those in Cheap-talk and both are higher than those in the
Baseline across all cycles in that Phase. Because I only have two sessions of data (about
30 observations per cycle per treatment), there can be session-level variances so that the
cooperation rates through the end of Phase 2 differ significantly across all treatments.
Hence, next I investigate the differences of cooperation rates across all treatments. Table
2.3 summarizes the results.
Note: Because some session has more cycles than another in one Phase, I label the first cycle in Phase 2
and 3 by the largest cycle number across all sessions, using red lines. Therefore cycle numbers are adjusted
for sessions where the first cycle in one phase is smaller than that number.
Figure 2.1: Evolution of Cooperation: All Treatments First Round
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Figure 2.2: Evolution of Cooperation: All Treatments All Rounds
Table 2.3: Cooperation Rates by Treatment (%)
Treatments Baseline Cheap-talk Contract
Cycle /
Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 2 Phase 3
Round / Phase
Last Cycle
First Round 60.7 50.0 76.7 70.0 53.6 82.1
Fifth Round 46.4 35.7 60.0 63.3 67.9 67.9
All Rounds 57.6 43.6 68.0 67.3 60.4 66.9
All Cycles
First Round 61.7 50.9 68.9 73.1 64.6 83.2
Fifth Round 53.2 43.8 64.2 60.0 57.9 73.0
All Rounds 56.9 45.9 67.8 67.5 60.1 75.4
From Table 2.3, I find that cooperation rates in both the last cycle and all cycles
through Phase 2 significantly differ across all three treatments. In Baseline, cooperation
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rates do not change much across all cycles in Phase 2. For the last cycle in Phase 2, both
first round and all rounds cooperation are highest in Cheap-talk and lower in other two
treatments. Therefore, I use the Difference-in-Difference method to estimate the true effect
of communication institutions on cooperation rates. To put the experiment environment
in the DID settings, consider period 0, the control period as Phase 1 through 2 and period
1, the treatment period as Phase 3. I are interested in whether communication institution
has an effect on the cooperation, which can be estimated as the difference in changes in
the mean cooperation in the treatment period, relative to the control period. Following
this idea, I estimate the effects of communication institutions on cooperation by running
the DID estimation for three pairs: Baseline v.s. Cheap-talk, Baseline v.s. Contract and
Cheap-talk v.s. Contract. In the first two paired comparisons, Baseline is the control and
in the third one Cheap-talk is the control group. The DID method estimates the “normal”
difference in the mean cooperation between the two treatments: the difference that would
still exist if neither treatment experienced the treatment, represented by the dotted line.
The treatment effect is then the difference between the observed mean cooperation in Phase
3 and the hypothetical mean cooperation in Phase 3 if the treated group doesn’t receive
the treatment. Table 2.4 reports the estimation results for first round cooperation.
From Table 2.4, the positive effect of each of the two communication institutions on
cooperation is significant: the positive changes in cooperation in Cheap-talk or Contract
relative to the control period are significantly greater than those in Baseline. The changes
in mean cooperation in Baseline are negative while both those in Cheap-talk and Contract
are positive. Remarkably, the “difference-in-difference” of Baseline and Contract is 26%,
indicating a substantially greater increase in cooperation rates in Contract. Comparing
the two communication institutions, more boost in cooperation is induced in Contract: the
“difference-in-difference” is 14.5%. Hence, I conclude that both communication institutions
significantly improve cooperation and Contract generates highest cooperation rates.
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Table 2.4: Difference-in-Difference Estimation: First Round Cooperation
Compared Groups
Phase 1 & 2 Phase 3
Control Treated Diff. Control Treated Diff. Diff-in-Diff
Baseline v.s. 0.597 0.694 0.097*** 0.507 0.720 0.212*** 0.115***
Cheap-talk 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.003
Baseline v.s. 0.597 0.662 0.066*** 0.507 0.833 0.326*** 0.260***
Contract (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
Cheap-talk v.s. 0.694 0.662 -0.032*** 0.720 0.833 0.114*** 0.145***
Contract 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.006
Note: Coefficients and standard errors are bootstrapped. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
2.5.2 Payoff Efficiency
Next I examine the efficiency of relationships in different treatments. First I quantify
payoff efficiency and then estimate the effect of communication institutions on efficiency.
To define payoff efficiency of a round, I use the relative difference between the expected
joint payoffs implied by the choices of a pair and those from the one-shot Nash choices.
A cycle’s efficiency is therefore defined as: (Expected Joint Payoff of a cycle - One-shot
Nash Equilibrium)/(Expected Joint Payoff of Full Cooperation-One-shot Nash Equilib-
rium). Next I first examine the evolution of payoff efficiency of a cycle, then estimate the
effect of communication institutions on the efficiency of a cycle using the DID method.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the evolution of payoff efficiency for all treatments.
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Figure 2.3: Evolution of Payoff Efficiency for All Treatments
Payoff efficiency has clear separation between three treatments in Phase 3: efficiency in
Contract is higher than Cheap-talk and that in both is higher than Baseline. Similarly, I
observe substantial differences in the efficiency when Phase 3 starts across three treatments,
especially between either one of the communication treatment and Baseline. There I use
DID method to estimate the effect of communication institution on efficiency. Results are
reported in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5 shows qualitatively, the conclusion on the comparison of cooperation rates for
all treatments applied to payoff efficiency. Remarkably, the DID effect of Contract relative
to Baseline on the payoff efficiency is about 30% while that of Contract relative to Cheap-
talk is about 14%. This further suggests that both communication institutions not only
improves cooperation but efficiency, among which Contract generates higher efficiency.
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Table 2.5: Difference-in-Difference Estimation: Payoff Efficiency
Compared Groups
Phase 1 & 2 Phase 3
Control Treated Diff. Control Treated Diff. Diff-in-Diff
Baseline v.s. 46.6 58.0 11.4*** 35.1 61.4 26.4*** 15.0***
Cheap-talk (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012)
Baseline v.s. 46.6 54.5 7.9*** 35.1 71.8 36.7*** 28.8***
Contract (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012)
Cheap-talk v.s. 58.0 54.5 3.5*** 61.4 71.8 10.3*** 13.8***
Contract (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.014)
Note: Coefficients and standard errors are bootstrapped.***p<0.01, **p<0.05,*p<0.1
2.5.3 Strategy Prevalence
The “reduced-form” finding about cooperation rates and efficiency seems to be con-
sistent with initial conjectures. However, cooperation rates and payoff efficiency still do
not inform us on the channels communication institutions generate high efficiency. It is
not clear still how the mechanics of each communication institution work to achieve higher
efficiency. Moreover, we still need to understand why Contract performs better than Cheap-
talk: how the one-sided binding power results in higher cooperation rates and efficiency.
This section answers these questions by closely examining the 1) the strategies specified by
each subject and the associated deviations in Phase 2; 2) the strategies specified or sent in
Phase 3 and their associated receiver responses.
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2.5.3.1 Phase 2 Strategies Table C1 reports the strategies specified at the start of
every cycle in Phase 2. The overall frequency indicates that the most prevalent specified
strategies are AC and AD. Other subgame perfect strategies are also specified with fre-
quencies close to 5%: WSLS (5.5), GRIM (4.9) and T11 (5.5). MONO, a strategy similar
to WSLS is specified with 5.5%. This result somewhat suggests that subjects are able to
specify a strategy that is or close to the set of subgame perfect strategies. Obviously, I are
more interested in their deviations from specified strategies. The final column reveals that
for the above six main strategies, the deviation rates are not higher than 5%: deviations
associated with AD and AC are almost 0. This implies that the subgame strategies speci-
fied are adhered in general by subjects. Beyond reporting the deviation rates, which do not
inform us on the consequences of deviation, I further report the difference between actual
choices and predicted choices by subjects’ specified strategies. The latter are generated
using the specified strategies, the first round choices of subjects and realized outcomes in
a cycle. I look for the consequences of deviation: whether subjects behave more or less
cooperative than what their strategies imply. Figure 2.4 reveals that the cooperation rates
change very little as a result of deviation. Therefore I conclude that subjects are able to
specify and follow subgame perfect strategies. However, they favor AC most.
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Figure 2.4: Actual and Implied All Rounds Cooperation Rates in Phase 2: All Sessions
2.5.3.2 Phase 3 Strategies In Phase 3, senders send strategies they would like to play
without commitment at the beginning of each cycle in Cheap-talk and with full commitment
in Contract. I examine these strategies as follows. First, I calculate the frequencies of
strategies specified by all subjects and those by senders. Second, I analyze the interactions
between senders and receivers. For each of the two communication treatments, I examine
the evolution of cooperation of senders and receivers separately. Further, I restrict our
attention to the four main strategies sent in the two treatments and examine the evolution
of cooperation.
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Table 2.6: Frequencies of Elicited and Sent Strategies (All cycles in Phase 3)
Strategy Cheap-talk Contract
AKA Overall Sent Rec. Coop Dev. Overall Sent Rec.Coop
AD 14.0 12.5 37.7 8.6 7.3 5.7 15.0
GRIM 10.4 9.2 60.9 0.1 10.9 11.1 67.6
T11 13.8 10.8 64.6 19.3 5.5 7.9 75.2
AC 39.0 47.5 69.4 8.5 61.1 65.7 84.9
2.5.3.3 Overall and Sending Frequencies of Strategies Table 2.6 reports the fre-
quencies of strategies specified by each subject and those actually sent in Phase 3 for both
communication treatments. Remarkably, the four most frequently sent strategies coincide
in the two treatments: AD, GRIM, T11 and AC. Among them, AC is the most frequently
sent message/contract: the frequency is 47.5% in Cheap-talk and 84.9% in Contract.
2.5.3.4 Cooperation Dynamics by Sender and Receiver Next I examine the in-
teractions between senders and receivers by analyzing the evolution of sender and receiver’s
cooperation. Figure 2.5 and 2.6 report the dynamics for first round cooperation. For
Cheap-talk, in addition, I look at the evolution of cooperation of implied senders’ choices
from senders’ strategies. The sequence of implied choices for a cycle is derived as a function
of the sequence of realized outcomes in the cycle and the strategy sent by the sender. In
Figure D1, I report the evolutions of all round cooperation.
For first round cooperation, I observe that in Cheap-talk, senders’ actual choices are
less cooperative than the implied choices, but the difference is small: on average about
5%. However, receivers’ choices are much less cooperative than senders’ actual choices:
on average receiver cooperation rates are about 10% less than senders’ actual cooperation
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rates. On the other hand in Contract, receivers’ cooperation rates are also in general less
than senders’ but close to it: on average the difference is 5%. Further, actual cooperation
in Cheap-talk is less than that in Contract.
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Figure 2.5: Aggregate Evolution of Sender and Receiver’s Cooperation in Cheap-talk: First
Round
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Figure 2.6: Aggregate Evolution of Sender and Receiver’s Cooperation in Contract: First
Round
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Because four main strategies account for about 90% in total among all the strategies
sent in both treatments, I now restrict our attention to the evolution of cooperation for
these four strategies in both treatments. Figure 2.7 and 2.8 illustrates the results for first
round cooperation.
AD (Sending Frequency=12.5% in Cheap-talk; =5.7% in Contract). In Cheap-talk,
senders’ deviations from the message are small: sender’s actual cooperation rate is 8.6%
while the implied metric is 0%. Receivers behave more cooperative than senders in Cheap-
talk (36.6%) and Contract (13.3%). Receivers are more cooperative in Cheap-talk than
their counterparts in Contract, partly because senders’ actual cooperation rate is higher.
GRIM (Sending Frequency=9.2% in Cheap-talk; =11.1% in Contract). Senders’ de-
viations from this strategy are little in Cheap-talk: the actual cooperation rate is 68.8%
while the implied metric is 68%. Receivers are in general as cooperative as senders in both
Cheap-talk (64%) and Contract (63.2%).
T11 (Sending Frequency=10.8% in Cheap-talk;=7.9% in Contract). Senders are less
cooperative than what their messages implied in Cheap-talk: the actual cooperation rate
is 88.3% while the implied metric is 92.4%. Receivers are less cooperative than senders
in both treatments and receivers are less cooperative in Cheap-talk (64.1%) than their
counterparts in Contract (72%).
AC (Sending Frequency=47.5% in Cheap-talk;=65.7% in Contract). Senders are less
cooperative than what their messages implied in Cheap-talk: the actual cooperation rate
is 91.5% while the implied metric is 100%. Meanwhile, receivers are less cooperative than
senders in both treatments. However in Contract (69.1%), receivers are less cooperative
than their counterparts in Cheap-talk (84.1%).
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Figure 2.7: Evolution of Sender and Receiver’s Cooperation in Cheap-talk by Four Main
Strategies
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Figure 2.8: Evolution of Sender and Receiver’s Cooperation in Contract by Four Main
Strategies
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2.5.3.5 Receiver Strategies Next I explore receivers’ behavior against the four sender
strategies in Cheap-talk and Contract. For each sender strategy, we estimate the strategy
distribution from receivers’ actual choices and outcomes. We employ the strategy fre-
quency estimation methods outlined in Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette (2011). The details of the
methodology is in Appendix E. After specifying a set of 18 strategies motivated by theory
and previous experimental literature6, I estimate the proportions of each strategy, using
data from all receiver responses. Table 2.7 reports the results.
In Table 2.7, I first focus on the most popular sender strategy in both Cheap-talk
and Contract: AC. About 30% of the receivers play AC in Cheap-talk and about 45%
of the receivers do so in Contract. In Cheap talk, on average about 12% of the receivers
play AD, T2 and MONO21 and about 6% of the receivers play FC, GRIM and WSLS.
In contrast, receivers’ responses are more cooperative and lenient in Contract: about 26%
of the receivers play MONO22; about 6% of the receivers play AD and T2. In summary,
receivers are more lenient and cooperative when AC is the contract than when AC is a
non-binding message.
Now I focus our attention on other sender strategies: AD, GRIM and T11. When AD is
sent in Cheap-talk, only 27% of the receivers’ responses are AD and the rest are more coop-
erative responses: WSLS (12.3%), DGRIM2 (13.6%), MONO21 (11.3%), MONO12(22.9%)
and MONO22 (11.0%). In contrast, 66% of the responses are AD and about 26% of the
responses are GRIM in Contract. However, note that the sending frequency of AD is half
in Contract of that in Cheap-talk. When GRIM is sent, most of the responses are coop-
erative and lenient strategies in both treatments: MONO21 and MONO12 both account
for about 40% each in Cheap-talk; AC accounts for about 40% in Contract. When T11 is
sent, in Cheap talk, most of the subjects respond by playing T11. This shows that even
the salience of the efficient equilibrium is weakened in the partnership game, it is selected
by a substantial proportion of subjects (10%).
6I use a similar set of strategies mainly from Fudenberg et al. (2010); Embrey et al. (2011).
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Table 2.7: Strategy Estimation of Receiver Responses Based on Main Sender Strategies
from Cheap-talk and Contract
Receiver / Cheap-talk Contract
Baseline
Sender Strategy AD GRIM T11 AC AD GRIM T11 AC
AC 0.0 0.0 18.1 30.4 0.0 42.7 31.3 44.8 21.5
AD 27.4 0.0 7.0 11.7 65.7 12.1 6.2 7.8 50.8
FC 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 4.2 2.8
GRIM 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.9 25.5 4.6 2.4 0.0
WSLS 12.3 12.1 0.0 7.5 0.0 1.9 0.0 4.1
MONOD 0.0 5.4 0.0 2.6 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.0 6.9
DWSLS 0.0 0.0 26.7 0.0 0.0 3.3 1.9 3.8 9.4
T2 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.2 0.0 4.4 2.6 6.3
T11 0.0 0.0 48.0 0.0 0.6 4.6 50.0 0.9
DGRIM2 13.6 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.5 5.9 0.2 0.0
MONO21 11.3 40.7 0.0 13.9 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 3.0
MONO12 22.9 41.8 0.0 0.1 0.5 4.6 0.0 0.0
MONO22 11.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.0 0.2 26.4 5.8
Gamma 0.47 0.69 0.73 0.57 0.38 0.74 0.33 0.44 0.52
Beta 0.89 0.81 0.80 0.85 0.93 0.79 0.95 0.91 0.87
The above analysis of senders and receivers’ strategies illustrate some departures from
our conjectures. First, most senders did not send any of the equilibrium strategies. In
Cheap-talk, only about 10% senders sent and the most efficient symmetric equilibrium
strategy T11. Instead, they send the most cooperative but non-dynamic strategy AC and
deviate little from it. In Contract, senders did not send the sequential equilibrium strategy
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DMONO but instead again send AC. Second, receivers did not best respond to senders’
messages. In Cheap-talk, though receivers discount the message and are much less coop-
erative than senders, they still employ cooperative and lenient strategies such as AC and
MONO21. In Contract, the best response given the AC contract is AD. However, most
of the responses are AC. Finally, if I compare the distributions of senders’ and receivers’
strategies to the distribution in Baseline, the proportion of cooperative and lenient strate-
gies is higher in both Cheap-talk and Contract. This shows that both senders and receivers
are more cooperative when two communication institutions are in place.
The message and response patterns in communication institutions indicate that both
senders and receivers are employing very cooperative yet non-dynamic strategies. For
senders in Cheap-talk, sending AC signals highest level of trust: any dynamic message
that involves the Defect state shows lower trust. For the receiver, if they were to respond
by playing AD, then the initial trust signaled by the sender would collapse and both
players might be stuck in mutual-defection, which gives each lowest payoffs. This applies
to subsequent responses of senders as well, which could explain the low deviation rate
(8.5%) associated with AC. Therefore in this dynamic environment, trust is maintained:
senders and receivers coordinate on AC.
In Contract, even when senders cannot change their actions, both senders and receivers
coordinate more on AC. To interpret the result, one can think of the repeated partnership
with preplay contract as a variant of the trust game. Here the sender’s endowment is the
expected payoff of offering an AD contract-the joint defection payoff. Similar to findings
from trust game experiments 7, the sender “sends” part of her endowment to the receiver:
such offer can be thought of as the difference between the sucker’s payoff and the joint
defection payoff. By offering such a trusting contract, the sender expects some reciprocity
from the receiver. And the receiver’s behavior is consistent with the findings from trust
game experiments as well: the receiver is trustworthy by coordinating with the sender on
7see Camerer (2003) for a review of the literature
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AC, i.e. returning a favor rather than exploiting the trust. Of course, such trustworthi-
ness could stem from costs of non-reciprocity: triggering the distrust among players and
therefore getting a less trusting contract later, etc.
2.6 CONCLUSIONS
I experimentally investigate two forms of communication in partnership games: Cheap-
talk and contract. Such communication is unilateral and introduced prior to the start of
each repeated game. By varying whether the message is binding or not, the experiment
tests the effect of communication institutions on efficiency.
I find that both communication institutions (Cheap-talk and Contract) increases coop-
eration rates and efficiency relative to communication-free Baseline. Moreover, Contract
generates higher cooperation rates and efficiency than Cheap-talk and Baseline, after con-
trolling for session-level variances in experience level using difference-in-difference methods.
I find that in Cheap-talk, senders’ actual cooperation rates are lower than implied coopera-
tion of their messages and receivers’ cooperation rates are much lower than senders’ actual
cooperation rates. The same result applied to Contract, but the magnitude of difference
between receivers and senders’ cooperation rates is smaller. Further after examining the
strategies sent and employed by senders and receivers, I find that AC, the most efficient
strategy is most frequently sent by senders in both communication institutions. Senders’
deviations from AC are small in Cheap-talk. In both communication institutions, senders
also send cooperative and lenient strategies.
Preliminary findings highlight the importance of trust in communication to improve
coordination and efficiency in repeated partnerships. In Cheap-talk, the sender sends AC
mainly to signal one’s intention to cooperate rather than intended strategy; receivers prove
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their trustworthiness by coordinating on AC. Trust is maintained by both parties to avoid
mutual defection. In Contract, behavior is similar to that in trust game experiments:
senders offer AC as a trusting contract and receivers are trustworthy in coordinating on
AC.
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3.0 DETERMINANTS AND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS OF
THE SALES METHOD IN M&A
3.1 INTRODUCTION
A vast literature investigates the wealth effects accruing to acquirer and target share-
holders mergers around the post-public announcement period of the acquisition process (see
e.g., Andrade et al. (2001)). Less is known about the sales method choice which takes place
during the private takeover process before the public announcement of the deal1. The the-
oretical literature has two competing schools of thought regarding the sales method and its
effect on takeover premiums. Bulow and Klemperer (2009) predict that auctions increase
competition and, compared to negotiations, should result in higher takeover premiums. In
contrast, French and McCormick (1984) and Hansen (2001) hypothesize that when infor-
mation costs associated with auctions are considered takeover premiums in auctions should
be no different than those offered in negotiated deals.
Recent empirical studies, most notably Boone and Mulherin (2007, 2008) (hereafter
BM), analyze the private takeover process in detail and investigate whether takeover pre-
miums differ between the two sales methods. They find that competition during the pre-
announcement takeover process is much higher than what had been previously documented
with auctions and negotiated deals each accounting for roughly half of their sample. They
1For an illustration of timeline of a typical M&A process, see Boone and Mulherin (2009).
81
find no difference in takeover premiums between these two sales methods. This result is
consistent with their competition tradeoff hypothesis, which predicts that while auctions
increase target premiums by introducing greater competition, greater information costs
inherent in the more intensive due diligence process offset the increase.
This paper revisits the question of whether there is an association between the sales
method and shareholder wealth effects in takeovers. We contribute to the literature based
on four innovations. First, we argue that the tradeoff between information costs and
competition benefits is likely affected by the relative size of the target in the acquisition.
Specifically, we hypothesize that size has a greater impact on information costs than it has
on competition premiums. For example, relatively larger targets may have more propri-
etary information than smaller ones, but might have a similar competition premium. This
suggests that for relatively small targets that use auctions, the positive effect of compe-
tition on takeover premiums may outweigh the negative effect information costs have on
takeover premiums. In contrast, for large targets the competition premium decreases due
to a smaller set of potential bidders, but larger information costs could offset this. In short,
we predict that relative size will affect the targets’ tradeoff between competition premiums
and information costs and label this the extended competition tradeoff hypothesis. We
note that BM’s sample covers the 1990s and includes relatively large targets. The mean
(median) target size is $2.69 ($0.69) billion and the mean (median) relative size is 56%
(27%)2. To put this in perspective, $2.69 billion represents roughly the 93rd percentile in
terms of size of all NYSE, NASDAQ, and Amex firms during that period and approximately
the 75th size percentile for takeover targets.
Second, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first paper to investigate the relation
between the sales method and wealth effects extending beyond the target premium, such
as bidder, dollar-denominated, and synergy returns, and the distribution of gains between
2BM acknowledge that target sizes in their sample are larger than usual: “. . . a relatively large value
which reflects the fact that the sample comes from firms listed on the Value Line Investment Survey”, (BM,
2007b, p. 13).
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the bidder and the target. We propose that bidders, as targets do, face a tradeoff because
the information gain from the due diligence process to each bidder should be unaffected
by increased competition. However, while increased competition is a cost to the bidder if
it increases the premium it must offer to win, bidders may benefit from competition by
acquiring more information about the target’s valuation, specifically about other bidders’
private signals of the target’s valuation. This information is sought to understand the
common-value component of that valuation3. The value discovery process improves by
aggregating bidders’ private information and leads to more precise valuation of the target,
and ultimately more efficient acquisition. We expect that the bidder’s tradeoff between
the information aggregation benefit and the competition cost will also be affected by the
relative size of the target. For relatively small targets, the potential benefit of information
aggregation for bidders is greater because the set of private signals from other bidders is
larger. We label this the bidder competition tradeoff hypothesis.
Third, we investigate the determinants of the sales method. The question of what de-
termines the sales method remains largely unanswered in the literature as it has focused
on estimating the relationship between sales method and target firm uncertainty4. Little
is known about how characteristics, such as financial constraints and industry liquidity,
affect the sales method. Therefore, in addition to previously documented determinants
of the sales method choice we consider a number of previously ignored determinants such
as the target’s operating performance, financial constraints, and industry characteristics5.
Understanding the determinants of the sales method is necessary for designing our empir-
3Gorbenko and Malenko (2014)models financial bidders’ M&A auction as a common-value auction and
strategic bidders’ as private-value auctions. However, we find in Section 3 that auctions are associated with
problem-fixing types of synergy which requires a less unique set of bidders. In this sense, strategic bidders’
auctions are private-value auctions with common-value components
4An exception, for example, is Anilowski et al. (n.d.) who study how managers’ incentives to manage
earnings relate to the sales methods. Section 2 will provide a more detailed review of the relevant literature
on the determinants of the sales method.
5For example, we focus on more direct measures of both the level of operating performance and also
its dynamics. Previous literature has looked mostly at indirect measures. Marquardt and Zur (2014) finds
that financial accounting quality, measured by accruals quality, is related to sales method. Anilowski Cain
et al. (2009) finds that auctioned targets have greater future cash flow uncertainty.
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ical tests exploring the wealth effects associated with the sales method. Furthermore, we
examine how deal initiation is related to the sales method and hypothesize that the sales
method serves as a device to maximize the probability of finding a bidder that matches
the financial needs of the target.
Fourth, we offer a number of methodological improvements. For example, we redefine
the sales method to better capture both the actual competition that results from the sales
method and the potential competition implied by the method. Potential competition has
been previously ignored, but is important for target shareholders’ wealth, as shown in
Aktas et al. (2010). Also, for our premium analysis we pay special attention to proper
identification of our empirical model and conduct a series of two-stage IV regression analy-
ses of target returns and sales method that control for endogeneity (between the two). We
validate our models using out-of-sample testing.
Based on a sample of 575 M&A deals announced between 1998 and 2012, we find
the following results. Target firms are more likely to use auctions when they are more
leveraged, financially more constrained, have smaller information costs and higher debt
burdens, higher operating expenses, and lower industry shocks. They also experience
stronger sales growth during the year prior to the deal announcement and are associated
with lower market share growth. We interpret these results to suggest that targets that use
auctions are able to induce competition from bidders because they experience attractive
economic performance, but given their financial constraints, may be searching for a bidder
who is able to finance their internal growth opportunities (see e.g., Masulis and Simsir
(2013); Fidrmuc and Xia, 2014). In this case, an auction may be preferred because the
set of potential bidders is less limited by concerns of finding a specific buyer that satisfies
the target’s specific operational needs. Similarly, targets are more likely to initiate a deal
when they are more levered, financially constrained, and operate in industries with fewer
industry shocks. This suggests alignment of incentives between deal initiation and the sales
method.
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Our two-stage regression analyses show that auctions are associated with significantly
higher target returns. The impact of the sales method is economically relevant as a ten
percent increase in the predicted probability of doing an auction leads to an increase in
target returns of approximately 3.5 percentage points, which represents more than 13%
of the average target return in the sample. The positive relation between auctions and
target returns continues to hold when we control for fixed effects, add different industry
characteristics, and estimate richer two-stage model specifications. When we split the
sample on the median (terciles) of relative size we find that the positive relation between
auctions and target returns continues to hold only for below median (lowest tercile) of
targets in the sample. This is consistent with the extended competition tradeoff hypothesis
and suggests that competition tradeoffs differ between small and large targets.
In terms of bidder wealth effects, we find weak evidence consistent with the bidder
competition tradeoff hypothesis. For example, auctions increase bidder returns for bidders
associated with relatively small targets but there is no overall effect. According to the
bidder competition hypothesis, bidders are faced with tradeoffs between the information
aggregation benefit and the competition cost. These tradeoffs are also affected by the
relative size. Given that it is the smaller targets for which we find the positive associa-
tion between auctions and percentage returns, not surprisingly, we find that target dollar
denominated wealth gains are lower in auctions. Similarly, we find that auctions are asso-
ciated with higher bidder dollar returns, which is driven by relatively larger bidders among
small bidders in auctions. This suggests that bidders with lower competition cost are more
likely to enter into the auctions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss the literature and our contri-
bution in Section 2. Section 3 introduces the sample. Section 4 reports the results from the
logistic analysis of the sales method. Section 5 reports 2SLS regression analyses of wealth
effects and the sales method. Section 6 reports a variety of robustness checks and Section
7 concludes.
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3.2 PREVIOUS LITERATURE
Our paper complements and contributes to a large literature analyzing the wealth
effects associated with mergers and acquisitions. Specifically, we aim to contribute to the
literature that investigates the determinants and wealth effects of the sales method. The
theoretical literature has two competing points of view with respect to the wealth effects,
especially insofar as target premiums are concerned, of the sales method choice.
Bulow and Klemperer (2009)show that auctions are preferred over negotiations and the
value of negotiating skills is small relative to additional competition. They also suggest
it might be wealth enhancing to the target shareholders to restrict the number of bidders
if an auction would diminish value by revealing private information. In general, they
hypothesize that auctions have positive shareholder wealth effects. However, it is unclear
from their model how information costs, as the tradeoff for competition, match the benefits
of competition.
In contrast, French and McCormick (1984) argue that the seller bears the cost of infor-
mation gathering in the sales process. One such cost from selling the firm is the revelation
of proprietary information to rivals (Hansen (2001)). Taking into account these information
costs, target returns could be the same for negotiations and auctions.
Incorporating information costs therefore sets up the competition tradeoff hypothesis
proposed in BM (2007a, 2007b). They examine a sample of 400 M&A deals between 1989
and 1999 and conclude that auctions and negotiations generate similar target wealth effects
from both multivariate and two-stage regression models. An important characteristic of
BM’s sample is that it contains, on average, relatively large targets. Our paper proposes
the extended competition tradeoff hypothesis, which predicts that size has a greater impact
on information costs than it has on competition premiums: For relatively small targets that
use auctions, the positive effect of competition on takeover premiums may outweigh the
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negative effect information costs have on takeover premiums. For large targets, in contrast,
the competition premium decreases because of the smaller set of potential bidders and these
two effects may cancel each other out.
Our paper relates to the literature that studies the wealth effects and the determinants
of the sales method. Anilowski Cain et al. (2009) studies the impact of incentives of target
managers to manage earnings on the method of sale. When target management engages in
“window-dressing” their financial statements, selling through an auction, instead of through
a one-one-one negotiation, can limit the level of timing of the information that bidders can
scrutinize. This reduces the risk of earnings management detection. In addition, controlling
for potential earnings management, both abnormal returns and premiums increase for
targets when they sell through an auction. Their findings suggest that both the market and
the bidder expect lower value acquisitions when the uncertainty about reported earnings
is higher.
Anilowski Cain et al. (2009) control for self-selection bias stemming from management’s
private information inherent in the sales mechanism and finds that auctions are associated
with higher target cumulative abnormal returns and offer premiums. With a sample of
target initiated deals, they focus on the impact of various proxies of adverse selection
risk and the uncertainty of future cash flows on the sale and find that targets with more
aggressive (or opaque) financial reporting are more likely to auction the firm and this
strategy proves beneficial only when the uncertainty of future cash flows is high. When
financial reporting is more transparent or the uncertainty of future cash flows is low, targets
benefit more from single bidder negotiations. While this paper regards sales methods and
target returns as a problem of self-selection, we follow BM and take the view that it is a
problem of endogeneity.
Marquardt and Zur (2014) examines the role of target firms’ accounting quality (AQ)
on the course of the acquisition process. They find that target AQ is positively associated
with the likelihood that the deal will be initiated as a negotiation rather than as an auction,
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the speed in which the deal is completed, and the likelihood of deal completion. Moreover,
they find that AQ has a more pronounced effect on transactions when the target firm is
sold via auction versus negotiation. Again, the results are consistent with the idea that
corporations with high AQ are easy to value given their low uncertainty about future
cash flows, while corporations with poor AQ are harder to value because of the increased
uncertainty.
Rogo (n.d.) find that the costs of disclosing proprietary information in auctions are
offset against the benefits of competition among bidders. Targets with valuable propri-
etary information choose negotiations to mitigate valuation uncertainty at lower costs and
maximize expected revenues. Specifically, the level of valuation uncertainty is positively
associated with the likelihood of negotiations. We incorporate the idea of information cost
in our estimation of the likelihood of conducting an auction.
Shleifer and Vishny (2003)point to industry factors that might affect the sales method.
They find that government regulation can constrain some potential bidders in buying a
firm. Hence, selling firms in regulated industries may be less likely to conduct auctions.
Based on these findings, we incorporate the role of industry effects into our analysis.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on deal initiation. Masulis and Simsir
(2013) show that target deal initiation is associated with lower announcement abnormal
returns and link this finding to information asymmetries concerning the quality of target
firms. Xie (2010) argues that deal initiation reveals both selling firm bargaining power, but
also bidder valuations and thus buyer initiated deals result in higher premiums. Xie (2010)
also shows that target initiated deals are more often organized as auctions whereas bidder
initiated deals are most likely privately negotiated. Fidrmuc et al. (2012) finds that target
initiation and high profitability are important determinants of whether firms are sold in
auctions or private negotiations. De Bodt et al. (2014) find that a higher willingness to
sell through target initiation is associated with lower premiums, but also increases deal
success probability. Finally, Fidrmuc and Xia (2014) find that targets that initiate deals
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are financially constrained.
While these papers address similar issues relating to the sales method, they do not take
the relative size of the deal explicitly into account when analyzing the tradeoffs between
competition and information costs relevant to the target shareholders. Specifically, we
consider the bidder’s tradeoff between competition costs and benefits from information
aggregation and analyze the relation between the sales method and, various shareholders
wealth measures.
3.3 SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
Our main sample comprises 575 takeovers of U.S. listed firms announced between 1998
and 2012. We construct the sample as follows. First, we extract all M&A deals during
1998-2012 from SDC that satisfy the following criteria:
1. Both targets and acquirers are public U.S. companies;
2. Deal value is be greater than $10 million;
3. Deals are completed6 ;
4. Acquisitions are of majority interest: the percent of shares owned after the acquisition
is greater than or equal to 100%;
5. Percent of shares held by acquirer 6 months prior to announcement is less than 50%
These selection criteria result in 3,050 transactions from SDC. We merge this sample
with COMPUSTAT and EVENTUS to obtain target and acquirer financial characteristics.
There 1,367 deals remaining that satisfy our data availability requirements7. Because
6We focus on completed deals because the sales method information is available in SEC filings. In most
withdrawn deals, both parties do not need to submit SEC filings.
7As we require a rich set of variables to be available for the target and bidder of each deal, there are
three variables that cause big drops in the sample size: acquirer size and two financial constraint indices
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information regarding each deal’s initiation and sales method is not reliably available in
electronic format, we must rely on careful hand-collection. We randomly choose 575 deals
to collect information regarding deal initiation and sales method from the “Background of
the Merger” section of the merger document for each deal filed with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC)8. The 575 deals form our main sample in the subsequent
analyses. As a control group, we also have the sample of the remaining 792 deals without
any hand-collected information regarding the private takeover process.
For each takeover in our main sample, we review the filings from the EDGAR system
of the SEC. We collect details of the sales process for each takeover from the background
section of 14A and S-4 filings (mergers) and 14D filings (tender offers).
Figure 3.1: Timeline of an M&A Process
Figure 3.1 illustrates the timeline of a typical private takeover process as described in
the SEC filings. Deals can start in many different ways: a target can put itself for sale; a
bidder can proactively approach the target about the possibility of a business combination;
a target can be approached by a third-party and then later contact the (final) bidder to
gauge the bidders’ interest, or be contacted by the (final) bidder. Both the target and
the bidder engage financial advisors after a deal is initiated. The target usually asks the
(WW and KZ Index).
8For each year, we randomly choose a fixed proportion of deals from the sample of 1,367 deals.
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financial advisor to contact other bidders to join in the bidding or just proceed with the
bidder for one-to-one negotiation. After bidder(s) are contacted, each interested bidder is
requested to sign a confidentiality agreement with the target. When negotiations continue,
remaining bidders are asked by the target to submit a preliminary indication of interest
as an initial offer and then to revise its bid until the target accepts the bid or the bidder
quits from the negotiation. To characterize this process, we collect the following variables
of the private takeover process: deal initiation party (bidder/target/both), deal initiation
date, date target and bidder CEO first meet; number of bidders contacted, number of
bidders that signed the confidentiality agreement, and number of bidders that submitted
preliminary indications of interest.
We then classify the deal initiation party and the sales method with the variables
collected for each deal. Targets and bidders might terminate their merger discussions
at some point for various reasons and later reinitiate them. We focus on the takeover
process that ultimately leads to the deal announcement without interruptions, which is the
most recent takeover process to the deal announcement date 9. There are several important
differences in our classifications relative to those made in previous studies. First, we classify
the sales method of a deal as an auction when the number of bidders contacted is greater
than one and negotiation when there is only one bidder contacted. This is different from
BM’s definition based on the number of bidders that signed the confidentiality agreement
to delineate between auctions and negotiations. Our approach is motivated by the idea that
the decision of the sales method by the target takes place before bidders begin to respond.
Also, our classification reflects the potential competition introduced by the target’s sales
method to the bidder(s), as noted in Aktas et al. (2010). We note that the number of
bidders contacted includes those contacted prior to and during the formal bidding process.
For example, if there is only one bidder contacted before the formal bidding process and
9The existing literature does not mention whether the number of bidders contacted or signed the con-
fidentiality agreement is calculated including all takeover processes (including potential termination of
discussions and reinitiation of discussions) in the background of SEC filings.
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after the bidder submits the initial bid other bidders choose to come in and make a play for
the firm, we classify the sales method as auction. We classify a deal as “target-initiated”
when the target contacts the bidder and as “bidder-initiated” when the bidder approaches
the target. If there is no clear indication about such move by the target or bidder in the
merger document, we classify the deal as a “both initiated” deal. For a deal where a third
party approaches the target first, we classify it as target-initiated (bidder-initiated) when
the target (bidder) later contacts the bidder to gauge their interest 10.
Table 3.1: Summary of the Sales Process
Sample Observations
Initiation
Contact Confidential Interest Length
Target Bidder Both
Panel A. The Full Sample
Full Sample 575 211 302 62 6.13 2.96 1.72 197
Panel B. The Sample Categorized by Sales Method
Auction 313 157 135 21 10.43 4.6 2.32 235
Negotiation 262 54 167 41 1 1 1 152
Table 3.1 summarizes the sales process in our sample. Auctions account for 54.4%,
which is similar to the 51% in BM. In target-initiated deals, auctions account for 74.4% and
in bidder-initiated deals, negotiations account for 55.2%. The proportions are in line with
those reported in the literature, e.g., BM (2008) and Aktas et al. (2010). The intensity of
potential competition in our sample is 11 bidders on average. The intensity of competition
in the final bidding process is 3 bidders on average. The length of an auction deal is shorter
than a negotiation deal, consistent with the results in Fidrmuc and Xia (2014). This may
reflect the incentive of targets to mitigate the cost of information disclosure in auctions
10In BM (2008), unsolicited deals are initiated by third-party and bidder. We categorize third-party
initiated deals into target or bidder initiated ones.
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when confidential information is revealed to multiple bidders (e.g., Anilowski et al. (n.d.)).
Table 3.2: Sample By Year
Year Full Sample Auction Negotiation
Initiation
Target Bidder Both
1998 75 27 48 20 51 4
1999 63 26 37 22 31 10
2000 55 22 33 16 31 8
2001 49 27 22 29 15 5
2002 31 20 11 12 17 2
2003 30 21 9 12 13 5
2004 37 20 17 12 23 2
2005 34 19 15 11 19 4
2006 38 27 11 15 18 5
2007 37 22 15 10 22 5
2008 28 21 7 15 10 3
2009 23 17 6 6 11 6
2010 31 17 14 11 19 1
2011 19 12 7 9 9 1
2012 25 15 10 11 13 1
Table 3.2 reports the number of deals and the proportion of auctions/negotiations
over our sample period. In years with relatively high M&A activity (1998, 1999 and
2000), there are substantially more bidder-initiated than target-initiated deals. In 1998,
the number of bidder-initiated deals is more than double the number of target-initiated
deals. In these merger wave years, there are also substantially more negotiations than
auctions. In 1998, the number of negotiations is almost twice that of auctions. This
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appears counter-intuitive to the idea posed by the theory of economic shocks on merger
activities. Results from the literature (e.g.Gort (1969); Ravenscraft, 1987; Mitchell and
Mulherin (1996); Harford (2005)) suggest that merger waves are induced by unexpected
“economic shocks” within industries, such as rapid changes in technology and demand,
movements in capital markets, and changes in entry barrier within industries. Also, during
these periods uncertainty in firm value rises and merger activity increases. Given these
explanations, we should expect to witness a dominant use of auctions in these wave periods.
During economic shocks, the internal growth opportunities deplete because of the industry
uncertainty and we would expect more firms seeking business combinations, particularly
through acquisitions. Therefore, an auction would be welfare-increasing to the target
because there are potentially more bidders. We further explore the time-series pattern in
Section 5 where we present the analysis of the sales method.
Table F1 reports summary statistics for firm, deal, industry characteristics and wealth
measures in our sample. All variable definitions, calculations, and sources are listed in
Appendix G of the paper. We report p-values to indicate whether the difference of these
variables between auctions and negotiations is statistically significant. There are no sig-
nificant differences in target, bidder, and relative size between auctions and negotiations.
Compared to the sample in BM (not reported), we note there is a substantial difference in
relative size. In BM, target and bidder size are defined as the value of equity and relative
size as the log of the target equity divided by bidder equity. We use the book value of assets
as a measure of firm size and to capture the magnitude of firm’s proprietary information11.
Relative size is defined as the log of target book value of assets divided by the bidder’s. Our
sample includes more relatively small targets compared to the BM sample, which translates
into a mean (median) of relative size is 33% (16%) compared to 57% (27%) in BM.
11Wangerin (2012)discusses the type of information exchanged between targets and acquirers in the due
diligence process. He points out that most of the attention in the due diligence process is directed towards
accounting identification and valuation of assets and liabilities of targets, and to obtain the fair value of
targets. We believe book value of assets is able to capture the majority of the type of information revealed
in the due diligence process and proxies for the costs of revealing information.
94
Deal characteristics differ significantly between the auction and negotiation samples.
Specifically, the auction sample contains significantly more cash deals, fewer tender offers,
and fewer bidder initiated deals compared to the negotiation sample. Second, for firm
characteristics, we find that in our sample, both targets and bidders in auctions are on
average smaller than those in negotiations, at 10% significance level. We also include three
indices for financial constraints: revised KZ index (Baker et al. (2003)), WW index (Whited
and Wu (2006)) and SA index (Hadlock and Pierce (2010)). Lamont et al. (2001) creates the
KZ index based on the regression estimates by Kaplan and Zingales (2000). The KZ index
is a linear combination of Q, leverage, operating cash flow, cash, and dividends.Baker et al.
(2003) points out a disadvantage of the index in including Q that might deliver opposite
predictions for investment and this use a revised index that omits Q. These indices measure
financial constraints, where a higher value indicates a more financially constrained firm.
For target industry and year characteristics, we include a liquidity index, an economic
shock index, the Herfindahl index, and deal volume. The liquidity index is defined as
the total value of corporate control transactions divided by the total book value of assets
of firms in the target’s industry in each year (Schlingemann et al. (2002)). This index
measures the intensity of corporate asset transactions within an industry and proxies for
that industry’s asset market liquidity. The economic shock index is calculated as in Harford
(2005), as the first principal component of the seven economic shock variables: profitability
(net income/sales), ROA, employee growth, R&D intensity, capital expenditure and asset
turnover. Each shock variable is measured as the industry absolute median change of
the corresponding economic variable. Hence we also include the seven shock variables
independently. Harford (2005) uses the economic shock index to capture an industry’s
operating environment and finds that the beginning of merger waves is significantly and
positively related to the index. Deal volume is the total number of deals in each year in
our main sample and describes the aggregate M&A activity annually. All these industry
indices are calculated based on Fama-French 48 industrial classifications. In our sample,
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target (bidder) sizes do not differ significantly between auctions and negotiations, as is the
opposite in BM. For target characteristics, we find that auctioned targets are associated
with higher debt ratio, lower ROE, lower Tobin’s Q, lower sales growth, lower industry
liquidity index, lower economic shock index and lower M&A activity.
Our wealth measures are target returns (TCAR), bidder returns (BCAR), target wealth
gains (T$CAR), bidder wealth gains (B$CAR), synergy wealth gains (S$CAR), synergy
returns (SCAR) and target relative gains (DELTACAR). Specific definitions of these mea-
sures are discussed in Section 5.3. In our sample, bidder returns are on average negative;
there are no differences in TCAR (BCAR) between auctions and negotiations, but T$CAR
(B$CAR, S$CAR) are significantly lower (higher) in auctions. We do not find a significant
difference in SCAR and DELTACAR between auctions and negotiations.
3.4 DETERMINANTS OF SALES METHOD
Before revisiting the wealth effects of the sales method, we consider the determinants of
the sales method, where we focus, respectively, on auctions versus negotiations, the number
of bidders contacted, and deal initiation.
3.4.1 Auctions versus Negotiations
While we are not the first paper to analyze the determinants of the sales method, we
propose, however, a richer set of explanatory variables. The specifications include uncer-
tainty, target financial characteristics and operating performance, but also cover target
financial constraints and target industry characteristics.
Table F2 (in Appendix F) reports the results for seven logistic model estimations of
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the sales method. The dependent variable is the binary auction dummy. We organize the
explanatory variables into five categories: (i) target financial characteristics, (ii) target
uncertainty, (iii) target information cost, (iv) target operating performance, (v) target
financial constraints, and (vi) target industry characteristics.
Target financial characteristics include Target Size, Leverage, ROA, ROE and Tobin’s
Q. Target uncertainty is proxied by Return Standard Deviation (Return Std.). Target in-
formation cost is measured by R&D intensity: the higher R&D intensity is, the greater the
magnitude of the private information is. Target operating performance includes Beta, Liq-
uidity, Market Share Growth, SG&A (selling, general and administrative expenses), Change
in ROA and Change in Sales Growth. We also define two dummies: Change in ROA/Sales
Growth Negative/Positive dummy that equals 1 when change in ROA/sales growth rate is
negative/positive and include two interaction variables of Change in ROA/Sales Growth
and their associated dummies. Target financial constraints include two dummies: High
SA/WW Index that equals 1 when target’s SA/WW Index is higher than the industry
median. Finally, target industry characteristics include the Economics Shock Index and
Herfindahl index.
Model (1) in Table F2 focuses on target financial characteristics, uncertainty and in-
formation cost. Model (2) adds target operating performance. In both models, auction is
significantly associated with higher leverage, lower ROE and information cost (R&D inten-
sity), and lower market share growth, decreases in ROA, and with positive changes in sales
growth. The relation between auctions and these variables is consistent across all of the
models presented in Table F2. Since EBIT is the numerator of ROA, our results suggest
that auctioned targets are usually not big players in the market and are more likely to have
higher operating expenses that decrease their returns on equity. Such operating expenses
also cause their ROA to dramatically drop over the year before the M&A deal. In contrast,
sales growths increases over the year before the M&A deal. Models (3) – (5) add financial
constraint indices as explanatory variables. Both the SA and WW index are functions of
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target size. For example, the two dummy variables that indicate High SA and high WW
index have correlations of approximately 60% with target size. To avoid multicollinearity,
we omit target size in these models. Model (3) adds the High SA Index dummy and Model
(4) adds the High WW Index dummy. The SA index dummy is not significant, but the
WW index dummy is significant. This provides some evidence that more financially con-
strained targets are more likely to use an auction in a corporate takeover. In Model (5) we
add the Economics Shock Index and the Herfindahl index. The Economics Shock Index is
significantly and negatively related to the likelihood of an auction, which is in line with
the earlier result from the summary statistics showing a clear time series pattern. We see
more bidder-initiated deals and negotiations and fewer auctions during active M&A years.
We revisit this time-series relationship later in this section. For model (5), we report both
the logit coefficients and marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the likelihood of
conducting an auction for easier interpretation.
3.4.2 Bidder competition
We next analyze the determinants of the number of bidders contacted in the sales
process. We use a Tobit model where the dependent variable is the number of bidders
contacted, right censored at the maximum number of bidders in the sample: 113. Table
F3 reports the results. We start with the same explanatory variables as in Model (2) from
Table F3. For brevity, we do not report specifications separately with the WW and SA
Index dummies), as their coefficients are insignificant and they do not affect the other
coefficient estimates in any of the specifications. Instead, we use the KZ Index dummy to
measure financial constraints. Model (1) shows that a negative change in ROA and positive
change in Sales Growth and the KZ Index dummy are significant determinants of bidder
competition. Model (2) we drop leverage from Model (1) and ROA becomes significantly
and negatively related to bidder competition. Model (3) and (4) adds the Economic Shock
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Index, Herfindahl Index and Potential Competition. In general, bidder competition is
positively associated with targets with lower ROA, lower information cost, lower market
share growth, negative change in ROA, positive change in Sales Growth, tighter financial
constraints, and lower industry economic shocks. Overall, the determinants of bidder
competition are similar to those in the sales method estimations12.
3.4.3 Deal initiation
Next, we examine the determinants of deal initiation and compare these to the determi-
nants of the sales method. The timing of the sales method differs between target-initiated
and bidder-initiated deals. For example, for target-initiated deals, the sales method occurs
simultaneously with the target’s decision to sell the firm. For bidder-initiated deals, how-
ever, the choice of method occurs after the bidder expresses its interest in merging with the
target. The simultaneity between the deal initiation and sales method in target-initiated
deals suggests that the incentives behind these two might be similar.
We report the results of this analysis in Table F4. In each specification, the dependent
variable equals 1 when the target initiates the deal and 0 otherwise. We start in Model (1)
with a similar set of explanatory variables that we used in the sales method estimation of
Model (5) in Table F2, but, without affecting our results, exclude the Herfindahl Index. We
find that target-initiated deals, like auctions, are associated with higher leverage, positive
changes in sales growth, and lower industry economic shocks. Model (2) drops Change
in ROA, Change in ROA negative and Change in ROA Ö Change Negative. In addition,
we find that target-initiated deals have lower Tobin’s Q. Model (3) adds sales growth into
Model (2). While the results from Model (2) hold, we also find that target-initiated deals
have higher sales growth rates, lower market share growth and tighter financial constraints.
12We also estimate the last model in the auction subsample and find that only Change in ROA Ö Change
Negative, Change in Sales Growth Ö Change Positive and KZ Index Dummy are positively related to the
number of bidders contacted.
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In Models (4) - (6) we drop Economics Shock Index, ROA, ROE and R&D intensity
sequentially. Our results continue to hold, in addition we find Uniqueness, a measure of
administrative and advertising expenses, increases with the likelihood of a target initiated
deal. Relative to Model (6), Model (7) adds the industry median Tobin’s Q. We find that
the coefficients on High WW index and (firm-specific) Tobin’s Q are not significant, while
higher industry Tobin’s Q is significantly related to bidder-initiated deals13.
These results suggest that when targets initiate a deal, they tend to operate in more
competitive industries. Also, these industries have fewer growth opportunities. In addition,
they are more leveraged, but experience positive sales growth. They also bear the burden
of higher administrative and advertising expenses. The commonality in deal initiation
and sales method determinants suggests that they are motivated by the similar incentives.
Tobin’s Q provides an interesting exception as it is an important determinant for deal
initiation, but is unrelated to the sales method.
3.5 M&A WEALTH EFFECTS AND THE SALES METHOD
We proceed with our analysis of the valuation consequences of the sales method, taking
into account the determinants for the sales method and deal initiation from the previous
section. To test the extended competition tradeoff hypothesis we analyze the target wealth
effects of auctions and negotiations and compare our findings with the results reported
in BM. We conduct an event study analysis of target returns followed by cross-sectional
multiple regression analyses. We then proceed to a two-stage simultaneous regression
framework to control for endogeneity between target returns and sales method. In Section
5.2 we re-estimate the two-stage simultaneous equation system where the number of bidders
13Tobin’s Q is often used as a proxy for operating performance. For example, Gompers et al. (2003)
conclude that firms with more shareholder rights are better governed since they have a higher Tobin’s Q.
Yermack (1996) also proxies board performance by Tobin’s Q.
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contacted proxies for bidder competition and investigate its relation with target returns.
In Section 5.3 we test the bidder competition tradeoff hypothesis and analyze bidder and
combined (synergy) wealth effects of the sales method.
3.5.1 The extended competition tradeoff hypothesis and target returns
Table 3.3 reports the average cumulative market-model adjusted abnormal returns for
the target, TCAR, based on a (–1, +1) window where day 0 is the announcement date
and the market index is the CRSP value-weighted index. The average of TCAR for both
the auction and negotiation subsamples are significantly positive and in line with earlier
studies. There is no significant difference in the average TCAR between auctions and
negotiations.
Table 3.3: Event Study Analysis: [-1, +1] Window
Sample Target Return (N=575)
Panel A. Full Sample: Mean Return (p-value)
Full Sample 26.0%
(0.000)
Panel B. Analysis by Sales Procedure: Mean Return (p-value)
Negotiation 26.2%
(0.000)
Auction 25.8%
(0.000)
Panel C. Paired t-tests: t-statistic (p-value)
Negotiation 0.4%
v.s. Auction (0.856)
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We next conduct a multivariate analysis of TCAR based on cross-sectional OLS regres-
sions. To conserve space we do not tabulate these results. Our main variable of interest is
the dummy variable for the sales method (Auction) and we include a set of control variables
that have been shown in the literature to affect target returns. All variables are defined in
Appendix G. Specifically, we include various combinations of relative size, a cash dummy
to indicate a pure cash deal; a tender offer dummy, a bidder-initiated deal dummy, and
target return standard deviation. The coefficient on auction is never significantly different
from zero in any of our specifications, suggesting there is no difference in target premiums
between negotiations and auctions. In contrast, relative size, cash dummy, tender dummy,
and return standard deviation each have coefficients significantly different from zero.
A concern with the OLS framework is that the coefficient on auction will likely be
biased because of endogeneity. For example, Hansen (2001), Smith (1987) and BM point
out the potential endogeneity bias arising from the method of sales and target returns. We
confirm the presence of an endogeneity bias between the two variables in our sample using
the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and therefore follow the previous literature and conduct a
series of two-stage simultaneous regression analyses14.
In our two-stage regression models, we follow our multiple regression analysis and Boone
and Mulherin (2007) in specifying our target returns equation by including a similar set
of explanatory variables. For our first stage equation, we choose two instruments for
Auction, which results in an over-identified system where the additional instruments can
be used to increase the precision of the estimates as they provide more exogenous variation
in predicting the endogenous variable15. With a single instrument there would be less
exogenous variation in the endogenous variable and the estimators less efficient.
Following Roberts and Whited (2012), we rely on economic arguments to justify our
14This is based on a two-stage regression, in which the first-stage has an auction dummy as the dependent
variable and the other variables from the target returns equation as explanatory variables.
15For example, Angrist and Krueger (1991) show that using 180 instruments in the schooling application
study gives tighter correct confidence intervals than using 3 instruments.
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instruments, but acknowledge that any instrument is subject to criticism in empirical cor-
porate finance research. We use target sales growth and deal volume, measured as the total
number of deals in each year in our main sample as instruments for Auction16. For target
sales growth, Comment and Schwert (1995) and Schwert (2000) document that target sales
growth is not significantly related to target returns. We are also unable to find evidence of
a significant relation between aggregate M&A activity and target returns, despite a large
literature investigating the determinants of target returns. Moreover, Bradley et al. (1988)
finds that institutional and regulatory change, as partially described by deal volume, does
not have a significant impact on target returns (instrument exclusion)17.
We report the results of our two-stage regression models in Table 3.418. Model (1)
is the baseline model. In the first-stage, Auction is regressed on the set of exogenous
variables, including the two instruments. The p-value for the joint F-test is less than 0.001
and indicates that our instruments are significantly related to Auction.Hall et al. (1996)
use Monte Carlo simulation to show that simply having an F-statistic that is significant
at the typical 5% or 10% level is not sufficient. Stock et al. (2002) suggest that the F-
statistic should exceed 10 for inference based on the 2SLS estimator to be reliable when
there is one endogenous explanatory variable. Our F-statistic is 11.515, therefore the
instrument relevance criteria appear to be satisfied. In the second stage, TCAR is regressed
on the fitted value of Auction (Auction*) from the first-stage and on the same set of
exogenous variables, excluding the two instruments. To test instrument exclusion, we
conduct Sargan’s test of over-identification restrictions and report the results in the table.
The null hypothesis is that instruments are valid and a significant test statistic could
therefore represent either invalid instruments or an incorrectly specified model. Our p-
value for Sargan’s test is 0.913, suggesting our instruments are valid. For each of the
16We think it is sensible to use deal volume in our restricted sample, since our target returns estimation
is focused on this sample.
17Harford (2005)shows that deregulatory events are associated with the beginning of merger waves.
18BM use target size as an instrument, but we find that this does not satisfy the relevance condition.
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subsequent two-stage regression models, we report a joint first-stage F-test statistic and
p-value, and Sargan’s test statistic and p-value.
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Table 3.4: Two-Stage Regression Analysis: (-1, +1) Window
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage (a) (b) (a) (b).
Intercept 1.470*** -0.083 1.766 -0.348 -0.570* 0.042 -0.299** 0.072
(0.324) (0.076) (1.388) (0.271) (0.331) (0.104) (0.149) (0.083)
Auction* 0.358*** 0.325*** 0.641* 0.138 0.450*** 0.119
(0.111) (0.107) (0.330) (0.155) (0.156) (0.137)
Relative Size -0.032 -0.010 0.001 -0.010 -0.044** -0.055* -0.028** -0.041**
(0.053) (0.006) (0.057) (0.006) (0.018) (0.031) (0.011) (0.021)
Cash 0.485** -0.002 0.619*** -0.001 0.049 0.057 0.005 0.053
(0.219) (0.030) (0.238) (0.031) (0.040) (0.059) (0.035) (0.049)
Tender -0.982*** 0.174*** -0.984*** 0.153*** 0.291*** -0.006 0.248*** 0.041
(0.249) (0.039) (0.274) (0.039) (0.087) (0.056) (0.055) (0.054)
Bidder Initiated -0.761*** 0.084*** -0.717*** 0.068** 0.204* 0.047 0.140*** 0.038
(0.182) (0.030) (0.197) (0.029) (0.105) (0.041) (0.054) (0.033)
Return Std. 3.918 1.290** 6.381 1.520** 2.194** 1.564* 1.960** 1.091
(4.641) (0.531) (5.571) (0.613) (1.097) (0.924) (0.839) (0.701)
Sales Growth -0.336* -0.412**
(0.179) (0.196)
Deal Volume -0.023*** -0.026***
(0.006) (0.006)
N 575 575 192 191 288 287
Industry FE No No Yes Yes No No No No
Pseudo R2/Adj. R2 0.092 0.068 0.134 0.088 0.090 0.02 0.09 0.029
F-statistics 11.516 11.635
p-value 0.000 0.000
Sargan’s Chi-sq 0.012 0.101 0.656 0.000 1.679 0.01
p-value 0.913 0.751 0.418 0.990 0.195 0.918
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The coefficient estimate in the second stage on Auction* is 35.8% and significant at the
one-percent level, which suggests that auctions significantly increase target returns. We
will further discuss this result and its implications later in the section.
In Model (2) we add industry fixed effects in both of our two stage models. The
coefficient on Auction* is 32.5% and remains significant at the one-percent level19. Model
(3) and (4) investigates how relative size affects our result from Model (2). In particular,
Models (3a) and (3b), respectively, split the sample into deals where the relative size of
the target is equal or below the median and above the median. Similarly, Models (4a)
and (4b) split the sample into deals where the relative size of the target is at the bottom
and upper tercile. For both Models (3a) and (4a), where we analyze relatively smaller
targets we find a positive and significant coefficient on Auction*. The coefficients for these
two specifications are and 45.0% and 64.1% respectively, while the coefficients for Models
(3b) and (4b) are 13.8% and 11.9% and both statistically insignificantly different from
zero percent. Together, our results are consistent with the predictions of the extended
competition tradeoff hypothesis and show that for relatively smaller targets we find the
strongest relation between the sales method and target returns.
3.5.2 Bidder competition and target returns
The two-stage simultaneous equation system allows us to estimate the relationship
between bidder competition proxied by the number of bidders contacted and target returns.
We use the specifications from Table 3.4 in Section 5.1. In the first-stage, we use a Tobit
model where the dependent variable is the number of bidders contacted. The Tobit model
is right-censored at 113, which is the maximum number of bidders contacted in the sample.
19The results are robust to adding more controls variables to the specification of Model (2)., such as
indicator variables for pure stock deals, related deals, and Deal Value for deal characteristics and ROA,
Tobin’s Q and Leverage for target characteristics. We also use target returns measured in [–3, +3] window
around the deal announcement date for Model (2) and the result still holds.
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Table F5 reports the result of the Tobit models. In Model (1) and (2) we see that
our result goes beyond the binary method of sales: greater bidder competition also signif-
icantly increases target returns. This result is related to Aktas et al. (2010), who focus
on the role of ex-ante competition as a threat for the bidder if the first-stage one-to-one
negotiation fails, in the number of bids. They find a positive relation between ex-ante
competition and bid premiums. They use industry deal frequency to proxy for ex-ante
competition. Note that we classify a deal as an auction when the number of bidders con-
tacted is greater than one and competition is measured prior to the process of actual bids
being submitted. Therefore, the results from the Tobit estimations in Table F5 suggest
that when ex-ante competition is higher, target returns are higher. Because we measure
the ex-ante competition specific to the target and the deal, our results are more informative
and contribute to our understanding of how true competition for the target contributes to
target shareholders’ wealth.
In summary, we find a positive and significant association between auctions and target
returns. However, this does not imply that firms should always use auctions. We show
that when information costs are relatively small, as is the case with relatively small targets,
auctions are, on average, preferred. However, as information costs increase auctions no
longer are associated with higher target returns.
3.5.3 The bidder competition tradeoff hypothesis: Alternative wealth mea-
sures
The primary focus of the literature on wealth effects associated with the sales methods
is on target premiums. An important, yet largely unanswered question is whether and how
the sales method affects bidder returns, synergy returns, and the distribution of gains be-
tween the bidder and the target. According to the bidder competition tradeoff hypothesis,
bidders, as a result of competition, face a tradeoff between the cost of offering a higher
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premium in order to win the bid, but also benefit from acquiring more information about
the target’s valuation, for example, about other bidders’ private signals of the target’s val-
uation. Note that the information gain in the due diligence process to each bidder is not
affected by the increased competition. Especially for relatively small targets where the set
of private signals from other bidders is larger, the potential benefit from more competition
through information aggregation may outweigh the cost of offering a higher premium.
Next, we include, in addition to the variables from our baseline model in Table 3.4,
target (bidder) size, bidder return std., and the number of target (bidder) SIC codes,
relative market share (target/bidder), hostile, target (bidder) operating cash flow and
relative Tobin’s Q (target/bidder). To avoid multicollinearity we only include target size
in models explaining target wealth effects and bidder size in all other models. As before,
we recognize the importance of proper identification and conduct a Durbin-Wu-Hausman
endogeneity test to determine whether there is potential endogeneity between each wealth
measure and auction choice for each model. We conclude that an endogeneity bias is again
likely between TCAR and the sales method, but not for our alternative wealth measures.
Therefore, we maintain the two-stage regression framework for TCAR, but use OLS for
the other wealth measures. We continue to use Target Sales Growth and Deal Volume as
instruments for Auction as they continue to satisfy the exclusion and relevance conditions.
Table F7 the results for the full sample. Model (1) confirms that for TCAR the coef-
ficient on Auction* remains positive and significant using the expanded specification. In
model (2) we investigate the relation between the sales method and bidder returns (BCAR).
BCAR is measured in the same way as TCAR and represents the bidder’s cumulative ab-
normal return in a (-1, +1) window around the deal announcement. The coefficient on
Auction is insignificant, suggesting that the sales method does not affect bidder returns.
We next consider dollar denominated returns ($CAR), which proxies for the net present
value of the transaction (Malatesta, 1985). For the target (bidder), the T$CAR (B$CAR)
is defined as the product of the TCAR (BCAR) and the market value of the target (bidder)
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measured one year prior to the deal announcement. In model (3) we find that the coefficient
on Auction is negative and significant if we focus on dollar dominated target wealth gains
(T$CAR). As F1 shows, targets in auctions are substantially smaller than those in negoti-
ations. The opposite signs of the coefficient on Auction in models (1) and (3) suggest that
the positive relation between target percentage returns and auctions is driven by smaller
targets. These auctioned targets have greater returns but are smaller, resulting in smaller
dollar gains. In summary, shareholders of smaller targets benefit from auctions in terms of
greater percentage returns, which represent smaller dollar gains. Vice versa, shareholders
of larger targets experience smaller returns measured in percentage terms that translate
into a greater dollar gains. This is consistent with our extended target competition tradeoff
hypothesis: smaller targets are more likely to enter into auctions because they are able to
attract a larger set of potential bidders and hence induce greater competition premium;
meanwhile their information costs in the auctions are much smaller20. The results based
on the dollar denominated returns, compared to those obtained with traditional announce-
ment period returns (TCAR), also illustrate that targets would not be uniformly better off
choosing an auction over a negotiation.
A similar observation can be made with respect to bidder percentage returns versus
dollar denominated returns, as shown in models (2) and (4). In model (2), the coefficient on
Auction is insignificant; in model (4), the coefficient on Auction is positive and significant
at the five percent level. From the summary statistics in F1, we know that bidder returns
are negative on average and that bidders are smaller in auctions than in negotiations.
This suggests that while there is no difference in bidder returns between auctions and
negotiations, smaller bidders in auctions are associated with smaller dollar denominated
20In unreported tables, we calculate the distribution of relative size, target and bidder market size. The
intersection between the terciles representing the smallest (largest) targets and the largest (smallest) relative
size in the sample contains only 18% (19%) of the sample observations. Similarly, the intersection between
the terciles representing the largest (smallest) bidders and the largest (smallest) relative size in the sample
contains only 7% (4%) of the sample observations. The correlation between relative size and, respectively,
target and bidder size is 0.222 and -0.587, both significant at the one-percent level.
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wealth losses. This is consistent with our bidder competition tradeoff hypothesis: smaller
bidders are more likely to enter into auctions because they rely more than the information
aggregation benefits of auctions to obtain more precise valuations of targets.
In unreported analysis, we re-estimate model (3) for, respectively, the bottom and top
terciles, and below and above median sub-samples of relative size. We confirm that BCAR
exhibits a positive, but marginally significant (p-value=0.101) relation with Auction for the
bottom tercile of relative size (i.e., on average smaller targets), but not for the other terciles.
This finding is consistent with the idea that relative size affects the bidder competition
tradeoffs: for bidders associated with relatively small targets, the benefits of information
aggregation are greater because the set of private signals from other bidders is larger, which
leads to a more precise valuation of the target, in the spirit of the Law of Larger Numbers.
Next, we consider the synergy returns based on the percentage and dollar denominated
return measures, SCAR and S$CAR. Synergy returns (SCAR) are defined as the market
value-weighted average of TCAR and BCAR, following Bradley, et al., (1988). The sum
of T$CAR and B$CAR, S$CAR, represents to the total dollar gain associated with the
transaction. In model (5) we find no association between the sales method and SCAR,
which we expect based SCAR representing a value-weighted average where the size effects
likely cancel each other out. In model (6) we consider the total dollar gain (S$CAR), which
is the sum of T$CAR and B$CAR. Since S$CAR is not value-weighted and because bidders
are generally larger than targets, it is no surprise to see that the coefficient on Auction is
similar to the one reported in model (4) for B$CAR.
Finally, we investigate whether the sales method is associated with the distribution of
the total gains, S$CAR, between the bidder and the target. We follow Ahern (2012) and
define relative gains accruing to the target shareholders (DELTACAR) as the difference
between target and bidder dollar gains, divided by the total market value. This measure
represents the relative gain of the target gains versus the acquirer for each dollar of total
market value and avoids the concern that total merger gains may be negative. Model (7)
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shows no relation between the sales method and DELTACAR.
Taken together, the results in Table F7 suggest the sales method is associated with
wealth effects beyond those of target returns and that the results are consistent with the
predictions of our hypotheses. First, though on average bidder competition tradeoffs cancel
out and result in no wealth effect from the auction, the value of the discovery process for
the bidder associated with a relatively small target in an auction outweighs the competition
cost, because of the larger set of private signals from other bidders. Second, the results
on wealth gains illustrate the size effect of sales method. Targets have greater return
in auctions but they are smaller, hence they have lower wealth gains. Bidder returns on
average are not affected by the sales method but bidders are smaller in auctions, hence they
have lower wealth losses. This size effect is consistent with our hypotheses. Smaller targets
enter into auctions because the set of potential bidders is larger and the information cost is
smaller. Smaller bidders enter into auctions because they rely more than the information
aggregation function of auctions to obtain more precise valuation of the targets.
3.6 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND MODEL VALIDITY
In this section, we evaluate the robustness of our results and also validate our empirical
model using an out-of-sample test.
3.6.1 Robustness
We first address the concern that announcement period returns may be biased because
they may not properly reflect differences in perceived likelihoods of deal completion based
on the sales method. If auctions are considered to be more likely to complete than ne-
gotiated deals, our results may reflect the difference in this likelihood. To mitigate this
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concern we estimate buy-and-hold abnormal returns starting one day before the public
announcement of the deal until one day after the effective date of the deal where there is
no more uncertainty regarding deal completion. We find that our results continue to hold
when we replace TCAR with its long-term counterpart. For brevity we do not report the
results in separate tables.
Industry variation could play a role in the tradeoffs between information costs and the
competition premium related to the sales method, which, in turn, affects returns. We
control for industry fixed effects in our basic specifications in F6. However, to better
understand what industry characteristics these industry dummies precisely capture and
these affect our results, we replace the industry dummies with four industry indices: the
economic shock index, the in-wave dummy, the Herfindahl index, and the liquidity index.
The in-wave dummy equals 1 when there is an industry merger wave in the target industry
during the deal announcement year. We estimate industry merger waves from our pre-
merging original SDC sample following the method in Harford (2005). We first divide the
sample into two subsamples: 1998-2005 and 2006-2012. Taking the total number of bids
over the entire subsample period for a given industry, we simulate 1,000 distributions of that
number of occurrences of industry member involvement in a bid over a 120-month period
by randomly assigning each occurrence to a month where the probability of assignment
is 1/96 for each month in the years 1998-2005 and 1/84 for the years 2006-2012. Since
waves are defined to be in 24 months, we compute the highest 24-month concentration
of activity from each of the 1,000 draws21. Finally, we compare the actual concentration
of activity from the potential wave to the empirical distribution of 1,000 peak 24-month
concentrations. If the actual peak concentration exceeds the 95th percentile from that
empirical distribution, that period is coded as a wave. The estimation results in 44 waves
in 19 industries. Table F6 shows that the coefficients on Auction* continue to be positive
and significant at a 5% level when we replace the industry dummies with the four industry
21We follow Harford (2005) and Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) in defining the length of merger waves
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indices and.
Finally, Bao and Edmans (2011) and Golubov et al. (2012) find that financial advisors
may possess a heterogeneous set of skills in advising M&A deals. In particular, for target
financial advisors, they may influence the choice of the sales method. In unreported results,
we control for financial advisor fixed effects in our baseline two-stage regression model. The
number of observations drops to 531 and the coefficient on Auction* is still statistically
significant. This implies that our results are robust to controlling for unobserved hetero-
geneity in financial advisors across deals as well. This further suggests that the different
set of skills of financial advisors22 alone cannot explain the auction’s wealth effects.
3.6.2 Out of sample evaluation
To validate our empirical models about target returns, we re-evaluate such results and
our estimations of the sales method using an out of sample methodology. Out-of-sample
validation addresses the questions of how models predict data, which is a different question
from how models describe the data.
We proceed as follows. Our estimation sample includes the 575 deals for which we have
information on deal initiation and sales method. Our validation sample includes the 792
deals without this information. We use the logistic models based on the estimation sample
to generate predicted probabilities of these two variables: deal initiation and sales method
and derive the optimal cutoff probabilities for the predicted probabilities. In our validation
sample, we use our estimated models to generate predicted probabilities and classify sales
method and deal initiation using cutoffs and evaluate our two-stage model of target returns
of sales method in the validation sample. The out-of-sample methodology is described in
Appendix H.2.
22Bao and Edmans (2011)) shows that certain banks have ability in identifying acquisitions or negotiating
terms, or trustworthiness in turning down bad deals.Golubov et al. (2012) shows that certain banks might
be better at one sales method (auction or negotiation) in conducting M&A deals.
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Table F8 reports the results of re-estimating our two-stage regression model for the val-
idation sample with the predicted auction and bidder-initiation dummies. The coefficient
on Auction* remains positive and significant at the five percent level, which implies that
the positive target wealth effect of auctions holds in the validation sample. The coefficient
is 0.291, which is similar to the effect found in the estimation sample. This suggests that
the results on target returns from our two-stage regression models can be generalized to a
larger and independent data set and do not come from potential small sample bias.
3.7 CONCLUSIONS
We investigate the determinants and the shareholder wealth effects of the sales method
in a sample of 575 M&A transactions during 1998-2012. Firms sold through auctions have
higher leverage, idiosyncratic risk, operating and interest expenses, lower market share
growth, smaller industry economic shocks; greater positive change in sales growth, and
negative changes in ROA. We estimate the determinants of deal initiation and conclude
that targets choose auctions to optimize their search for bidders that can relieve their
financial constraints and pay a higher premium.
We extend the hypothesis that the choice between auctions and negotiations is deter-
mined by a tradeoff between the competition premium and information costs and argue
that relative size plays an important role in this tradeoff. We find that for relatively small
targets the competition premium outweighs information cost, whereas for relatively large
targets, these two effects may cancel out. We find that auctions are associated with higher
target announcement returns, particularly for smaller targets. This result is robust to
controlling for industry characteristics and a large set of deal characteristics.
Bidders are expected to face tradeoffs between competition cost and information ag-
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gregation benefit in auctions where information aggregation benefits outweigh competition
costs for bidders associated with relatively small targets, but these effects might cancel out
for other bidders. Our empirical analysis provides weak support for the bidder competi-
tion hypothesis. We show that targets have greater percentage returns in auctions, but are
smaller in size. Bidder percentage returns are unaffected by the sales method, but bidders
are smaller in auctions. As a result, we find that auctions are associated with lower target
dollar gains and higher bidder dollar gains, which lends further support to the target and
bidder competition tradeoff hypotheses.
In terms of social efficiency and wealth redistribution, we find that synergy percentage
returns are positively related to auctions. This suggests that the sales method is not a
zero-sum game where target shareholder gains are just wealth transfers. Consistent with
this, we find no association between the sales method and a measure of the relative gain
captured by the target shareholders.
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APPENDIX A
STRATEGY FREQUENCY ESTIMATION-CHAPTER 1
We will briefly describe the econometric model adopted in SFEM, discuss about the
set of strategies we include in the estimation and then reports the estimated frequency of
strategies for each of the treatments. To use SFEM, we assume that each subject chooses
a fixed strategy for the last six cycles (the supergames). These chosen strategies are
implemented with the possibility of independent mistakes, where another choice than the
intended action is made. In this section, we report the results from our SFEM estimations.
We first briefly describe the econometric model adopted and then report the estimated
strategy weights for each of the main treatments.
Denote the choice made by subject i in round t of cycle m by cimt. We specify a
priori a set of K possible public perfect strategies Φ = {φ1, . . . , φK}, where the choice
of the strategy φk prescribes the choice s
k
imt = φ
(
yjm1, ..., yjm(t−1)
)
following the public
history
(
yjm1,, . . . , yjm(t−1)
)
. Each subject is assumed to follow a particular strategy φk,
but they make independent mistakes each round with a probability (1 − β), and chose
the prescribed action with probability β. Given three actions (C, D and T ) a random
uniform choice is represented by β = 1/3 , while a perfect match with a strategy by β = 1.
The econometric model assumes a mixture model across the available strategies, so that
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strategy φk is selected with probability qk.
Define the indicator, Ikimt = 1{cimt = skimt}, which assigns a value of one if the observed
subject choice matches the strategy choice σk match. The likelihood that the observed
choices for subject i were generated by the strategy φk are given by
Pr
i
(φk;β) :=
∏
m∈Mi
∏
t=1Tim
βI
k
imt (1− β)1−Ikimt ,
where Mi is the set of cycles, and Tim the set of active rounds. Combining across all
subjects in a treatment we obtain the following likelihood function:
∑
i∈I
ln
∑
φk∈Φ
qk Pr
i
(φk;β)

for the specified set of strategies Φ and summing the log-likelihoods across all subjects I in
the treatment. The parameters to be estimated by maximum likelihood are the vector of
probabilities q = (q1, . . . qK) and the strategy-match probability β, under constraints that
β ∈ [1/3, 1], and that the vector of probabilities q lies in the probability K-simplex. The
numerical maximization, and bootstrapping of the results, was completed in Mathematica
using a differential-evolution constrained-optimization algorithm, using starting points for
the estimation obtained following the same techniques followed in Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette
(2011).1
In total we allow for 38 different strategies, motivated by theory and the previous
experimental literature. Many of the important strategies are defined in the main text,
but a full list and definition of each strategy are available from the authors by request.
1We also conducted the same exercise in Matlab using modified code provided by Guillaume Fre´chette,
obtained qualitatively similar results. However, the Mathematica numerical routines seemed to be slightly
better at attaining a global solution.
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Table A1: Strategy Estimates: Main Treatments (last six cycles)
None Sym-75 Sym-125 Asym-First Asym-Last Asym-Moral
AC 0.056 0.178?? 0.136? 0.279?
(0.041) (0.090) (0.075) (0.148)
AD 0.335??? 0.307??? 0.189??? 0.360??? 0.037
(0.086) (0.097) (0.066) (0.121) (0.037)
AT 0.052 0.928??? 0.058
(0.053) (0.070) (0.043)
CDCD 0.024 0.072 0.034
(0.032) (0.056) (0.031)
DCDC 0.025 0.022 0.037
(0.032) (0.028) (0.028)
C-AllD 0.057 0.022 0.070 0.038 0.040
(0.042) (0.021) (0.058) (0.049) (0.051)
C-T
D-T
Grim 0.255??? 0.240? 0.247???
(0.094) (0.124) (0.092)
Mono 0.070 0.023 0.028
(0.058) (0.069) (0.022)
WSLS 0.036 0.070 0.040
(0.031) (0.051) (0.050)
T11 CD 0.005 0.019
(0.019) (0.037)
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S-Mono 0.070 0.022
(0.044) (0.026)
S-WSLS 0.046 0.023
(0.033) (0.022)
Grim-2
Grim-3
Mono21 0.073 0.082
(0.060) (0.070)
Mono31 0.003 0.246?
(0.025) (0.147)
Mono12
Mono22
Sum2 0.045 0.042 0.020
(0.044) (0.033) (0.040)
Sum3
Sum4
S-Sum2 0.037
(0.050)
C-1-Strike 0.049 0.022 0.099
(0.070) (0.032) (0.088)
C-2-Strike 0.027 0.115? 0.133
(0.041) (0.065) (0.131)
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C-3-Strike 0.045 0.050
(0.058) (0.051)
D-1-Strike 0.022
(0.024)
D-2-Strike 0.054 0.034
(0.048) (0.041)
D-3-Strike
CD-11-Strike
CD-12-Strike
CD-21-Strike 0.054
(0.103)
CD-22-Strike
Probation
S-Probation 0.026
(0.033)
Probation21 0.171?
(0.094)
Probation12
β 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.033) (0.028) (0.025) (0.039) (0.027) (0.020)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors (across sessions, subjects and cycles) in parentheses. Significance
indicated by: ???–1 percent level; ??–5 percent level; ?–10 percent level.
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APPENDIX B
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES-CHAPTER 1
B.0.1 Within-Session Dynamics
Examining subjects’ initial response in the experiment—the first round of the very first
cycle, before they have interacted with other subjects—we do not see a stark cooperation
differences across treatments. Across all sessions the median initial cooperation rates is 70
percent, with an interquartile range of 64–73 percent.1 Expanding beyond this very first
choice in the experiment, and analyzing the first six cycles in the sessions, the cooperation
rate in active rounds in symmetric treatments is generally within the 60–70 percent range.
For the other treatments, outliers in initial cooperation are the No T treatment, with an
already much-lower active cooperation rate of 50 percent, and the A-Judge treatment with
76.5 percent cooperation.2
1Extreme outliers for initial cooperation in cycle-one-round-one are one session of No T and one for
S-75 on the low side (36 and 46 percent, respectively), and one session of S-75 and one for S-125 on the
high (89 percent and 92 percent).
2No T is significantly lower (p = 0.030) and A-Judge is significantly higher (p = 0.051) than the
symmetric treatments S-75–135. A-First also has significantly lower initial cooperation than the symmetric
treatments (p = 0.051), however the difference is quantitatively smaller, at 57 percent active cooperation.
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No T S-75 S-85 S-95 S-105 S-115 S-125 S-135 A-JudgeA-First A-Last0%
50%
100%
C   Active, first 6 cycles
Inactive, first 6 cycles
C   Active, last 6 cycles
Inactive, last 6 cycles
Figure B1: Cooperation and Inactivity across Sessions
As the session progresses, the active cooperation rate decreases by approximately 10
percent in each treatment, with the exception of A-Judge and A-First. Looking at the final
six cycles in each session, the symmetric treatments have active cooperation rates of 50–55
percent (with a single outlier in the S-95 session). No T decreases to 40.5 percent active
cooperation, while A-Last has a similar ten percent decrease to 46.8 percent. For A-First,
the cooperation rate slide is much larger, decreasing to just 9.6 percent active cooperation
in the final six cycles, with a matched increase in inactivity across the session. Finally,
A-Judge is the only treatment which shows an increase in cooperation across session. The
final six-cycles in A-Judge have active cooperation rates of 87.0 percent, while activity
rates remains fairly constant across the sessions at approximately 94 percent.3
For the symmetric treatments with termination, the activity-rate trend across sessions
is more varied. All sessions for S-75 –95 show increased relationship activity (and reduced
3Figure B1 in Appendix B.0.1 illustrates the activity and cooperation across sessions by treatment.
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termination rates) in the last six cycles when compared to the first six, as subjects move
away from using the termination action as the session progresses. In contrast, every session
from S-105 –135 shows decreased relationship activity (increased termination) in the final
six cycles (though the activity drop in the single S-115 session is quantitatively small).
B.0.2 Conditional Response
To examine aggregate strategic responses, Figure B2 illustrates the proportion of action
choices (either C, D or Terminate) conditioned on the previous round’s history in our multi-
session treatments (similar graphs for the single-session symmetric treatments are provided
in Appendix B.1). Given the imperfect monitoring environment, subject i observes the
sub-history
(
at−1i , y
t−1) for all rounds t ≥ 2, her own previous action choice and the
public outcome, and the empty history ∅ in the very first round. Each figure indicates the
proportion of choices in Active rounds over the last six cycles in the session.4 The main
square in each figure represents all active rounds in rounds two and onward, while the
thinner bar to the left indicates the actions chosen in the first round. The set of all active
rounds is then sub-divided horizontally to indicate the previous round’s history. The square
is therefore divided into at most four regions, as all active rounds have a sub-history in
{C,D}×{S, F}. The proportion of active rounds with the relevant sub-history is given by
the area covered by each of these four bands, here proportional to their width. For instance,
in the No-Termination treatment the modal action-outcome pair in the previous round was
(D,F), while the least common was (C,F ). In contrast, for S-125, the most common action-
outcome the previous round was (C,S), though it should be noted that only 54.5 percent of
the relevant rounds in this treatment are active.5 Each history-specific band (including the
4Given M total cycles in a session, all analyses referring to the last six cycles use session cycles M −3 to
M − 1, dropping the last cycle in the session to remove an end-session effect stemming from some subjects
realizing the session was about to end where the hour had elapsed. For each cycle, each subject has two
distinct partnerships, so we have a total of six distinct cycles.
5For all treatments except No Termination, we provide the activity rate for all rounds other that the
first one in the treatment label.
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Figure B2: Conditional response in last five cycles, ati
∣∣(at−1i , yt−1)
Note: For each treatment the main square indicate all active rounds for t ≥ 2 in the last six cycles. This is
then divided horizontally into the proportion of active rounds with the relevant (at−1i , y
t−1) history. The
proportion of action choices following each history are represented by dividing the band into three regions:
D in gray, at the bottom, C in white from the top, and the Terminate action in black. The bar to the left
in each plot indicates the proportion of actions chosen in the very first round.
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first round empty-history band) is itself divided up vertically into three regions, indicating
the proportion of actions chosen, given the last period’s sub-history. The bottom gray
region reflects the proportion of defection choices, the top white region reflects cooperation
choices, while the black middle region indicates termination choices. Examining the No-
Termination treatment, the figure indicates that the initial action choice in the first round
is to play a1i = C in 52 percent of subject-cycles, while D is played 48 percent of the time,
with no termination decisions (by design).
After the first round, conditional on cooperating and getting a successful outcome last
round,the (C, S) sub-history, subjects continue to cooperate 75 percent of the time in No
T, while for every other sub-history defection is the more common response (with defection
rates between 75–80 percent). In fact, the modal response to successful cooperation last
round is to cooperate again across all of our treatments, and at higher rates than No T.6
The highest cooperation rate following the (C, S) sub-history is for A-Judge, where subjects
continue to cooperate 93 percent of the time, though this is closely followed by S-75 at 91
percent. The large efficiency differences between A-Judge and S-75—67.1 percent vs. 42.3
percent payoff efficiency overall, and 69.6 percent vs 32.7 percent in the last six cycles—are
mostly attributable to greater first-round cooperation in A-Judge.
The figures partially illustrates leniency and forgiveness through the cooperation rates
after histories other than (C, S). In terms of symmetric memory-one strategies, cooperating
after the history (C,F ) indicates lenience (a willingness to delay entering a punishment
phase) while cooperation following (D,F ) and (D,S) indicates forgiveness (attempts to
enter a new cooperative phase from punishment). Across treatments, the most lenient and
forgiving treatment using this rubric is A-Judge. In comparison to No T, S-75 and S-
125 —where defection is the modal response to every sub-history bar (C, S)—the A-Judge
treatment has cooperation as the modal response regardless of previous round’s history.
6The No T cooperation rate following (C, S) is matched by A-First, though we will mostly ignore this
treatment for much of the discussion as there are only four Active-state observations in rounds two and
onward in the last six cycles, due to very high termination rates in round one.
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The treatment with the least lenient behavior is No T, with 29 percent cooperative decisions
following (C,F ) the previous round. In contrast, cooperation rates following (C,F ) in
symmetric treatments with termination are 42 percent in S-75 and 49 percent in S-125.
The presence of a dissolution option therefore increases the selection of lenient responses.7
In contrast to lenience, the presence of an unused, low-payoff termination option has a
negative effect on forgiveness. Pooling the decisions where (D,F ) and (D,S) occurred the
previous round, the cooperation rate is 20 percent in No T compared to just 13 percent in
S-75. Where termination is present and utilized, the raw cooperation rate after a defection
the last round increases in S-125 to 27 percent, so forgiveness seems to increase. In this
situation however, the reduced-form figure is harder to parse, as selection effects through
partnership dissolution are more pronounced. Because many more cycles are dissolved in
the punishment phase, those that are not are over-sampled. We address this in the paper
body through the SFEM analysis.
Examining the black shaded regions in each figure, the termination action is primarily
used either: i) as a decision to opt out in the very first round; ii) as a punishment following
failed cooperation, (C,F ); or iii) to exit an inefficient relationship following failed-defection,
(D,F ). In addition to A-First—where 90 percent of first-round actions are termination
and subsequently 99 percent of partnerships in the last six cycles end in round one—round-
one dissolution is most common in the S-105 –135 treatments (with 7–8 percent round-one
termination) and A-Last (7.5 percent). Outside these treatments, round-one termination
is rare (less than 0.5 percent across S-75–95 and 1.2 percent in A-Judge).
Conditional on being in an active relationship past round one, the highest dissolution
rates follow failed cooperation, and can thus be interpreted as unforgiving punishments.
The incidence of termination following (C,F ) varies from low rates in S-75 and S-85 (4.5
percent and 1.6 percent, respectively), to middling rates in A-Last (9.5 percent), to the
7The other symmetric termination treatments mostly have cooperation rates following (C,F ) of 43–53
percent, with the one outlier being S-135 with 33 percent cooperation.
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more substantial in S-95–135 and A-Judge (mostly in the 20–25 percent range, with two-
outliers S-115 at 14.6 percent and S-135 at 45.8 percent). Termination is rarely used
following successes last round, and termination rates are generally lower than 0.5 percent
after either (C, S) or (D,S).8 Finally, termination rates are non-negligible following a
failed defection the previous round. However, in all treatments but A-Last the termination
rate following (D,F ) is a fraction of that following (C,F ), and matches the idea that the
participant shares more of the blame for the observed failure, given their defection.
8The only notable exceptions are termination rates of 2.0 and 3.5 percent following the (D,S) history
in S-125 and S-135, respectively.
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B.1 SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURES AND INSTRUCTIONS (FOR ONLINE
PUBLICATION)
Table B1: Most Common Sequences
No-T S-75 S-125 A-First A-Last A-Judge
1 CCCCC CCCCC CCCCC Tˆ Tˆ Tˆ Tˆ Tˆ CCCCC CCCCC
(0.092) (0.267) (0.185) (0.701) (0.130) (0.390)
2 DDDDD DDDDD Tˆ Tˆ Tˆ Tˆ Tˆ CˆTˆ Tˆ Tˆ Tˆ Tˆ Tˆ Tˆ Tˆ Tˆ CCCCC
(0.082) (0.052) (0.050) (0.143) (0.047) (0.026)
3 CDDDD DDDDD CˆTˆ Tˆ Tˆ Tˆ CCCCC DDDDD CCCCC
(0.035) (0.022) (0.028) (0.035) (0.029) (0.022)
4 DDDDD CCCCC CTˆ Tˆ Tˆ Tˆ DˆTˆ Tˆ Tˆ Tˆ DˆTˆ Tˆ Tˆ Tˆ CCCCC
(0.032) (0.022) (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) (0.022)
5 DDDDD DDDDD DDˆTˆ Tˆ Tˆ CTˆ Tˆ Tˆ Tˆ CCCCC CCTˆ Tˆ Tˆ
(0.019) (0.016) (0.026) (0.006) (0.018) (0.017)
N 468 739 488 847 328 441
(0.259) (0.379) (0.315) (0.910) (0.252) (0.477)
Note: Five most frequent sequences of the form
{(
a1i , y
1
)
, . . . ,
(
a5i , y
5
)}
, where each cell indicates the
action sequence a1a2a3a4a5, where at represents yt =Success, at represents yt =Failure, and a˜t indicates
the relationship state became/was Inactive in period t. The number N5 indicates the total number of
subject-cycles for the five most popular sequences, while figures in parentheses indicate the fraction of the
total subject-cycles represented by the sequence/top-five sequences.
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Figure B3: Conditional response in last five cycles, ati
∣∣(at−1i , yt−1)
Note: For each treatment the horizontal axis indicate the proportion of active rounds t ≥ 2 in the last five
cycles given the relevant (at−1i , y
t−1) history. The vertical axis indicates the proportion of each of the three
possible actions: D in gray, C in white, and the Terminate action in black. The bar on the left of each plot
provides the proportion of actions chosen at the empty history (round 1)
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Figure B4: Screenshot of Experimental Interface
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Table C1: Distribution of Elicited Strategies (All cycles in Phase 2, %)
No. 1st A (S, C) A (S, D) A (F,C) A (F, D) AKA Freq. Dev.
1 D D D D D AD 16.2 –
2 D D D D C 1.9 10.0
3 D D D C D 0.8 25.0
4 D D D C C 2.6 7.1
5 D D C D D 1.1 66.7
6 D D C D C 1.7 55.6
7 D D C C D 2.8 33.3
8 D D C C C 1.1 16.7
9 D C D D D 0.6 66.7
10 D C D D C DWSLS 3.0 25.0
11 D C D C D 1.1 50.0
12 D C D C C 1.9 40.0
13 D C C D D 1.1 50.0
14 D C C D C 0.8 50.0
15 D C C C D 0.8 50.0
16 D C C C C 0.9 0.0
17 C D D D D 1.5 50.0
18 C D D D C 1.1 16.7
19 C D D C D 0.9 40.0
20 C D D C C 1.7 33.3
21 C D C D D 0.4 50.0
22 C D C D C 0.9 –
23 C D C C D 3.0 –
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24 C D C C C 0.9 20.0
25 C C D D D GRIM 4.9 7.7
26 C C D D C WSLS 5.5 3.4
27 C C D C D 2.3 –
28 C C D C C 3.4 5.6
29 C C C D D MONO 5.3 –
30 C C C D C T11 5.5 –
31 C C C C D 1.9 –
32 C C C C C AC 22.3 0.8
Note: AC’ (AD’) denotes that a strategy will behave as AC (AD) in every history it will reach if choices
are perfectly implemented. Subgame perfect strategies are denoted in bold. The letters in the strategy
names denote the recommended action after each possible contingency: initial round (Firsta); SC (a SC);
SD (a SD); FC (a FC); FD (a FD), where the first letter designates the outcome last round. Only strategies
with positive frequencies are included.
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Figure D1: Aggregate Evolution of Sender and Receiver’s Cooperation in Cheap-talk: All
Round
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Figure D2: Aggregate Evolution of Sender and Receiver’s Cooperation in Contract: All
Round
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APPENDIX E
STRATEGY FREQUENCY ESTIMATION-CHAPTER 2
Here we briefly describe the econometric model adopted in SFEM, discuss about the
set of strategies we include in the estimation and then reports the estimated frequency of
strategies for each of the treatments. To use SFEM, we assume that each subject chooses
a fixed strategy for the last six cycles (the supergames). These chosen strategies are
implemented with the possibility of independent mistakes, where another choice than the
intended action is made. In this section, we report the results from our SFEM estimations.
We first briefly describe the econometric model adopted and then report the estimated
strategy weights for each of the main treatments.
Denote the choice made by subject i in round t of cycle m by cimt. We specify a
priori a set of K possible public perfect strategies Φ = {φ1, . . . , φK}, where the choice
of the strategy φk prescribes the choice s
k
imt = φ
(
yjm1, ..., yjm(t−1)
)
following the public
history
(
yjm1,, . . . , yjm(t−1)
)
. Each subject is assumed to follow a particular strategy φk,
but they make independent mistakes each round with a probability (1 − β), and chose
the prescribed action with probability β. Given three actions (C, D and T ) a random
uniform choice is represented by β = 1/3 , while a perfect cycle with a strategy by β = 1.
The econometric model assumes a mixture model across the available strategies, so that
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strategy φk is selected with probability qk.
Define the indicator, Ikimt = 1{cimt = skimt}, which assigns a value of one if the observed
subject choice cycles the strategy choice σk cycle. The likelihood that the observed choices
for subject i were generated by the strategy φk are given by
Pr
i
(φk;β) :=
∏
m∈Mi
∏
t=1Tim
βI
k
imt (1− β)1−Ikimt ,
where Mi is the set of cycles, and Tim the set of active rounds. Combining across all
subjects in a treatment we obtain the following likelihood function:
∑
i∈I
ln
∑
φk∈Φ
qk Pr
i
(φk;β)

for the specified set of strategies Φ and summing the log-likelihoods across all subjects I
in the treatment.
In total we allow for 13 different receiver strategies, motivated by theory and the pre-
vious experimental literature.
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Table F1: Sample Characteristics
Variable Full Sample (N=575) Auction (N=313) Negotiation (N=262) p-value
Panel A. Firm Size Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Target ($ bil) 2.96 0.21 3.69 0.23 2.09 0.21 0.576
Bidder ($ bil) 21.82 2.46 21.12 2.56 22.67 2.37 0.818
Relative Size 33% 16% 31% 13% 36% 20% 0.818
Panel B. Deal Characteristics
Cash 36% 40% 32% 0.040
Tender 20% 13% 27% 0.000
Bidder 53% 43% 64% 0.000
Panel C. Firm Characteristics
Target M.V. ($ bil) 1.35 1.11 1.63 0.258
Bidder M.V. ($bil) 22.04 18.48 26.27 0.084
Return Std. 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.731
R&D Intensity 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.411
Intangible Assets 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.964
Debt Ratio 0.50 0.52 0.48 0.043
ROE 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.038
Liquidity -0.20 -0.21 -0.20 0.415
Book Leverage 0.49 0.51 0.46 0.022
Market-to-Book 2.82 2.74 2.91 0.536
Capital Expenditure 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.308
Uniqueness 0.39 0.41 0.36 0.113
Operating Cash Flow 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.215
Tobin’s Q 2.01 1.88 2.15 0.088
Sales Growth 0.22 0.17 0.27 0.020
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ROA 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.130
Beta 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.954
KZ Index 0.13 0.20 0.04 0.490
WW Index -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 0.417
SA Index -3.09 -3.10 -3.08 0.746
Panel D: Industry and Year Characteristics
Liquidity Shock Index 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.039
Economics Shock Index 0.35 0.30 0.41 0.000
Econ Shock 1:Profitability 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.925
Econ Shock 2: ROA 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.042
Econ Shock 3: Employee Growth 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.906
Econ Shock 4: Sales Growth 0.35 0.30 0.41 0.000
Econ Shock 5: R&D 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.241
Econ Shock 6: Capital Expenditure 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.000
Econ Shock 7: Asset Turnover 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.005
Herfindahl index 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.752
Deal Volume 44.31 40.83 48.47 0.000
Panel E: Wealth Measures
TCAR 0.262 0.259 0.265 0.808
BCAR -0.020 -0.019 -0.021 0.729
T$CAR 105.01 154.76 259.77 0.013
B$CAR -206.32 -74.79 -362.05 0.007
S$CAR -20.47 62.52 -118.74 0.073
SCAR 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.966
DELTACAR 0.044 0.043 0.045 0.713
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Table F2: Logistic Model Estimations of Sales Method Choice
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 0.435 0.306 -0.118 -0.143 0.064
(0.308) (0.356) (0.247) (0.247) (0.257)
Target Size -0.048 -0.063
(0.039) (0.047)
Leverage 0.458** 0.532** 0.410* 0.412* 0.341 0.135
(0.213) (0.242) (0.220) (0.220) (0.222) (0.088)
ROA -0.429 -0.437 -0.442 -0.365 -0.373 -0.148
(0.481) (0.604) (0.604) (0.607) (0.619) (0.245)
ROE -0.267* -0.304** -0.301** -0.303** -0.279* -0.111*
(0.142) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.153) (0.061)
Tobin’s Q -0.021 -0.034 -0.026 -0.027 -0.025 -0.010
(0.031) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.015)
Return Std. -4.705 -4.813 -3.259 -3.855 -3.073 -1.218
(3.499) (3.866) (3.468) (3.509) (3.545) (1.405)
R&D Intensity -0.273* -0.426** -0.399** -0.389** -0.383** -0.152**
(0.161) (0.172) (0.172) (0.173) (0.173) (0.069)
Beta 0.158 0.126 0.141 0.104 0.041
(0.114) (0.105) (0.106) (0.107) (0.043)
Liquidity 0.014 -0.133 -0.077 -0.207 -0.082
(0.377) (0.366) (0.366) (0.372) (0.147)
Market Share Growth -0.497*** -0.503*** -0.467*** -0.491*** -0.195***
(0.139) (0.138) (0.140) (0.141) (0.056)
Uniqueness 0.248 0.239 0.243 0.220 0.087
(0.180) (0.179) (0.180) (0.179) (0.071)
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Change in ROA 1.278* 1.274* 1.313* 1.301* 0.516*
(0.720) (0.719) (0.715) (0.720) (0.285)
Change in Sales Growth -0.050 -0.036 -0.034 -0.048 -0.019
(0.104) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.041)
Change in ROA Negative 0.235* 0.230* 0.237* 0.222* 0.088*
(0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.135) (0.054)
Change in Sales Growth -0.105 -0.104 -0.113 -0.121 -0.048
Positive (0.124) (0.124) (0.125) (0.125) (0.050)
Change in ROA Ö 0.817 0.781 0.728 0.696 0.276
Change Negative (1.014) (1.007) (1.008) (1.012) (0.401)
Change in Sales Growth 0.411** 0.387* 0.388* 0.459** 0.182*
Ö Change Positive (0.209) (0.208) (0.209) (0.211) (0.084)
High SA Index 0.158
(0.126)
High WW Index 0.220* 0.202* 0.081*
(0.127) (0.128) (0.050)
Economics Shock Index -0.503*** -0.199***
(0.155) (0.062)
Herfindahl Index -0.427 -0.169
(2.200) (0.872)
N 575 575 575 575 575
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.054 0.055 0.055 0.069
Model p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table F3: Tobit Estimation of Bidder Competition
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 3.848 4.004 8.682 9.676
(5.988) (5.977) (6.078) (6.422)
Financial Characteristics
Target Size -1.133 -0.840 -1.127 -1.132
(0.817) (0.732) (0.733) (0.734)
Leverage 3.392
(4.153)
ROA -14.004 -16.984* -16.081* -16.824*
(10.336) (9.685) (9.729) (9.862)
ROE -2.046 -1.811 -1.267 -1.369
(2.426) (2.417) (2.412) (2.425)
Sales Growth -3.718 -3.349 -0.834 -1.746
(5.749) (5.723) (5.785) (6.104)
Uncertainty
Return Std. -55.804 -50.874 -45.251 -44.301
(65.230) (64.862) (64.465) (64.554)
R&D Intensity -5.558* -5.746* -5.496* -5.556*
(2.981) (2.973) (2.950) (2.955)
Operating Performance
Beta 0.170 -0.269 -0.576 -0.647
(1.868) (1.787) (1.780) (1.788)
Liquidity 1.564 0.219 -1.407 -1.466
(6.273) (6.050) (6.063) (6.068)
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Market Share Growth -6.818 -7.099 -9.217* -9.017*
(4.821) (4.813) (4.869) (4.895)
Uniqueness 5.019* 4.581 4.499 4.447
(2.981) (2.930) (2.907) (2.910)
Change in ROA 8.390 8.870 8.173 8.863
(12.001) (11.973) (11.919) (12.021)
Change in -2.336 -2.145 -2.472 -2.452
Sales Growth (1.703) (1.685) (1.671) (1.675)
Change in 1.742 1.766 1.328 1.457
ROA Negative (2.279) (2.277) (2.268) (2.286)
Change in -1.301 -1.359 -1.562 -1.808
Sales Growth Positive (2.119) (2.116) (2.105) (2.167)
Change in ROA 36.660** 38.297** 36.653** 36.696**
ÖChange Negative (16.865) (16.728) (16.591) (16.591)
Change in Sales Growth 10.835*** 10.507*** 11.424*** 11.679***
Ö Change Positive (3.757) (3.723) (3.730) (3.775)
Financial Constraints
High KZ Index 3.376* 3.650* 3.421* 3.501*
(1.936) (1.905) (1.894) (1.903)
Industry Characteristics
Economics Shock Index -9.781*** -9.639***
(2.829) (2.846)
Herfindahl Index 0.667 -0.184
(36.719) (36.806)
Potential Competition -2.714
(5.639)
sigma 19.656*** 19.644*** 19.473*** 19.484***
(0.830) (0.829) (0.820) (0.821)
N 575 575 575 575
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.013 0.017 0.017
Model p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table F4: Logistic Estimations of Deal Initiation
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Intercept -1.109*** -1.159*** -1.182*** -1.377*** -1.270*** -0.637
(0.428) (0.396) (0.397) (0.386) (0.341) (0.439)
Financial Characteristics
Leverage 1.108*** 1.197*** 1.139*** 1.232*** 1.180*** 1.221*** 0.975***
(0.368) (0.360) (0.362) (0.359) (0.338) (0.335) (0.349)
ROA -0.189 0.478 0.346 0.390
(1.018) (0.876) (0.878) (0.879)
ROE 0.047 0.061 0.090 0.056
(0.230) (0.228) (0.229) (0.228)
Tobin’s Q -0.110 -0.111* -0.119* -0.120* -0.110* -0.105* -0.049
(0.068) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.063) (0.060) (0.064)
Uncertainty
Return Std. 7.549 7.570 9.321 8.192 7.081 6.867 8.271
(5.769) (5.748) (5.823) (5.783) (5.490) (5.418) (5.468)
R&D Intensity 0.229 0.287 0.291 0.287 0.202
(0.288) (0.283) (0.281) (0.281) (0.241)
Operating Performance
Beta -0.148 -0.129 -0.151 -0.113 -0.120
(0.175) (0.173) (0.174) (0.173) (0.172)
Liquidity 0.673 0.755 0.675 0.800 0.793 0.809 0.531
(0.600) (0.595) (0.597) (0.591) (0.587) (0.585) (0.597)
Market Share -0.379 -0.315 -1.189** -1.033** -1.031** -1.043** -1.074**
Growth (0.234) (0.221) (0.502) (0.489) (0.488) (0.487) (0.492)
145
Uniqueness 0.378 0.439 0.436 0.450 0.371 0.438* 0.589**
(0.292) (0.279) (0.280) (0.279) (0.247) (0.233) (0.245)
Sales Growth 1.155** 0.974* 0.984* 0.949* 0.980*
(0.574) (0.560) (0.558) (0.556) (0.559)
Change in ROA 0.574
(1.224)
Change in Sales -0.371** -0.361** -0.322* -0.308* -0.302* -0.324* -0.370**
Growth (0.179) (0.176) (0.176) (0.175) (0.174) (0.173) (0.179)
Change in ROA 0.219
Negative (0.226)
Change in Sales -0.311 -0.297 -0.309 -0.305 -0.293 -0.284 -0.260
Growth Positive (0.213) (0.209) (0.210) (0.209) (0.208) (0.207) (0.208)
Change in ROA * 1.558
Change Negative (1.721)
Change in Sales Growth 1.169*** 1.146*** 0.966*** 0.922** 0.883** 0.941*** 0.968***
Ö Change Positive (0.358) (0.357) (0.366) (0.365) (0.358) (0.355) (0.359)
Financial Constraints
High WW Index 0.336 0.347 0.351* 0.364* 0.349* 0.387* 0.312
(0.212) (0.211) (0.212) (0.211) (0.210) (0.199) (0.202)
Industry Characteristics
Economics Shock Index -0.470* -0.477* -0.560**
(0.278) (0.276) (0.279)
Industry Tobin’s Q -0.561**
(0.236)
N 575 575 575 575 575 575 575
Pseudo R2 0.067 0.063 0.068 0.063 0.062 0.059 0.059
Model p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table F5: Tobit Two-stage Analysis of Target Returns
(1) (2)
Variables 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Intercept 12.154*** -0.101 9.430 -0.371
(3.134) (0.079) (19.053) (0.270)
Competition* 0.448*** 0.436***
(0.133) (0.130)
Relative Size 0.147 -0.014** 0.392 -0.013**
(0.512) (0.006) (0.525) (0.006)
Cash 4.324** -0.002 4.443** 0.003
(2.082) (0.029) (2.130) (0.030)
Tender -7.554*** 0.159*** -8.566*** 0.154***
(2.536) (0.036) (2.648) (0.038)
Bidder Initiated -11.569*** 0.126*** -11.494*** 0.118***
(1.799) (0.039) (1.838) (0.038)
Return Std. 78.505* 0.955* 93.939* 1.208*
(45.030) (0.532) (50.745) (0.617)
Sales Growth -3.078* -3.045
(1.857) (1.905)
Deal Volume -0.230*** -0.250***
Sigma 18.812*** 18.151***
(0.786) (0.758)
N 575 575
Industry FE No No Yes Yes
Pseudo R2/Adj. R2 0.028 0.070 0.041 0.093
F-statistic 5.526 10.173
p-value 0.011 0.016
Sargan’s Chi-sq 0.058 0.015
p-value 0.811 0.904
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Table F6: Robustness Checks: Two-Stage Regression Analysis with Industry Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Intercept 1.505*** -0.103 1.534*** -0.023 1.493*** -0.087 1.447*** -0.093
(0.338) (0.096) (0.331) (0.077) (0.329) (0.077) (0.325) (0.080)
Auction* 0.386*** 0.277** 0.357*** 0.373***
(0.134) (0.110) (0.111) (0.117)
Relative Size -0.032 -0.010 -0.029 -0.011* -0.031 -0.010* -0.030 -0.010
(0.053) (0.006) (0.053) (0.006) (0.053) (0.006) (0.053) (0.006)
Cash 0.485** -0.005 0.482** 0.007 0.489** -0.003 0.494** -0.004
(0.219) (0.031) (0.220) (0.029) (0.220) (0.030) (0.220) (0.030)
Tender -0.982*** 0.180*** -0.964*** 0.153*** -0.978*** 0.173*** -0.981*** 0.176***
(0.249) (0.042) (0.249) (0.039) (0.249) (0.039) (0.250) (0.040)
Bidder-Initiated -0.766*** 0.088*** -0.753*** 0.068** -0.761*** 0.084*** -0.764*** 0.087***
(0.182) (0.032) (0.182) (0.030) (0.182) (0.030) (0.182) (0.030)
Return Std. 4.034 1.279** 3.790 1.384*** 3.892 1.292** 6.007 1.053*
(4.653) (0.533) (4.647) (0.534) (4.639) (0.532) (4.928) (0.567)
Sales Growth -0.336* -0.340* -0.339* -0.314*
(0.179) (0.179) (0.180) (0.179)
Deal Volume -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.022***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Economics Shock 0.126 0.012
Index (0.348) (0.036)
In-Wave Dummy 0.238 -0.050*
(0.234) (0.025)
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Herfindahl index -1.283 0.333
(3.510) (0.417)
Liquidity Index -1.631 0.174
(1.234) (0.154)
N 575 575 575 575
Industry FE No No No No No No No No
Pseudo R2/Adj R2 0.092 0.067 0.093 0.07 0.092 0.067 0.094 0.066
F-statistic 10.856 11.608 11.531 10.4
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan’s Chi-sq 0.000 0.138 0.007 0.019
p-value 0.999 0.810 0.933 0.890
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Table F7: Analysis of Other Wealth Measures
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Intercept -0.064 0.039 -1227.817*** 1457.545*** 540.107 0.073*** 0.013
(0.137) (0.025) (139.270) (412.198) (399.737) (0.023) (0.024)
Auction -0.000 -76.443** 261.152** 187.242* 0.003 0.003
(0.007) (36.888) (110.843) (107.492) (0.006) (0.006)
Auction* 0.278**
(0.122)
Target Size -0.005 173.660*** 0.004*
(0.009) (14.235) (0.002)
Bidder Size -0.006** -211.853*** -85.472** -0.007***
(0.002) (41.508) (40.253) (0.002)
Relative Size -0.009 -0.007** -0.330 -131.178*** -15.895 0.006** 0.011***
(0.009) (0.003) (13.741) (46.305) (44.905) (0.003) (0.002)
Cash -0.013 0.026*** 79.712* -7.865 53.243 0.018** -0.020***
(0.032) (0.008) (42.314) (127.430) (123.577) (0.007) (0.007)
Tender 0.144*** 0.009 -27.398 101.692 89.858 0.009 -0.006
(0.041) (0.009) (47.469) (142.651) (138.339) (0.008) (0.008)
Bidder Initiated 0.073** 0.002 31.199 79.988 125.526 0.005 0.005
(0.031) (0.007) (36.264) (109.078) (105.781) (0.006) (0.006)
Target Return Std. 1.819** 0.144 3292.788** 843.803 2072.171 0.077 -0.194
(0.868) (0.245) (1372.180) (4108.893) (3984.681) (0.233) (0.232)
Bidder Return Std. -0.234 -1.344*** 2530.464 -12582.179** -9866.994* -0.926*** 0.918***
(1.420) (0.357) (1994.197) (5987.943) (5806.927) (0.340) (0.337)
No. of SIC 0.047** 0.003 71.702** -45.164 -7.443 0.005 0.000
Target (0.020) (0.006) (31.061) (93.512) (90.685) (0.005) (0.005)
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No. of SIC 0.011 -0.003 96.028*** -1.238 96.523 0.004 0.006
Bidder (0.020) (0.006) (31.763) (95.607) (92.717) (0.005) (0.005)
Relative Market Share 0.006 0.002 -18.343 28.575 16.535 0.009*** 0.004
(0.011) (0.003) (18.207) (54.705) (53.051) (0.003) (0.003)
Hostile -0.044 0.007 26.214 202.620 342.705 0.020 0.008
(0.128) (0.037) (205.740) (617.758) (599.083) (0.035) (0.035)
Target Operating -0.073 0.032 -142.514 417.942 350.199 0.038 -0.033
Cash Flow (0.086) (0.025) (138.205) (415.213) (402.661) (0.024) (0.023)
Bidder Operating 0.309** -0.014 581.317*** -1739.453*** -1182.642** 0.016 0.040
Cash Flow (0.144) (0.034) (192.492) (578.492) (561.004) (0.033) (0.033)
Relative Tobin’s Q -0.027** -0.007** 17.168 -23.255 -0.840 0.006* 0.010***
(0.011) (0.003) (18.152) (54.529) (52.880) (0.003) (0.003)
N 547 546 547 546 546 546 546
adj. R-sq 0.08 0.11 0.33 0.06 0.00 0.10 0.20
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Table F8: Two-Stage Regression Analysis in Validation Sample
Variables 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Intercept -0.070 0.099***
(0.298) (0.031)
Auction* 0.291**
(0.119)
Relative Size -0.015 -0.017***
(0.049) (0.005)
Cash -0.115 0.070***
(0.206) (0.020)
Tender -0.442* 0.092***
(0.247) (0.026)
Bidder Initiated -0.712** 0.039
(0.335) (0.031)
Return Std. 2.194*** -0.043
(0.270) (0.066)
Sales Growth -0.234*
(0.134)
Deal Volume -0.027***
(0.006)
N 792
Industry FE No No
Pseudo R2/Adj. R2 0.034 0.012
F-statistic 11.23
p-value 0.002
Sargan’s Chi-sq 0.217
p-value 0.641
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APPENDIX G
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
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Table G1: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition Source Calculation
Sales Process
Auction The number of bidders contacted >1 SEC
Negotiation The number of bidders contacted =1 SEC
Target Target CEO approaches Bidder CEO
first
SEC
Bidder Bidder CEO approaches Target CEO
first
SEC
Both No clear indication who approaches first SEC
Contact The number of bidders contacted by the
target financial advisor
SEC
Confidential The number of bidders that signed the
confidentiality agreement
SEC
Interest The number of bidders that submitted
preliminary indications of interest
SEC
Length Days between the deal initiation and
date of deal announcement
SEC
Deal Characteristics
Cash dummy=1 if it is a pure cash deal SEC
Tender dummy=1 if it is a tender offer deal SEC
Stock dummy=1 if it is a pure stock deal SEC
Related dummy=1 if the two-digit SIC codes of
the target and bidder are the same
SEC
Bidder-initiated dummy=1 if it is a bidder-initiated deal SEC
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Target Characteristics
Return Std. the standard deviation of target stock
returns in the period -317 to -64 days
prior to the deal announcement
Eventus
R&D Intensity R&D expenses divided by sales COMPUSTAT xrd/sale
ROE ebit divided by common equity COMPUSTAT ebit/at
Liquidity total net liquid assets divided by book
value of assets
COMPUSTAT (ch+msa-lct)/at
PE Ratio common equity divided by net income COMPUSTAT csho*prcc f/ni
Leverage book value of debt divided by the book
value of assets
Market-to-Book market value of equity divided by book
value of equity
COMPUSTAT csho*prcc f/ceq
Capital
Expenditure
capital expenditure divided by book
value of assets
COMPUSTAT capx/at
SG & A selling and general administrative
expenses divided by sales
COMPUSTAT xsga/sale
Tobin’s Q market value of assets divided by the
book value of assets.
COMPUSTAT (lt+pstkl-txditc+csho*prcc f)/at *
Sales Growth percent growth of total sales over the
past year
COMPUSTAT [salet-salet-1]/salet-1
ROA 1 ebit divided by book value of total assets. COMPUSTAT ebit/at
Beta computed using target returns and
market model and daily returns
between(-316, -64) prior to the deal
announcement
Eventus
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Market Share Growth the percent growth in the market share
of the target firm. For a given year, the
market share of a company is the ratio of
its annual salesto the total sales of the
firms in its industry. Industries are
defined using FF48
COMPUSTAT
Change in ROA/Sales Growth change in ROA/Sales Growth over the
past year prior to the deal announcement
Change in ROA/Sales Growth
Negative/Positive
dummy=1 if Change in ROA/Sales
Growth is negative/positive
Change in ROA /Sales GrowthÖ
Change Negative/Positive
interactions between Change in ROA
/Sales Growth and their associated
dummies
KZ Index KZ-index=-1.001909Ö (Cash flow)
+3.139193Ö (Leverage)-39.36780Ö
(Dividend) -1.314759Ö (Cash
holdings).Calculations follow Baker et.al.
(2002). Note that flow and leverage
variablesare calculated differently from
that of the WW index.
COMPUSTAT
WW Index WW-index=-0.091*(Cash flow) -0.062Ö
(Dividend payer dummy) + 0.021Ö
(Leverage) -0.044Ölog (Book value of
Assets)+0.102Ö(Industry sales
growth)-0.035Ö(Firm sales growth).
Calculations follow Whited and Wu
(2006)
COMPUSTAT
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SA Index SA-index=-0.737Ö (Size) +0.043Ö
(Sizeˆ2)-0.04Ö (Age), where size is the
natural log of the inflation adjusted (to
2004 USD)book value of assets and age
is the number of years the firm has been
on Compustat with a non-missing stock
price. We winsorize size at 4.5 billion
USD and age at 37. Calculations follow
Hadlock and Pierce (2010).
COMPUSTAT
High SA Index dummy=1 if SA Index is higher than the
industry median
High WW Index dummy=1 if WW Index is higher than
the industry median
High KZ Index dummy=1 if KZ Index is higher than the
industry median
Industry and Year Characteristics
In-wave Dummy dummy=1 when the year of deal
announcement and the target industry
(defined by FF48) is during the identified
24-month industry merger waves
COMPUSTAT/SDC
Liquidity Shock
Index
the number of M&A transactions in the
target’s industry (defined by FF48
industrial classifications) divided bythe
total book value of assets over the year
prior to the transaction. Calculations
follow Schlingemann et.al. (2002)
COMPUSTAT/SDC
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Economics Shock Index following Harford (2005), we estimate,
for each industry (defined by FF48),the
median absolute change in the
Profitability, Asset Turnover, R&D,
Capital Expenditures, Employee Growth,
ROA and Sales Growth figures. The
economic shock index is the first
principal component of these seven
variables. The calculation of the
variables is explained below.
COMPUSTAT
Econ Shock 1:Profitability the median absolute change in net
income./sales for target industry
COMPUSTAT ni/sale
Econ Shock 2: ROA the median absolute change in ROA for
target industry
COMPUSTAT ebit/at
Econ Shock 3: Employee Growth the median absolute change in employee
growth for target industry
COMPUSTAT [empt-empt-1]/empt-1
Econ Shock 4: Sales Growth the median absolute change in sales
growth for target industry
COMPUSTAT [salet-salet-1]/salet-1
Econ Shock 5: R&D the median absolute change in R&D for
target industry
COMPUSTAT
Econ Shock 6: Capital
Expenditure
the median absolute change in capital
expenditure for target industry
COMPUSTAT capx/at
Econ Shock 7: Asset Turnover the median absolute change in sale/at for
target industry
COMPUSTAT sale/at
Herfindahl index the sum of squares of market share of
each firm in the target industry
COMPUSTAT
Deal Volume the number of deals per year SDC
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APPENDIX H
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
H.1 TWO-STAGE REGRESSION ANALYSES
To motivate our two-stage model, consider the abstraction of the ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression model1:
y = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + ...+ βKxK + µ,
where E(µ) = 0, Cov(xj, µ) = 0,j = 1, 2, ...,K − 1, and y is the target announcement
return, CAR, x1 to xK−1 are the exogenous control variables, xK is the auction indicator
variable (Auction) and µ is the residual. Auction is the endogenous explanatory variable
that is correlated with µ. To conduct the two-stage least square analysis, we need instru-
ment(s) that satisfy the relevance and exclusion conditions. Following Roberts and Whited
(2012), with one instrument, Z1, we need:
1a) Instrument relevance in the reduced form equation: xK = δ0 + δ1x1 + δ2x2 + ... +
δK−1xK−1 + θ1Z1 + rK , θ1 6= 0.
2a) Instrument exclusion: Cov(Z1, µ) = 0
1Here we provide a summary of econometrics of instrumental variables from Wooldridge (2010) and
Roberts and Whited (2012).
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Note that the instrument relevance condition means that Z1 is partially correlated
with µ once the other exogenous variables have been netted out. We should also point
out that while instrument relevance is testable with a simple t-test of θ1 in the reduced
form equation, instrument exclusion is not testable because it involves the unobservable
µ. However, having more than one instrument enables us to test whether the additional
instruments are valid in the sense that they are uncorrelated with µ.
Suppose we have two instruments Z1 and Z2 for xK . We can now restate the above
two conditions:
1b) Instrument relevance: in the reduced form equation: xK = δ0 + δ1x1 + δ2x2 + ...+
δK−1xK−1 + θ1Z1 + θ2Z2 + rK , θ1 6= 0., θ1 6= 0&θ2 6= 0.
2b) Instrument exclusion: Cov(Z1, µ) = 0&Cov(Z2, µ) = 0.
In this case instrument relevance can be tested directly using a joint F-test on θ1 and θ2.
Instrument exclusion can be tested using Sargan’s test of the over-identifying restrictions2.
H.2 OUT-OF-SAMPLE ESTIMATION
The purpose of the out-of-sample estimation is to assess how the results of a statistical
analysis will generalize to an independent data set. Out-of-sample validation addresses
the questions of how models predict data, which is a different question from how models
describe the data. It starts with splitting the sample into an estimation sample, where
models are constructed to estimate the outcomes and a (usually smaller) validation sample,
where estimated models are used to predict the outcome. A comparison between actual
outcomes and predicted outcomes yields the forecasting power of estimated models.
2We recognize the shortcomings of using a test for over-identification as explained in Roberts and Whited
(2012). For example, the test implicitly assumes that at least one of the instruments is valid, but does not
specify which one and there may be a lack of power resulting from model misspecification.
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The inputs to the two-stage regression models are the bidder-initiated and auction
dummy variables. Therefore, we start by identifying variables that are similar between
the estimation and validation samples3. While we do not tabulate this, we find that deal
characteristics do not differ between two samples, but some target characteristics, such as
Leverage, Liquidity, Change in ROA, Economics Shock Index do. However, because some
variables, such as Leverage are important variables for our estimation of the sales method,
we relax our requirement that explanatory variables should not significantly differ between
two samples4. Specifically, while we allow variables to differ significantly, we restrict the
effect of the difference on the sales method/deal initiation likelihoods to be smaller than
1%5. Such effect is calculated as the marginal effect of the variable in the logit model
of sales method/deal initiation times the difference of mean of that variable between two
samples. In summary, we look for a model that explains sales method/deal initiation
consistently with models in Section 5 and minimizes the bias between the two samples.
We select ROE, R&D Intensity, Market Share Growth, SG&A, Beta, High WW Index
and KZ index based on significant differences in their means. Another consideration is that
variables need to deliver similar qualitative predictions to those in Section 5. Therefore, we
also include Leverage, Tobin’s Q, Change in Sales Growth, its associated dummy and the
interaction variable between the two. While the medians are significantly different between
the two samples for these variables, the effects of the differences of these variables on the
sales method/deal initiation likelihood are below 1%. After estimating sales method and
3We note that the validity of our approach depends on the assumption that the relations described by
the models on deal initiation and sales method in the estimation sample are the same in our validation
sample. A potential bias would also occur if there are significant differences in the explanatory variables
used to samples to estimate and predict.
4We believe these differences do not question the randomness of our sample, but is caused by our small
estimation sample (n=575). In our subsequent analysis we show that these differences do not affect our
main result on the auction’s wealth effects
5To measure the effects of difference on the likelihoods, we first estimate the marginal effect of a variable
in the logistic models. The effect of the difference is then calculated as the difference of the variable between
the two samples times the marginal effect of that variable. Even with our variable selection, any remaining
differences can bias the quantitative predictions, such as derived predicted probabilities in the validation
sample. The larger the estimation sample, the smaller this bias will be.
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deal initiation party, we generate predicted probabilities associated with sales method and
deal initiation and determine the optimal cutoffs. The optimal cutoff allocation rule uses
standard statistical measures of the performance of a binary classification test: sensitivity
and specificity. Sensitivity is the true positive rate, defined as the number of actual auctions
(bidder-initiated deals) correctly classified as negotiations (bidder-initiated deals) / the
number of predicted auctions (bidder-initiated deals). Specificity is the true negative rate,
defined as the number of actual negotiations (non-bidder-initiated deals) correctly classified
as negotiations (non-bidder-initiated deals) / the number of predicted negotiations (non-
bidder-initiated deals). Given every possible cutoff between 0 and 1, we calculate sensitivity
and specificity and plot them on Figure 2 and 3. The optimal cutoff is where the absolute
difference between sensitivity and specificity, i.e., the error, is minimized. The optimal
cutoff for auctions and bidder initiation are 0.55 and 0.53, respectively, indicated by the
vertical line in Figures 2 and 3.
Using the optimal cutoffs, we classify auctions and bidder-initiated deals in our vali-
dation sample. Finally, we predict 30.3% auction and 12.7% bidder-initiated deals. The
proportion of auctions is closer to that in the estimation sample but that of bidder-initiated
deals appears to be low6. We then estimate our base two-stage model in the validation
sample using the classified sales method and deal initiation party.
6Such a bias comes from the intrinsic small sample bias of the estimation sample, rather than from the
methodology
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